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ABSTRACT 
The anaclitic relationship between psyche and soma is a basic premise of psychoanalytic 
thought, and is richly woven into classic and contemporary literature in this field. Yet 
there is limited work drawing together these disparate references, or focussing directly on 
the role of the body as anaclitic basis for the mind, particularly in relation to the 
reciprocal conditions of containment and traumatisation. This qualitative case study aims 
to explore the usefulness of this particular body of psychoanalytic theory in making 
meaning of a two-year therapy process with a child who had been multiply maltreated. 
Clinical case material from this psychoanalytically-oriented therapy was analysed 
through the lens of the psychoanalytic literature reviewed. This analysis revealed four 
themes, which reflect the interplay between physical and psychic skins in the child's 
relationship to the maternal object (Theme 1) and in his sense of self (Theme 2), and the 
interaction between bodily and emotional digestion in his intake of goodness (Theme 3) 
and expulsion of badness (Theme 4). These fmdings point to the utility and robustness of 
this particular theoretical framework in understanding and integrating a large corpus of 
previously bewildering and disjointed case material with a multiply traumatised child. 
Implications for theory and for practice are indicated. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This study grew out of the very rich, at times overwhelming, and ultimately deeply 
privileged experience of a two-year therapy process with a seven year old boy who had 
been subjected to multiple traumas. These traumas included inadequate early maternal 
containment, material deprivation and emotional neglect, and chronic physical, 
psychological and sexual abuse. The concept of 'child maltreatment' encompasses all 
these acts of omission and commission, and is therefore useful in contextualising this 
study. In this introductory chapter, I briefly discuss the issue of child maltreatment in 
South Africa, and then outline my motivation for undertaking the current study, the aims 
of this research, and the structure of this dissertation. 
1.1 Chlld maltreatment in South Africa 
'Child maltreatment' is a general term denoting all forms of child abuse and neglect 
perpetrated by someone close to the child, including physical, sexual and emotional 
harm, and the failure to provide for a child's basic material, mental or emotional needs 
(http://www.yesican.orgldefmed.html;Kaplan&Saddock.1998).Child maltreatment is 
associated with a wide range of psychological sequelae and psychiatric symptoms 
(Kaplan & Saddock, 1998). In 1990, the United States Advisory Board on Child Abuse 
and Neglect declared child abuse and neglect to be a national emergency (Dawes, 2002). 
Prevalence rates in South Africa are unclear and controversial, because of differing 
defmitions of maltreatment and inaccurate record-keeping, as well as under-reporting. 
Despite this, there is consensus amongst experts in this field that here too, ''we in this 
country have an emergency on our hands" (Dawes, 2002, p.2, emphasis in original). A 
recent study points in particular to the pervasiveness of child maltreatment in the Western 
Cape, and calls for urgent responses (Dawes, 2006). In their review of a decade of 
literature in the journal Child Abuse and Neglect, Lachman & Poblete (2002) found that, 
while research on child maltreatment in Africa as a whole has increased over this period, 
this has been predominantly epidemiological in nature, focussing on documenting the 
prevalence and incidence of different forms of abuse. Thus there is little documented 
knowledge about the psychological impact of child maltreatment in the South African 
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context, or about psychotherapeutic interventions with children who have been multiply 
maltreated. 
1.2 Impetus for the current study 
This study is rooted in the richness of the therapy process with a young client I shall refer 
to as Chad 1. Digestion, both physical and psychic, was a central theme and process 
during this two-year psychoanalytically-oriented therapy, and after therapy terminated I 
felt that there was still so much to metabolise. Particularly as the dynamics of the trauma 
to which Chad had been subjected were re-constellated in the therapy, I felt that lowed it 
to Chad and to myself as a trainee therapist, to continue reflecting on and processing, 
integrating and containing, this material after termination. I was particularly moved, as 
well as mystified, by the importance of physical· phenomena, including my own and 
Chad's bodies, in the therapy process. The driving motivation of this dissertation is 
therefore to explore the relationship between material and psychic, body and mind, under 
conditions of containment and traumatisation. These conditions are understood to be 
reciprocally related: psychological trauma being defmed as a rupture to containment, and 
containment being recognised as the process through which this rupture can repair. 
The 'digestive' work of this thesis has included immersing myself in psychoanalytic 
literature on the role of the body in relation to trauma and containment, synthesising this 
into a historic review to be used as a lens through which to read the case material. In this 
process the theory has functioned as a container which has enabled me to think about and 
make meaning of the clinical material, which often felt chaotic, fragmented and cryptic 
during the therapy process. While I understand that this state of 'not-knowing' was 
central to Chad's experience, and therefore important for me to be in and bear, it feels 
equally important, even in retrospect, to metabolise and make meaning of this. Alongside 
this personal motivation, the recognition that child maltreatment constitutes a crisis in 
1 The name of the participant and his family members have been changed in order to protect confidentiality. 
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this country and globally, provided strong impetus for closer examination of this 
particular case. 
1.3 Research aims 
In this study, I hope to develop a clinically and theoretically useful understanding of the 
relationship between physical and psychic phenomena, and particularly of the 
relationship between therapist and client's bodies and minds, in a therapeutic process 
with a child trauma survivor. In analysing the case material through the lens of 
psychoanalytic literature on the role of the body in containment and trauma, I seek to gain 
insight into shifts from physical to psychic processes in the light of the layered 
implications of inadequate early maternal containment and chronic traumatisation. More 
specifically, I seek to understand how Chad's relationship to the maternal object plays out 
in relation to my body in the therapy space, and how his sense of self manifests in 
relation to his own body. Of focus will be the dual processes of intake of goodness and 
elimination of badness, and shifts between concrete and psychic means of doing so, 
through incorporation and expulsion, introjection and projection. 
My aim in so doing is to draw together and integrate the disparate psychoanalytic 
literature in which concepts of the body converge with those of trauma and containment, 
in order to create a coherent theoretical frame through which to analyse the case material. 
This attempt to fill a gap identified in the existing literature will be done in three ways: in 
Chapter 2, I provide a historical review of different theorists in whose work these key 
concepts converge; secondly, I apply an integrated understanding of these to the analysis 
of case material in Chapter 3, using the theory as a cohered lens through which to 'read' 
the data; thirdly, in Chapter 5 I make explicit links between the case analysis and the 
reviewed psychoanalytic literature, examining the 'goodness of fit' between these and 
identifying points of convergence and divergence. 
3 
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1.4 Dissertation structure 
This dissertation is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides a historic review of psychoanalytic literature on the role of the body 
in trauma and containment by tracing the overlaps between these concepts in the work of 
key theorists. Of focus are the dual relationships between psyche and soma, and between 
mother and child, and the processes of mergence, separation and reconnection between 
these two sets of entities, under conditions of containment and traumatisation. The motif 
of the skin on the one hand, and metabolisation on the other, are discussed in relation to 
the bodily and psychic processes of incorporation/introjection and expulsion/projection. 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology of this psychoanalytic case study, situating this 
design in relation to qualitative clinical research. The context of the study, details of the 
child participant, and the nature of the therapeutic intervention are outlined, and the 
method of data collection and analysis described. Ethical considerations are also 
addressed here. 
Chapter 4 comprises an analysis of the case material through the lens of the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 2. After outlining the case history, four inter-related themes in the 
case material are identified and explored: Chad's relationship to the maternal object; his 
attempts at incorporation and introjection of goodness; Chad's sense of himself; and his 
evacuation and projection of badness. These themes are discussed in relation to the 
layered implications of inadequate early material containment, and of the chronic 
subsequent trauma to which Chad was subjected. 
Chapter 5 summarises the fmdings of this study through a discussion of the usefulness of 
the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 in making meaning of the case material analysed in 
Chapter 3. Various limitations of this study are then outlined, and fmally 
recommendations are made for future research and clinical practice. 
4 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE ROLE OF THE BODY IN 
PSYCHOANALYTIC UNDERSTANDINGS OF 
TRAUMA AND CONTAINMENT 
Trauma is a kind of wound. When we call an event traumatic, we are borrowing the word 
from the Greek where it refers to a piercing of the skin, a breaking of the bodily 
envelope. In physical medicine it denotes damage to tissue. Freud (1920) used the word 
metaphorically to emphasise how the mind too can be pierced and wounded by events, 
giving graphic force to his description of the way in which the mind can be thought of as 
being enveloped by a kind of skin, or protective shield (Garland, 1999a, p.9). 
This chapter provides an historical review of the role of the body in psychoanalytic 
conceptions of trauma and containment, tracking key theorists in whose work these 
concepts converge. As the excerpt above suggests, these themes are entwined: the 
workings of the mind mirror those of the body, both of which are implicated in trauma, 
which is itself a rupturing of containment. Of focus are the changing relationships 
between psyche and soma, and simultaneously between mother and child, in early 
development. Both sets of relationships will be explored through the psychoanalytic 
concept of anaclisis, and discussed through the stages of initial mergence, gradual 
differentiation, and on-going connection. It is through containment, initially maternal and 
then internal, that this mysterious, almost alchemical transmutation from physical to 
psychical, and from absolute dependence to selfhood, will be shown to take place. 
Disruption to containment, which constitutes trauma, will be shown to result in a reversal 
back into the initial state of indistinction between body and mind, self and other, so that 
symbolic thought becomes concretised. 
Two central motifs weave through all these themes and across the different theorists 
discussed: the physical and psychical role of the skin on the one hand, and of 
metabolisation on the other, during the early oral stage of development. In particular, this 
review will explore the role of the mother's body and mind in functioning as a skin for 
her child, in digesting for her child, before these capacities are internalised, and the 
5 
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implications if this does not go well. These motifs will be discussed in relation to the 
psychological processes of internalisation and projection, based on corporeal 
incorporation and expulsion, and their role in constituting the boundaries of the self, 
enabling separation and communication with mlother, and thus in the evolution of inner 
psychic reality. In addition to the consequences when this process is disrupted through 
trauma, I explore 'benign' disruptions in the form of manageable frustration which gives 
rise to symbolic thought, and through which physical and psychical are differentiated, 
and in the form of abjection, or that which is inassimilable, where states of mergence and 
separation between mother and child are held in tension. 
2.1 Definitions of trauma 
In discussing the theme of psychological trauma, I accept the contemporary 
psychoanalytical defInition of this as the internal implications of external events that 
overwhelm the psyche by breaking through its protective barrier and thus disenabling 
processes of assimilation (Garland, 1999). Historical changes in psychoanalytic 
understandings of trauma are discussed in relation to particular theorists, but space 
constraints preclude a dedicated discussion of contemporary psychoanalytic trauma 
theory - instead, implications for this are mentioned in relation to relevant theorists. 
While the central psychoanalytic debate regarding the relative weight of the internal or 
external worlds, of fantasy or reality, in determining traumatisation is implicit in much of 
what will be discussed, this is also not of focus here. 
For the sake of clarify, I distinguish in the discussion that follows between what I 
(somewhat unsatisfactorily) term 'developmental' and 'external' trauma2• The fIrst, 
which psychoanalysis has historically emphasised, relates to incremental disruption 
within the primary caregiving relationship, usually involving separation and loss. This 
may be caused by factors stemming from mother and/or child, which range from overt 
events such as maternal illness or absence, to more subtle complications such as the 
2 While this distinction is central to the historical development of psychoanalytic thinking on trauma, I have 
found no clear terminology or definitions by which it has been clarified. 
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infant's envy, or a failure to bond (Temple, 1999). The second form of trauma, which is 
the focus of contemporary psychoanalytic theory as well as psychiatric approaches to 
trauma, relates to (the internal consequences of) extreme, concrete, external events. These 
may range from a single devastating event to chronic situations of prolonged physical, 
sexual or psychological abuse, or neglect and deprivation (Herman, 1997). The case to be 
analysed in this research study involves both 'developmental' and 'external' trauma. 
2.2 Defining the boundaries of the review 
In focusing on the relationship between psyche and soma, this review is situated within 
the historical philosophical 'body-mind' debate, which remains a central question across 
the social- and neuro-sciences. The legacy of Cartesian dualism meant that body and 
mind were split in modern Western thought, a divide which post-modernism has sought 
to problematise and bridge (Grosz, 1994). While it forms the backdrop to this chapter, the 
direct exploration of this debate is outside its bounds, which are restricted to 
psychoanalytic literature. This means omitting beyond brief mention literature from the 
contemporary cross-disciplinary body theory field that situates psychoanalytic thought 
within the body-mind debate (see Grosz, 1994). A major figure in this field, feminist 
writer Elizabeth Grosz (ibid, p.27-8), understands that the contribution of psychoanalysis 
to this debate lies in its ''radical presumption of a correspondence or correlation between 
the forms of the body and the forms of mind", which challenges and subverts the 
Cartesian divide. 
In so doing, psychoanalysis recognises what Grosz (ibid., p.27) calls "a two-way 
determination or overdetermination, a clear interaction of the biological and 
psychological". This two-way interaction involves the role of the body in generating the 
psyche, and the role of the psyche in shaping the body. Although in some ways an 
artificial distinction, I limit this discussion to the first half of this interaction: the 
evolution of the psyche (and its defences) from out of the soma, rather than the effects of 
the mind on the body. This means omitting the substantial field of psychosomatic 
symptomatology (although a few exceptions are made when directly applicable to the 
case material), as well as the field of body work (which has particular application with 
trauma survivors). Despite the fact that the corporeal basis of psychical functioning is a 
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basic premise of psychoanalysis, there is a dearth of literature within this field that 
elaborates on this premise and so explicitly explores this 'loop' of the body-mind 
relationship. In addition to the few theorists who do address this theme directly, I 
therefore examine its implicit presence in the work of key psychoanalytic theorists. In so 
doing, I follow a conceptual trajectory from Freud to Klein; post-Kleinians Bion, Segal, 
Bick and Anzieu; Winnicott and finally Kristeva. 
2.3 Freud 
Psychoanalysis is premised on a particular understanding of the relationship between 
body and mind; this school of thought grew out the study of psychological trauma. These 
two fundamental themes, of the body-mind relationship and of psychological trauma, will 
now be traced in Freud's thinking3, with emphasis on places of overlap, which is where 
the third theme of containment emerges. The concept of anaclisis, identified as central to 
this thesis, is explored in relation to the organic and psychic components of (oral) 
instinct; the growth of emotional love from its basis in bodily nourishment; the 
development of psychological internalisation and projection from the corporeal model of 
incorporation and expulsion; and the evolution of the psychical ego from out of the 
bodily ego. The relationship between physical and psychical is then tracked through 
Freud's three fonnulations of psychological trauma. 
Freud is acknowledged as on  of the great twentieth century thinkers to challenge and 
subvert Cartesian dualism through his fonnulation of a complex and irreducible 
interrelationship between body and mind (Grosz, 1994). While there is a tension in his 
work between neurological and psychological paradigms, Freud always sought to 
integrate the two (Anzieu, 1989). He famously proposed that ''the ego is first and 
foremost a bodily ego" (Freud, 1923/1995, p.636), founded upon "a person's own body, 
and above all its surface" (ibid.). Freud never elaborated on this significant and highly 
condensed statement, and although it is often quoted in secondary sources outside of 
3 While this discussion moves between different stages of Freud's thinking without making this explicit, I 
acknowledge that his theorising is not unified (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). 
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psychoanalysis, the implications of this assertion have not been explored within this field 
- with the notable exception of Didier Anzieu (Grosz, 1994). According to Anzieu (1989, 
p. 84, emphasis added), this statement assumes what he identifies as "one of the 
fundamental tenets of psychoanalysis, which states that every psychical phenomenon 
develops in constant reference to bodily experience". This relationship between physical 
and psychical takes a particular form, captured in the psychoanalytic concept of 
'anaclisis' which stems from the Greek word meaning "to rest upon, to lean on" 
(Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p.29). 
Freud first used the idea of anaclisis to explain the relationship between physical and 
psychical process in the development of instincts, which he understood to exist "on the 
frontier between the mental and the physical" (Freud, 1905/1995, p.256). What he termed 
the 'source' of the instinct is somatic (in the prototypical case of hunger, this would be 
the bodily need for nourishment), but the 'aim' (to eat and so satisfy the hunger) and 
'object' (in this case, food) of the instinct transports it into the psychical realm. This 
object to which the instinct attaches itself is understood as a precursor to internal object 
relations, which emerge out of the fulfillment of the oral instinct (Greenberg & Mitchell, 
1983). This means that instincts "are not only the mechanisms of the mind, they are also 
its contents" (ibid., p.23, emphasis in original). Instincts therefore undergo ''vicissitudes'' 
(Freud, 1915/1995, p.568) from physical to psychic, in which the relationship between 
these is 
... neither parallelistic nor causal; rather, it is understood by analogy with the relationship 
between a delegate and his mandator (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p.364). 
This analogy illustrates the nature of the anaclitic relationship: the delegate carries out the 
instructions of the mandator, but in so doing modifies these such that they both stem from 
and depart from the initial directions. 
An equivalent relationship is understood to exist in the evolution of emotional love from 
its basis in bodily nourishment during the oral stage. This occurs through the gradual 
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differentiation of sexual instincts from ego instincts4• As Freud (1905/1995, p.263) 
explains in relation to oral activity during breast-feeding, initially "sexual activity 
attaches itself to functions serving the pwpose of self-preservation". Gradually, the erotic 
pleasure becomes distinct from the pleasure derived from the satisfaction of hunger, and 
becomes associated instead with emotional love which is independent of the bodily need 
for nourishment. The departure of the drive from the instinct on which it is based occurs 
(like the instinct from its somatic source) through the nature of its object, which is now in 
the realm of fantasy: love as opposed to food (Grosz, 1994). Freud termed this psychical 
side of the sexual instinct 'libido', which "stands in the same relation to love as hunger 
does to the nutritional instinct" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p.240). He identified 
specific developmental stages characterised by particular forms of libidinal energy, and 
dominated by different erotogenic zones (including oral, anal, phallic and genital stages). 
At each stage, specific modes of object relating emerge out of the particular 
developmental activity and the associated forms of pleasure experienced. For example, 
during the oral stage: 
The activity of nutrition is the source of the particular meanings through which the 
object-relationship is expressed and organised; the love-relationship to the mother, for 
example, is marked by the meanings of eating and being eaten ... Furthermore, the 
experience of satisfaction ... is an oral experience; one may therefore advance the 
hypothesis that desire and satisfaction are forever marked by this first experience (ibid., 
p.287-8, emphasis in original). 
Thus, just as the sexual pleasure here located in the mouth and lips develops through an 
anaclitic relationship to feeding, so the particular relational model emerges out of the 
satisfaction of the instinctual aim. 'Incorporation' is both the instinctual aim and the 
relational mode during the oral stage, and involves the phantasy of taking an external 
object inside the body, of retaining it there, and of adopting its qualities (ibid.). This is 
4 This terminology follows Laplanche & Pontalis's (1973) distinction, in keeping with Freud's. Grosz 
(1994) explores the same relationship with reference to drives and instincts. I understand the latter to be a 
generalisation of the former, and use the two sets of relationships interchangeably in this discussion. 
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associated with pleasure to the self, as well as destruction of the penetrating object. While 
incorporation is modeled on the oral ingestion of food, it may be transferred to other 
functions such as hearing, touch or sight, seen for example in the phantasy of "'devouring 
with the eyes'" (ibid., p.237). Incorporation provides the "corporeal model" (ibid., p.211) 
for the psychical process of introjection, which similarly involves the phantasy of 
transposing objects, along with their intrinsic qualities, from outside to inside, but is now 
independent of ''the body's real boundaries" (ibid., p.229). 
Projection is the complementary psychical process to introjection, and is based on the 
bodily experience of expulsion. In this primitive defense against unpleasureable internal 
excitations, objects or desires which ''the self refuses to recognise or rejects" (Laplanche 
& Pontalis, 1973, p.349) are 'put into' another person or object, and so treated as 
external. While experiences of expulsion occur in the oral stage of development, it is 
during the second, anal, stage that evacuation, alongside retention, becomes the focal 
process. During this stage (occurring around two to four years of age), object relating is 
shaped by meanings associated with the functions of defecation. On the one hand, 
evacuation provides a model for destruction of the object; on the other hand, retention is 
associated with possessive control. Observing that the activity of defecation gives rise to 
''the symbolic meanings of giving and withholding" (ibid., 1973, p.36), Freud came to see 
faeces as the child's first gift. 
The psychological processes of introjection and projection are therefore anaclitically 
based on corporeal incorporation and expulsion. Freud (cited in Laplanche & Pontalis, 
1973, p.230) illustrates this relationship in relation to orality: 
"I should like to eat this', or 'I should like to spit it out' ... [becomes] more generally: 'I 
should like to take this into myself and to keep that out"'. 
11 
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It is throughs these dual sets of processes that inside and outside become distinguished, 
and through their generalisation from bodily to psychological that this separation comes 
to include that of subject and object, ego and other. In relation to the first set of 
processes: 
In psychoanalysis the bounds of the body provide the model of all separations between an 
inside and an outside. Incorporation involves this bodily frontier literally. Introjection has 
a broader meaning in that it is no longer a matter only of the interior of the body but also 
that of the psychical apparatus, of a psychical agency, etc (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, 
p.230). 
Freud understood the passage from one libidinal stage to another to occur through a 
'''translation' that may be more or less successful" (ibid, p.237). When successful, the 
child is able gradually to develop from dependence to autonomy by renouncing the 
particular ties associated with each stage (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). When 
unsuccessful, 'fixation' occurs at a particular stage, and functioning continues 
unchangingly to be determined by the forms of satisfaction and object relating specific to 
that stage (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973). Fixation is therefore the aetiological root of 
mental illness and the point to which regression recurs. Freud understood fixation to 
result from constitutional and/or environmental factors, the latter including both 
'developmental' and 'external' trauma. When specific developmental tasks have not been 
successfully negotiated, the ability of the psyche to manage subsequent traumas is 
impaired. For example, in the case of mourning, when the distinction between inside and 
outside has not been adequately established through the processes discussed above, the 
lost object cannot be internalised. Instead, Freud understood that "the shadow of the 
object fell upon the ego" (cited in Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p.71), which Ulnik 
(2008, p.37) translates into "'the shadow of the object surrounding the ego"'. Although in 
a pathological form, this suggests the idea of containment (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). 
S Whether these processes are dependent upon, or actually usher in the differentiation between internal and 
external is subject to debate. 
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In his structural model ofid, ego and superego, Freud (1920/1995, p.606) understood the 
ego to be situated "on the borderline between outside and inside" such that it is both 
''turned towards the external world and must envelop the other psychical systems". He 
saw that this reflected the physical functions of the skin6, which he therefore understood 
to be the anaclitic root of the psychic functions of the ego: 
the ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from 
the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of 
the body (ibid., p. 637). 
The psyche is therefore understood to both arise and depart from the physical body; it is 
neither reducible to, nor completely divisible from, its somatic source. Rather, the ego 
emerges through transfonnation of matter into mind: "an actual psychical operation 
consisting in the 'projection' of the organism into the psyche" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 
1973, p.141). Freud did not resolve the question of how this transmutation takes place, 
tenning it ''the mysterious leap" (cited in Grosz, 1994, p.51) from soma to psyche. It has 
been left to later theorists to contextualise his thinking in relation to the philosophical 
body/mind debate, which is beyond the scope of this discussion [See Grosz (1994) and 
Hinshelwood (1989)]. In thus picturing the ego as an envelope, Freud ushered in a new 
era in psychoanalysis, and one considered essential for its later development: While 
previously psychoanalysis had focussed on the (unconscious and conscious) contents of 
the psyche, the containing function of the psyche itself now assumed centrality (Houzel, 
1990). As such, the ego as 'limiting membrane' is understood to protect the psyche from 
both external and internal excitations. Those that break through this shield Freud defined 
as traumatic. It is to Freud's three theories of psychological trauma that this discussion 
now turns. 
6 It was left to later theorists to develop this link, principally involving distinction and integration (see 
Anzieu and Winnicott below). 
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Freud's fIrst theory of psychological trauma, known as the 'seduction' theory, grew out 
of his early work on hysteria. Hysteria was a widespread public health problem in 
nineteenth century Europe in which women presented with a range of physical symptoms 
for which no organic causes could be found. These symptoms (such as paralysis of limbs, 
loss of perceptual functioning and intestinal disturbances) mystifIed medical experts, and 
were frequently disbelieved (Likierman & Urban, 1999). The celebrated neurologist, 
Charcot, was the fIrst to systematically study hysteria, which he came to understand as a 
neurological disorder with a psychogenic aetiology. His followers, Freud and Breuer, 
expanded on this understanding in their important work, 'Studies on Hysteria' 
(1896/1995), where they outlined their fIndings that hysteria is rooted in psychological 
trauma. This they defIned as ''the overwhelming of the ego ... " (Freud & Breuer, 
1896/1995, p. 96) by "external events". 
Through a process of historically tracing back their patient's symptoms, Freud and 
Breuer found that these 'external events' all related to early sexual abuse, which they 
concluded to be ''the aetiological precondition for hysterical symptoms" (ibid., p.100). 
These symptoms were therefore seen as somatic symbols of the sexual trauma which 
remained repressed as a 'foreign body' within the psyche. Psychic conflict was therefore 
understood to be both expressed and repressed through the body, making hysteria a 
condition which ''travers[es] the body/mind split" (Grosz, 1994, p.38). Right at its 
inception, therefore, the study of psychological trauma was intertwined with the question 
of the relationship between body and mind7• The 'talking cure' of psychoanalysis arose 
from the recognition that these hysterical symptoms improved when the underlying 
traumatic event, and the feelings associated with this, were made conscious, remembered 
and verbalised (Herman, 1997). 
7 Exploration of this question in relation to hysteria is beyond the scope of this discussion, as it relates to 
symptomatology. See Grosz (1994) and Anzieu (1990). 
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In his second theory of psychological trauma, Freud (1897/1995, p.l11) came to 
understand that "neurotic symptoms were not related to actual events but to wishful 
phantasies", and therefore that "psychical reality was of more importance than material 
reality" (ibid.). These phantasies, understood to be of an Oedipal nature and so involving 
forbidden desires, Freud understood to be traumatic in themselves (Freud, 1905/1995). 
They were therefore repressed, giving rise to hysterical symptoms. While the reasons for 
this reformulation have been much debated [see Herman (1997) and Gay (1995], it was 
of great significance for the development of psychoanalysis, which turned attention away 
from the internal implications of external events, to the internal world of unconscious 
phantasy (Garland, 1999). Thus, ''psychic contlict replaced psychic trauma as the major 
theoretical and clinical paradigm of psychoanalysis" (Ulman & Brothers, 1988, p.2). 
In his third formulation of psychological trauma, Freud, prompted by his witnessing of 
combat neurosis during and after World War 1, returned to his original emphasis on 
external reality, but now with a greater recognition of the interplay between inner and 
outer worlds. Freud drew a parallel between what he termed the 'traumatic neurosis' of 
war, and hysteria, which he called ''the traumatic neuroses of peace" (Freud, 1920/1995, 
p.598). He now understood both post traumatic conditions as "a consequence of an 
extensive breach being made in the protective shield against stimuli" (ibid., p. 608). This 
barrier, which Freud pictured as "a special envelope or membrane", protects the psyche 
from excessive external and internal stimuli, in order to maintain psychic equilibrium 
according to the pleasure principle. Freud defmed as traumatic "any excitations from the 
outside which are powerful enough to break through the protective shield" (ibid., p.607). 
This theory of psychic trauma was modelled on that of physical wounding as a 
consequence of rupture to the body's boundary. In the case of bodily injury, excitations 
move from the surface where the skin has been broken, to the brain, and it is here that the 
pain is registered. Analogously, Freud understood that psychic trauma results not from 
the traumatic event itself (as 'shock theory' held), but from the 
effects produced on the organ of the mind by the breach in the shield against stimuli and 
by the problems that follow in its train (ibid., p.608, emphasis added). 
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Anxiety is understood to be the psychic equivalent of physical excitations that 
communicate the traumatic rupture to the mind (Garland, 1999b). The psychological 
implication of this is the triggering of unresolved unconscious fantasy, particularly that of 
an Oedipal nature. Thus Freud's fInal formulation of trauma brought together his initial 
recognition of its origins in external events and his subsequent exploration of the role of 
unconscious fantasy, now understanding that it is the internal meaning of the external 
event that is psychically traumatising. This forms the basis for contemporary trauma 
theorist's understanding that trauma arises through a "combination of internal and 
external factors" (Bell, 1999, p.167), external events being rendered traumatic according 
to the specifIc internal meaning that they hold for a particular person at a particular time, 
according to their internal object relations, anxieties and defences. 
Freud's theory of psychical healing was also modelled on that of physical repair. He 
proposed that excessive, free flowing excitations that break through the protective shield 
undergo a process of psychic 'binding'. Although inconsistent in his use of this term, 
Freud understood binding to be a defensive linkage of dispersed energy to form a 
cohesive "mass" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p.50), which can then be discharged 
through "dreams, sublimations and neurotic symptoms" (Bell, 1999, p.173). This process 
is understood by contemporary theorists as that by which traumatic material is given 
meaning in relation to existing internal object relations (Garland, 1999c). This process, 
however, is dependent on an already developed ego (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973). In 
cases of early and enduring trauma in which this is not yet established, binding may be 
replaced with what Garland (1999b, p.19) calls "fusion", where present and the past 
collapse into one another in such a way that each "not only makes sense of the other, but 
each seems to confIrm the most pathological features of the other". This underlies the 
'repetition compulsionS" which Freud understood to stem from the process of binding 
(Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973). 
8 The evolution of this 'stimulus barrier' theory of psychological trauma out of Freud's understanding of 
the 'compulsion to repeat' is beyond the scope of this discussion. 
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2.4 Klein 
Melanie Klein, writing between the years of 1921 and 1960, developed a new school of 
psychoanalytic theory and practice that built upon the basic tenets of Freudianism but 
moved well beyond these. In contrast to Freud's retrospective understanding of early 
development through the analysis of adult patients, Klein specialised in the 
psychoanalysis of children, and it was from this clinical experience that she developed 
her theory of the inner world of early childhood and infancy. Klein believed that a 
primitive, fragile and poorly integrated ego exists from the time of birth, containing both 
benign and malevolent internal objects. These objects evolve through the dual processes 
of introjection and projection in the interplay between internal phantasy and external 
reality. This early ego oscillates between states of disintegration and integration 
according to the predominance of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions (Bell, 
1999). The paranoid-schizoid position is dominated by part-object relations, in which bad 
is split off from good and projected outwards, giving rise to paranoid anxiety. In the 
depressive position, with the advent of whole object relations, these disowned parts can 
be reintegrated into the ego, and good and bad held in ambivalence (Segal, 1973). For 
Klein, these positions represent both specific stages of development, and configurations 
of intrapsychic functioning which we continue to move between throughout life (ibid.). 
Segal summarises the particular patterns of object relations, anxieties ands defences 
characteristic of each position. In paranoid-schizoid functioning: 
The object is seen as split into an ideally good and a wholly bad one. The aim of the ego 
is total union with the ideal object and total annihilation of the bad one, as well as of the 
bad parts of the self. Omnipotent thinking is paramount and reality sense intermittent and 
precarious. The concept of absence hardly exists. Whenever the state of union with the 
ideal object is not fulfilled, what is experienced is not absence; the ego feels assailed by 
the counterpart of the good object - the bad object or objects ... A leading defence 
mechanism in this phase is projective identification (Segal, 1954/1988, p.I64). 
During depressive position functioning, 
... the main characteristic of object relation is that the object is felt as a whole object. In 
connection with this there is a greater degree of awareness and differentiation of the 
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separateness between the ego and the object. At the same time, since the object is 
recognized as a whole, ambivalence is more fully experienced. The ego in this phase is 
struggling with its ambivalence and its relation to the object is characterized by guilt, fear 
of loss or actual experience of loss and mourning, and a striving to re-create the object. 
At the same time, processes of introjection become more pronounced than those of 
projection, in keeping with the striving to retain the object inside as well as to repair, 
restore and re-create it (ibid., p.166). 
Klein's understanding of the development of inner psychic reality is based on what has 
been termed a "body function model" (Davis & Wallbridge, 1981, p.66). In keeping with 
the psychoanalytic concept of anaclisis explored above, the processes of introjection and 
projection through which internal objects are constituted are understood to evolve on the 
basis of the bodily experiences of taking in nourishment and expelling waste. Thus 
goodness is 'eaten' into the body/psyche, and badness 'excreted' out beyond its borders. 
Klein understood the mother's body to be paramount in these processes: as the infant's 
fIrst object (initially in the form of the breast as part-object), it is the earliest source of 
gratifIcation and love, as well as of frustration and envy: ''The child turns to his mother's 
body all his libidinal desires but ... also all his destructiveness" (Segal, 1973, p.5). Thus it 
is the maternal body (and initially it's parts) from which the infant seeks to take in 
goodness, and into which he9 seeks to expel badness. 
Klein extended Freud's understanding of instincts in emphasising the role of phantasy 
that emerges in direct response to them, as, for example, a hungry infant, instinctually 
seeking to satisfy this hunger, phantasises an object able to do so. These fIrst phantasies, 
like the instincts they accompany, are experienced as "somatic as well as mental 
phenomena ... " (Segal, 1973, p.13). This means that both the object conjured through 
phantasy to satisfy the instinctual desire, and the actual satisfaction gained through this 
9 The masculine pronoun is used throughout as this enables easier distinction from the (feminine) mother, 
and because the case examined in this research project is a boy. This by no means implies that the 
processes discussed are no less relevant for girl children. 
18 
U
"
n
r
n
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
phantasy, are experienced as ''physical happenings" (ibid.). Segal (ibid.) provides two 
examples of this: 
... an infant going to sleep, contentedly making sucking noises and movements with his 
mouth or sucking his own fingers, phantasies that he is actually sucking or incorporating 
the breast and goes to sleep with a phantasy of having the milk-giving breast actually 
inside himself. Similarly, a hungry, ranging infant, screaming and kicking, phantasies that 
he is actually attacking the breast, tearing and destroying it, and experiences his own 
screams which tear him and hurt him as the tom breast attacking him in his own inside. 
With regard to the first of these processes, the good breast is introjected through 
"imaginative eating" (Davis & Wallbridge, 1981, p.66), the psychological experience of 
intake being anaclitically based upon the physical one. As Klein explains: " ... the infant 
feels that he concretely intemalises the breast and the milk it gives (Klein, 1957/1975, 
p.180, emphasis added). Klein understands the mysterious transmutation from bodily to 
psychical experience to occur through unconscious phantasy, in which the infant 
"imbue[s] the breast with qualities going far beyond the actual nourishment it affords" 
(ibid.). When it has been adequately introjected m this way, the good breast becomes 
integrated into the ego, forms its core and enables its development and cohesion 
(Hinshelwood, 1989). Therefore: "the infant who was first inside the mother now has the 
mother inside himself' (Klein, 1957/1975, p.180). 
The second psychic process, that of projecting out badness, Klein similarly understood to 
be rooted in, and experienced through, bodily expulsion. As in the case of introjection, 
physical experience is imbued with psychological qualities through unconscious 
phantasy. This takes the form of what Klein (1957/1975) terms 'urethral-' and 'anal-
sadism', in which the mother's body is, in the first case, drowned or burned and, in the 
second case, exploded or poisoned. These phantasied attacks leave the child with 
immense anxiety in relation to the broken and revengeful objects felt to be left in the 
mother's body. This anxiety is therefore displaced from the mother's body to the external 
world, a process which Klein understood as the start of symbolisation. She saw play as 
the primary medium of this, which, along with activity in general, "serves to express, 
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contain and canalise the child's unconscious phantasy" (Segal, 1973, p.9). Klein therefore 
believed symbol formation to be the basis of ego development (Segal, 1954/1988). 
A more complex illustration of the relationship between unconscious phantasy and bodily 
experience is found in Klein's understanding of, and distinction between, greed and envy. 
Both involve phantasied attacks on the maternal body, the first through introjection and 
the second through projective identification: 
Greed is an impetuous and insatiable craving, exceeding what the subject needs and what 
the object is able and willing to give. At the unconscious level, greed aims primarily at 
completely scooping out, sucking dry, and devouring the breast: that is to say, its aim is 
destructive introjection; whereas envy not only seeks to rob in this way, but also to put 
badness, primarily bad excrements and bad parts of the self, into the mother, and first of 
all into her breast, in order to spoil and destroy her ... This process ... [can be] defined as 
a destructive aspect of projective identification (Klein, 1957/1975, p.1S1). 
Here introjection and projection are used for destructive rather than productive purposes, 
and with this the focus of phantasied action turns from the ego to the object: good is 
greedily taken away from the mlother (not just taken into oneself), while bad is put into 
the envied object (not just gotten out of oneself). In this anomaly of attacking the 
maternal body that is at the same time "the source of life" (Segal, 1973, p.40), Klein saw 
the first expression of the death instinct. Klein's understanding of the primitive defence 
mechanism of projective identification is closely associated with that of envy. It can be 
defined as an "anal attack on the object by means of forcing parts of the ego into it in 
order to take over its contents or to control it" (Hinshelwood, 1989, p.179, emphasis in 
original). This situation of one person felt to contain parts of the another makes Klein's 
understanding of projective identification a pre-cursor for conceptions of containment 
central to contemporary psychoanalysis (ibid.). 
While Klein herself did not directly address the topic of psychological trauma, her 
thinking is drawn on extensively by contemporary psychoanalytic trauma theorists 
(Garland, 1999). Her understanding that events in the external world are flltered through 
the dynamics of the internal world implies that psychological danger is internally 
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generated through persecutory anxieties and fears of retaliation in response to destructive 
impulses. In this way, 
[i]nner realities shape the way external realities are perceived by the child so that 
frustrations and discomforts feel as if they are hostile, attacking forces (St. Clair, 2004, 
p.46). 
It follows that the external traumatic event is felt to be caused by internal objects, either 
in the form of hateful bad ones or neglectful good objects (Young, 1999). At the same 
time, chronic early trauma disrupts the internalisation of good empathetic objects. This 
leads to a self-perpetuating cycle in which reality confIrms rather than disconfrrms 
intense early internal fears of annihilation, persecution and fragmentation (Bell, 1999). 
2.5 Bion 
Wilfred Bion (1897 - 1979) drew on and developed classical Freudian and Kleinian 
theory to create his own formulation that has changed the course of psychoanalysis. 
While he insisted that his thinking "does not replace any existing psycho-analytic theory 
but is intended to display relationships which have not been remarked' (cited in Sandler, 
2006, p.190), Bion has come to be seen as the key figure in post-Kleinian thought, argued 
by same to have surpassed her in influence (Hinshelwood, 1989). Bion worked with 
psychotic patients, and his thinking is based on this experience. This discussion focuses 
on Bion's model of psychic functioning as a mental metabolic system rooted in the oral 
phase of development, the application of this in the container-contained relationship, and 
the implications when this relationship is ruptured. I then look at the differentiation 
between physical and psychic in the evolution of thought, and the collapse in distinction 
between these under conditions of 'developmental' trauma. I conclude by mentioning the 
applications of Bion's work in contemporary psychoanalytic understandings of 'external' 
trauma. 
Bion's (1962) theory of psychical functioning is modelled on that of physical digestion. 
He understood that the bodily processes of metabolisation forms the concrete basis upon 
which mentalisation evolves. This occurs through the "adaptation" (ibid., p.S7) of 
physical alimentation in response to the requirements of reality. Through this adaptation, 
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the physical digestive system is "abstracted" (ibid., p.62) into what Bion terms the 
''mental alimentary system" (ibid., p.102). This system is adaptive in its capacity to 
psychically digest raw sensory and somatic material and so transform it into meaningful 
psychical components. Bion termed the ''undigested'' (ibid., p.7) units of experience 
'beta-elements'. Through the process of psychical metabolisation that he named 'alpha-
functioning', these are transformed into mental products known as 'alpha-elements'. 
Alpha elements link together to enable thinking and the capacity to dream, daydream, 
imagine and remember, and so can be likened to "food for thought" (Bleandonu, 1994, 
p.152). These linked-together alpha elements, which Bion called the 'alpha-screen', at the 
same time serve a protective function in filtering out excessive internal and external 
stimuli. The alpha-screen, to which Bion referred alternatively as the 'contact barrier', is 
therefore the psychical equivalent of Freud's neurophysiological 'protective shield', and 
alpha functioning an elaborated understanding of Freud's concept of 'binding' 
(Hinshelwood, 1989). When this process is seriously disrupted, the absence of alpha-
functioning is understood by Bion as "mental indigestion" (1962, p.8). Bion understood 
the mental apparatus to be constituted through the cumulation of linked together alpha-
elements. His answer, then, to the mysterious question of how "a biological organism 
becomes an experiencing psyche" (Hinshelwood, 1989, p.229) lies in alpha-functioning 
which effects "a conversion process of some kind across the body/mind discontinuum" 
(ibid., p.217). 
Bion's model of psychological functioning is thus based both analogously and actually, 
in terms of its evolution, on its bodily "background" (Bion, 1962, p.64). The model itself 
he inversely saw as "a concretisation of an abstraction" (ibid., p.79). This model grew out 
of Bion's understanding of the oral phase of development, based on but departing from 
that of Freud and Klein. Bion saw that together with the physical sustenance of breast 
milk, the infant receives psychic qualities of "love, understanding, solace" (ibid., p.10). 
Initially, the infant makes no distinction between milk and love, and introjects both in a 
form experienced concretely as the 'good breast'. But, Bion asked, just as the milk "is 
received and dealt with by the alimentary canal; what receives and deals with love? 
(ibid., p.33-4, emphasis added). His answer is the 'mental alimentary system' upon which 
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psychic development is as dependent as physical development is upon the bodily 
digestive system (ibid.). 
Initially, the infant digests his raw and overwhelming anxieties through his mother's 
mental metabolic system, and only later, if all goes well, is he able to internalise this to 
form his own alpha-function. Before this happens, the only way for the infant to manage 
his devastating fears of fragmentation and annihilation, of being dropped, abandoned, or 
left to starve, is by evacuating these beyond the body's boundary (Garland, 1999c). This 
is achieved through projective identification, which Bion, following Klein, understood in 
terms of a relationship between container and contained, but to which he added the 
function of communication. Thus the infant transfers these terrible fears 'into' his mother 
not only to be rid of them, but to make them known. The mother contains these not only 
by receiving, but by understanding them. The elimination of overwhelming anxieties is 
initially based on bodily expulsion, so the infant feels he can "evacuate this indigestible 
matter as if it were a physical product like faeces or urine" (Taylor, 1999, p.50). 
The containing function of the mother depends then on her ability to psychically take 
inside herself these projected beta-elements, to emotionally think about them, and to bear 
this experience. In order to do so, she must be in a state of "calm receptiveness" 
(Hinshelwood, 1989, p.420) which Bion termed 'reverie'. Through reverie, the mother 
operates as a ''psychological receptor organ ... [for her] infant's needs for love and 
understanding" (Bion, 1962, p.36). It is through this emotional metabolisation that 
containment takes place, by which the mother uses her own alpha functioning to 
transform her infant's raw feeling into meaningful, mental form, which she returns back 
to him through ''the channels of communication, the links with the child" (ibid.). This 
may be as simple as cooing over her crying baby, wondering aloud with sensitive 
curiosity what may be the matter, gently trying a few possibilities and eventually arriving 
at one that settles the infant, which she can then communicate back to him in words. In 
this way, the filtering function of the Freudian stimulus barrier is initially performed by 
the mother, who "acts to protect her baby from the extremes of experience, both 
environmental and emotional" (Garland, 1999b, p.9). 
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Yet Bion (1962, p.36) wondered what psychological process is needed for the infant 
to be able to profit from reverie as it is able, thanks to the digestive capacities of the 
alimentary canal, to profit from the breast and the milk it supplies. 
His answer was that the infant is able to introject not only the product of reverie (his 
initial anxiety made bearable through containment) but the containing function itself. 
This enables the development of 'internal containment', of the infant's own alpha 
function, through which he becomes able to think about and symbolise his own anxieties 
without being overwhelmed by them. This internalised state of maternal reverie (in which 
the mother sought to understand her child' s experience) forms the basis of all learning, 
stemming from the child's sense of curiosity and desire to know, which Bion designated 
'K'. 
The container-contained relationship may be disrupted by the infant's envious attacks on 
the containing function, and/or by the mother's inability to bear her infant's intense 
projected feelings, which may arise from her own under-established alpha functioning, or 
because she is too distracted to perform this function for her infant. In either case, the 
infant's overwhelming anxieties will be returned to him stripped of whatever meaning 
they had held, and so magnified, rather than modified through maternal metabolisation. 
This leaves the infant in a state Bion understood as 'nameless dread', of unknowable, 
incommunicable, uncontainable terror. In this case, 
instead of an experience being mediated through the mind of the mother, it is returned to 
the baby, in phantasy, as persecution. It is as if the original projection, together with the 
mother's 'refusal' is re-deposited into the baby as an unthinkably bad and terrible thing 
(Frenkel, 2004, p.IS3) 
When this occurs repeatedly, the infant is likely to feel himself to be made up of this 
unthinkable badness. This sense of inherent badness would be reinforced by the failure of 
the containing object of which Bion believed that we have an innate expectation -
impairment to which is therefore experienced as the fault of the infant. This is associated 
with the internalisation of an abandoning and punitive, rather than empathic and 
responsive, maternal object, which "destroys meaning and leaves the subject in a 
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Yet Bion (1962, p.36) wondered what psychological process is needed for the infant 
to be able to profit from reverie as it is able, thanks to the digestive capacities of the 
alimentary canal, to profit from the breast and the milk it supplies. 
His answer was that the infant is able to introject not only the product of reverie (his 
initial anxiety made bearable through containment) but the containing function itself. 
This enables the development of 'internal containment', of the infant's own alpha 
function, through which he becomes able to think about and symbolise his own anxieties 
without being overwhelmed by them. This internalised state of maternal reverie (in which 
the mother sought to understand her child's experience) forms the basis of all learning, 
stemming from the child's sense of curiosity and desire to know, which Bion designated 
'K'. 
The container-contained relationship may be disrupted by the infant's envious attacks on 
the containing function, and/or by the mother's inability to bear her infant's intense 
projected feelings, which may arise from her own under-established alpha functioning, or 
because she is too distracted to perform this unction for her infant. In either case, the 
infant's overwhelming anxieties will be returned to him stripped of whatever meaning 
they had held, and so magnified, rather than modified through maternal metabolisation. 
This leaves the infant in a state Bion understood as 'nameless dread', of unknowable, 
incommunicable, uncontainable terror. In this case, 
instead of an experience being mediated through the mind of the mother, it is returned to 
the baby, in phantasy, as persecution. It is as if the original projection, together with the 
mother's 'refusal' is re-deposited into the baby as an unthinkably bad and terrible thing 
(Frenkel, 2004, p.153) 
When this occurs repeatedly, the infant is likely to feel himself to be made up of this 
unthinkable badness. This sense of inherent badness would be reinforced by the failure of 
the containing object of which Bion believed that we have an innate expectation -
impairment to which is therefore experienced as the fault of the infant. This is associated 
with the intemalisation of an abandoning and punitive, rather than empathic and 
responsive, maternal object, which "destroys meaning and leaves the subject in a 
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mysterious meaningless world" (Hinshelwood, 1989, p.354). All knowing and 
understanding now becomes denuded, a state Bion designated -I(, which results in a 
stunting of the child's own curiosity and desire to know, and therefore of the capacity to 
learn. The container-contained relationship is then characterised by '"without-ness''' 
(Bion, 1962, p.97): 
It is an internal object without an exterior. It is an alimentary canal without a body ... In 
short it is the resultant of an envious stripping or denudation of all good and is itself 
destined to continue the process of stripping (ibid.). 
Under conditions of manageable, or optimal frustration, Bion (1962) understood that 
thought develops as the means of managing this frustration. While Bion's theory of 
thinking is extensive, this discussion will be limited to the differentiation and collapse of 
distinction between physical and psychical on which this faculty depends. Bion, in 
keeping with psychoanalytic thinking, saw that when the breast is temporarily 
unavailable to supply the infant it with both milk and love, the infant feels frustration. 
This need for the good breast in its absence is experienced by the infant as the presence 
of a bad breast, which it therefore wishes to evacuate. This expulsion of the bad breast 
occurs through the return of the good breast, when, on feeding, ''the taking in of milk, 
warmth, love, may be felt as taking in a good breast" (ibid., p.34). Thus the absence of 
the good breast was felt as the presence of the bad breast, and the presence of the good 
breast felt as the expulsion of the bad breast. Initially, both the "good and bad breasts are 
felt as possessing the same degree of concreteness and reality as milk" (ibid.). Eventually, 
however, the desired but absent breast is experienced not as a ''bad breast present", but as 
the "'idea of a breast missing'" (ibid., emphasis added). As the gap of frustration is filled 
with thought, the two breasts become differentiated in quality: the good (present) breast 
remains associated with the real milk that satiates the infant, and so continues to be 
experienced as concrete and physical, while the bad (absent) breast 
is much more likely to become recognised as an idea than the good breast which is 
associated with ... a thing-in-itself(Bion, 1962, p.34). 
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This led Bion to wonder, "Is a 'thought' the same as an absence of a thing?" (ibid., p.35). 
Mental thought therefore depends on the ability to distinguish the thought from the object 
itself, and the distinction between physical and psychical is in turn dependent on the 
evolution of thought. 
Under situations of unmanageable frustration that amount to 'developmental' trauma, the 
gap of a wanted but absent (good) object cannot be filled with the idea of this, so the 
psyche remains full of bad (absent good) objects. These bad objects come to replace 
thoughts, and in their concrete state, as beta-elements in the absence of alpha functioning, 
can only be managed by evacuation: 
What should be a thought... becomes a bad object, indistinguishable from a thing-in-
itself, fit only for evacuation (Bion, 1967, p.112). 
This evacuation occurs through direct discharge, acting out, or 'excessive' (as distinct 
from normative) projective identification. Despite these attempts to rid the psyche of 
beta-elements, when un-thinkable frustration is ongoing they accumulate, and the mind 
itself then becomes "an apparatus for ridding the psyche of accumulations of bad internal 
objects" (ibid.). In this reversal of meaning-making, alpha-elements revert back to beta-
elements and attempts to cohere these dispersed beta-elements results in a concrete, rigid 
and yet chaotic organisation, which Bion called the 'beta-screen'. In beta-screen 
functioning, understanding itself becomes threatening as a link that could lead to 
knowledge too painful to know. This link is therefore attacked, and ''the experience of 
being understood ... [is] split up" (Bion, 1967, p.96). This leaves the psyche fragmented 
by its own destructiveness, and in need of further projective identification to get rid of the 
splintered pieces. 
This reversal in functioning is associated with a collapse in distinction between physical 
and psychical, which occurs initially in relation to bodily and emotional forms of 
nourishment. When an infant, either because of inadequate containment or his own 
attacks on this function, fears his own or mother's aggression, his desire for 
psychological sustenance will diminish; at the same time, fears of physical starvation will 
compel this infant to resume feeding. This means that sucking becomes based on bodily 
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but no longer emotional need, which leads to "[a] split between material and psychical 
satisfaction" (Bion, 1962, p.lO). The infant may then attempt to get rid of the bad breast 
or unpleasant feelings by expelling it concretely: 
... if it passed a motion while taking milk ... it would associate a physical act with a result 
that we would call a change in its state of mind from dissatisfaction to satisfaction (ibid., 
p.35). 
Similarly, this dissolving of psychical back into physical would later in life result in the 
concretisation of thoughts, which would revert back to their bodily basis. Bion (ibid., 
p.62-3) illustrates how in certain patients this gives rise to 
the belief that they digest thoughts and that the consequences of doing so are similar to 
the digestion of food. That is to say that if they attempt what might ordinarily be regarded 
as meditating on an idea, they believe that the thoughts so treated suffer a change 
analogous to that undergone by food that is turned into faeces: some ideas, or their verbal 
representations, survive and if expressed emerge not as evidence of the possession of an 
idea, but as evidence embedded in a matrix of gibberish, that their thoughts have been 
destroyed and denuded of meaning in the way that faeces and its undigested particles can 
be regarded as food that has been destroyed and denuded of its value as food. 
Through this collapse of distinction between physical and psychical, the child and later 
adult continues his "insatiable .... search for material comforts" (ibid., p.ll) in the place 
of emotional love and understanding. But these physical means (which Bion refers to in 
this context as beta-elements) can never satisfy the craving for the mental quality (or 
absent alpha-functioning). Inversely, therapeutic interpretations may be experienced as 
concrete intrusions or empty evacuations, as "flatus" (Bion, 1962, p.12). In such cases, 
the patient 
... feels able only to establish the counterpart of a relationship in which such sustenance 
can be had as inanimate objects can provide (ibid., p.12). 
The patient would therefore establish a strong relationship with what Bion terms ''the 
material comforts ... of the consulting room" (ibid., p.13), of which the patient needs 
increasing more. At the same time, Bion (1967) understood that the provision in 
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psychoanalytic treatment of experiences of containment unavailable in infancy may mean 
that, 
... the poignancy of [the patient's] deprivation is thereby rendered the more acute and so 
are the feelings of resentment at the deprivation. Gratitude for the opportunity coexists 
with hostility to the analyst as the person who will not understand and refuses the patient 
the use of the only method of communication by which he feels he can make himself 
understood [direct discharge/projective identification] (Bion, 1967, p.l05). 
While Bion did not himself explore the application of his thinking to 'external' rather 
than 'developmental' trauma, his theories of containment and of thinking, and 
specifically of beta-screen functioning, have been applied by contemporary 
psychoanalytic trauma theorists (Brown, 2006). These build on Freud's last formulation 
of trauma, understanding trauma to rupture alpha functioning and lead to the pattern of 
beta-screen functioning explored above. This breakdown in alpha function is understood 
both as a direct result of the trauma and a defensive means by which the survivor avoids 
meaningfully 'knowing' the experience that is by definition unbearable. This rupture 
constitutes a failure of both external (the world) and internal (internal objects) 
containment, that for Garland (1991c) is the defining feature of trauma. This results in a 
self-perpetuating cycle in which trauma erodes containment, and lack of containment 
leads to vulnerability to trauma. Trauma therefore disenables that which it requires to 
heal 10 , and the experience instead becomes locked into a rigid, chaotic beta-screen, or 
traumatic organisation that precludes repair and new learning: 
New experiences are seen as carbon copies of the original trauma and the hope of 
enrichment from a reality experienced as fresh and new is dashed. The trauma remains an 
'undigested fact' and cannot be transformed into memory; instead, the traumatic 
experiences are registered as ego alien and concretely encoded dissociated incidents 
(Brown, 2006, p.1573, emphasis added). 
10 See Ingham (1999) for a discussion on the complex and reciprocal relationship between trauma and 
mentalisation. 
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2.6 Segal 
Hanna Segal was a follower of Klein writing in the 1940's to 1980's, with a particular 
focus on the process of symbol formation - explored here as it stems from and, under 
conditions of trauma, returns to, bodily experience. Following Klein, Segal (1954/1988) 
understood symbolisation to be rooted in the infant's early experiences of his own and his 
parent's bodies (which is then gradually displaced onto the external world), but she was 
the fIrst to link this process to that of containment. This link has provided an important 
basis for contemporary psychoanalytic trauma theory (Garland, 1999). Segal (ibid., 
p.163, emphasis in original) conceived of symbolisation as what she termed a "three-term 
relation": 
. .. a relation between the thing symbolised, the thing functioning as a symbol and a 
person for whom the one represents the other. In psychological terms the symbol would 
be a relation between the ego, the object, and the symbol. 
Symbol formation occurs as a means for the ego to manage anxieties about its 
relationship with the object. These anxieties include fear both of bad objects, and of the 
loss or unavailability of good objects. Symbolisation therefore reflects object relations, 
and disturbance in the latter manifests in disturbance in the former. Such disturbance 
stems from a lack of differentiation between ego and object, and thus between symbol 
and symbolised object, which gives rise to concrete thinking. 
Segal (1954/1988) distinguished between two forms of symbolisation, a more primitive 
'symbolic equation' associated with the paranoid-schizoid position, and a more mature 
capacity for the 'symbol proper' that is achieved with the depressive position. She 
understood the primitive defence mechanism of projective identifIcation to be the fIrst 
form of symbolisation, in which parts of the self and internal objects are projected out 
onto objects which become identifIed with, or come to represent, the projected parts. 
These projections and identifIcations form the fIrst symbol equations and so are felt to be 
the actual original object rather than to be a substitute for it (and are therefore not seen to 
have properties of their own). The purpose of the symbolic equation is therefore "to deny 
the absence of the ideal object, or to control a persecuting one" (ibid., p.168). 
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In contrast, symbol formation in depressive-position functioning "is used not to deny but 
to overcome loss" (ibid., p.168-9). This occurs with the capacity to recognise whole 
objects and therefore to experience ambivalence, as well as to distinguish between ego 
and object. Instinctual drives to incorporate good and expel bad can then be inhibited and 
displaced, through symbolisation, which serves now to save the object from this 
possessiveness and aggressiveness and so to decrease both guilt and fear of loss. This 
'symbol proper' is therefore further removed from the original object than the 'symbolic 
equation', as its purpose is now to protect it. Such symbols are "created in the internal 
world as a means of restoring, re-creating, recapturing and owning again the original 
object" (ibid., p.167, emphasis in original). This more mature form of symbolisation is 
therefore dependent on separation between subject and object, on the ability to 
experience and tolerate this loss, and on the desire to re-create the lost object internally. 
This creation, recognised as the ego's own and distinct from the original object, can then 
be projected into the real world and used freely. The shift from concrete symbolic 
equation to symbolisation proper is not absolute, but c n reverse under anxiety when, 
in massive projective identification the ego becomes again confused with the object, the 
symbol becomes confused with the things symbolised and therefore turns into an 
equation (ibid., p.168). 
Segal (ibid., p.172) came to understand the relationship between what she terms "the 
projected part and the object projected into" in terms of Bion's theory of the container 
and the container discussed above. Understanding symbol formation as the basis for both 
internal and interpersonal communication, Segal saw language acquisition as a form of 
containment in which the infant's experiences are 'bound' through the mother's provision 
of words which "contains, encompasses and expresses the meaning [of the experience]" 
(ibid., p.175). The infant can then intemalise the words, their meaning and the ability to 
vernalise and so think about an experience. When containment is inadequate, Segal saw 
that there is an inability to progress from, or a regression back to, symbolic equation, 
where words are experienced as concrete things. In therapy, this loss of distinction 
between the symbol and symbolised may mean that interpretations are felt to be 
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physically intrusive, or to have concrete effects on patients' bodies. In this way the 
symbolic returns to its source in the somatic. 
While Segal understood this breakdown in symbolisation proper as a result of inadequate 
containment, she, like Klein, did not explore this in terms of psychological trauma. This 
has been done by contemporary psychoanalytic theorists, who understand trauma to erode 
the capacity for symbolisation proper, leading to a collapse of distinction between symbol 
and symbolised characteristic of symbolic equation (Garland, 1999c). This makes therapy 
with trauma survivors very challenging, as words are felt to be things in themselves 
rather than symbols standing for things. This means that, 
To utter the word is at some level to recreate the traumatic event, which, as it has before, 
overwhelms the containing object with catastrophic anxiety ... (ibid., p.lll). 
This gives rise to a self-perpetuating cycle in which the traumatic experience, by 
rupturing internal containment, erodes symbolic functioning, on which psychic repair is 
dependent. The therapeutic task in such cases would be the re-establishment of the 
capacity to symbolise. Segal (1954/1988, p.171) reminds us that the word symbol stems 
"from the Greek term for throwing together, bringing together, integrating". She goes on 
to say: 
The process of symbol formation is, I think, a continuous process of bringing together 
and integrating the internal with the external, the subject with the object, and the earlier 
experiences with the later ones (ibid.). 
2.7 Dick 
Post-Kleiman Ester Bick (1901-1983) conceived of a very early form of containment 
when the primitive psyche is not yet differentiated from the body or integrated in itself. 
Bick's theorising grew out of a technique of infant observation she initially developed as 
a training method for child psychotherapists and through which she sought to validate 
Klein's conception of early infancy, but which led her to new discoveries. She departed 
from Klein's understanding of an ego from the start able to introject and project (which 
presupposes a distinction between internal and external), as wen as from Bion's 
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assumption of the innate existence of a sense of internal space into which the containing 
function can be introjected. She understood both as developmental achievements 
dependent on this earlier form of containment. 
Bick observed a period very early in life, when the primitive, not-yet cohered personality 
is "not as yet differentiated from parts of the body" (Bick, 196711988, p.187). She 
understood that these disparate, bodily-based personality fragments are felt to lack a 
"binding force" (ibid.) between them, and therefore seek out external objects by which 
they can feel passively held together, and so in existence. The "optimal object" (ibid., 
p.188) for this is the mother's nipple, which, alongside the skin contact generated through 
her holding and soothing, performs a containing function through the stability of its form, 
which provides a stability of meaning and a focus for the infant's oral instincts (Houzel, 
1990). Other external objects that capture the infant's attention, such as a repetitive 
sound, a light, a smell, may operate as temporary containers, felt to hold the personality 
parts together by engaging its awareness. Bick proposed that all such external containing 
objects are "experienced concretely as a skin" (Bick, 1967/1988, p.188, emphasis added). 
She therefore calls this form of containment the "primal skin function" (ibid.). 
When this primal skin function operates adequately, the infant is able to introject the 
experience of being externally cohered, and to transfer this holding function to his own 
skin. Thus the physical skin, functioning "as a boundary" (ibid., p.187) to the psychical 
self, serves an "internal function of containing the parts of the self' (ibid., emphasis 
added). This experience of being bounded by his own skin enables the infant to develop a 
"concept of a space within the self' (ibid.). Bick understands this to be a prerequisite for 
the ability to introject and project, and therefore for the establishment of internal objects. 
When the primal skin function fails, either through inadequate maternal containment, or 
the infant's phantasied attacks on this, there is a corresponding failure in the infant's 
capacity to introject a containing object, and to use his own skin as a boundary. This lack 
of boundary means that "the personality simply leaks uncontainedly out into a limitless 
space" (Hinshelwood, p.428). This is associated with a 'flattening' of internal space and 
'two-dimensional' object relationships which Bick characterised as 'adhesive'. This 
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entails "the experience, and phantasy, of sticking to an object as opposed to projecting 
into it" (ibid., p.215, emphasis in original). 
Under such circumstances, Bick (1967/1988, p.188) understands that a defensive 
'" second skin' formation" develops to compensate for the absent "skin container 
function". This takes the form of omnipotence and pseudo-independence which attempt 
to hold the self together without the need for external support (Hinshelwood, 1989). The 
second skin formation therefore masks "a passive experience of total helplessness" (Bick, 
1967/1988, p.188) which Bick terms 'unintegration'. This manifests physically through 
body (such as posture or skin disease) and in "corresponding functions of mind, 
particularly communication" (ibid., p.190). In such cases, Bick emphasises the 
importance of what she terms ''the containing aspect of the analytic situation [which] 
resides especially in the setting" (ibid., p.191). 
2.8 Winmcott 
Donald Winnicott was an English paediatrician and psychoanalyst writing in the 1930s to 
1970s. Although he drew on Freud and Klein, he is credited with developing his own 
school of thought, which remains close to his clinical experience. Winnicott famously 
proposed that there is no such thing as a baby as distinct from a mother, and that there is 
no such thing as a psyche separable from a body. His understanding of processes of 
differentiation and integration between these two anaclitically related pairs is the focus of 
this discussion. These are explored in conditions of good-enough maternal holding (a 
concept distinct from yet related to that of containmentll), and of trauma that results 
when the holding function fails. 
Winnicott (194911958) believed that the historical splitting of body and mind was an 
illusion which future scientists would reveal. His own conception of a "bodily self' as 
''the imaginative elaboration of somatic parts, feelings, and functions" (ibid., p.244) has 
II See Ogden (2004) for a distinction between Bion's concept of containment and Winnicott's concept of 
holding. 
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arguably gone some way towards doing just that. In keeping with psychoanalytic thought, 
Winnicott believed that at the earliest stages of life ''physiology and psychology have not 
yet become distinct, or are only in the process of doing so" (cited in Davis & Wallbridge, 
1981, p.107), and that the psyche develops out of the body by anacUsis (Anzieu, 1989). 
But significantly, to this he added that the linkage, or integration, between body and mind 
is essential for human wellbeing. In this way, he extended Freud's notion of the ego as 
body-ego by specifying that it is only under conditions of health that the self is 
experienced as dwelling within the body: 
The ego is based on a body Ego, but it is only when all goes wen that the person of the 
baby starts to be linked with the body and the body-functions, with the skin as a limiting 
membrane (Wimricott, cited in Anzieu, 1989, p.30). 
Winnicott understood the distinction between psyche and soma to rest on the gradual 
cohesion of the former, which comes about through the mother's quality of physical and 
emotional 'holding' of her infant. This occurs during the early stage of absolute 
dependence, when both infant and mother experience themselves as merged: the good-
enough mothers' intense identification with her child enabling maximum attunement, and 
this attunement allowing the infant the experience of omnipotence. Through the mother's 
unique quality of sensitive, attentive, tender holding (involving all the activities of care 
and protection as well as her individual expression of love), the infant gradually feels his 
own body to be cohesive. This sense of bodily wholeness provides the basis for psychical 
integration that enables ego development. Through this, the child begins to be able to 
'hold himself together'. As the emerging psychical ego becomes cohered in itself, it 
begins to differentiate from the bodily ego, on which it therefore becomes gradually less 
dependent. 
As counterpoint to this differentiation between psyche and soma, Winnicott emphasised 
the simultaneous importance of their linkage, or integration (without loss of distinction). 
This he understood to be rooted in an aspect of the 'holding environment' that he termed 
'handling'. Through this, the mother brings together her own bodily and emotional 
involvement with her infant in -such a way that he begins to experience a "linkage" 
(Winnnicott, cited in Davis & WaUbridge, 1981, p.S1) between his own physical and 
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psychical selves. This linkage enables the infant to gradually "accept the body as part of 
the self, and to feel that the self dwells in and throughout the body" (ibid., p.109). 
Winnicott evocatively called this experience the "indwelling of the psyche in the soma" 
(ibid.). 
Just as the cohesion of the psychical ego enabled its differentiation from the bodily ego, 
so this integration between body and mind enables a growing distinction between this 
'bodily-self and others. Winnicott understood the skin, as "limiting membrane" (ibid., 
p.20), to play a central role in this differentiation between what he tenned 'me and not-
me'. This boundary of the 'bodily self enables the corporeal functions of "intake and 
output" (Winnnicott, cited in ibid., p.51) to become imbued with psychological meaning. 
In this way, inner psychic reality evolves through the processes of introjection and 
projection. Central to Winnicott's thinking was his cOnception of 'transitional 
phenomena' which mediate this process of separation between mother and child. Such 
phenomena exist in the intennediate realm between inner and outer worlds, between 
fantasy and reality. in a 'potential space' which "initially both joins and separates the 
baby and mother" (Winnicott, cited in ibid., p.77). (It is here that Winnicott understood 
psychotherapy to take place). 
Winnicott understood psychic trauma in relation to impingement (Davis & Wallbridge, 
1981). Under good enough circumstances, contact between mother and child evolves in 
such a way that inevitable impingement is incremental and manageable, and the infant 
slowly establishes a "continuity of being" (ibid.). When impingements (stemming from 
deficiencies either in the ego-support of the infant and/or in environmental protection) 
interrupt this continuity of being by provoking a reaction in the infant, and when this is 
not adequately repaired, these impingements become traumatic. This early trauma was 
understood by Winnicott to elicit "unthinkable anxieties" (ibid.) including 'Going to 
pieces', 'Having no relation to the body', and 'Complete isolation because of there being 
no means of communication' (ibid., p.58). These primitive anxieties lead to a 
fragmentation of the growing self that disrupts the process of cohesion essential to 
maturation. Under such circumstances the potential space cannot develop. Winnicott saw 
that prolonged and severe traumatic impingements lead to what he tenned the 'sustained 
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traumatic condition'. The fonn of this that he focussed on was antisocial acting out, 
which he understood to result from situations where a child's early testing of his own 
destructive power is not withstood by the home environment, which therefore fails in its 
holding function at this stage of development. The child will then look beyond the home 
for constancy and security, and so test the holding capacity of institutions or social 
environments. Winnicott therefore understood this condition to be "really a search for a 
boundary or framework" (ibid., p.77). 
2.9 Anzieu 
French psychoanalyst Didier Anzieu is one of the few contemporary psychoanalytic 
theorists to elaborate on and systematise the relationship between psyche and soma 
implicit in psychoanalytic thinking. Through his model of the Skin Ego, Anzieu (1989) 
attempts to move beyond reductionism and polarisation of body and mind. The Skin Ego 
exists on the border of body and mind, and so acts both as "a bridge and as an 
intermediary screen between the psyche and the body, the world, and other psyches" 
(1989, pA.). This theory. based on both empirical and theoretical data from across 
various disciplines, is a refonnulation of traditional Freudian and Kleinian conceptions of 
the oral phase of development, and is situated alongside post-Kleinian's Bick and Bion, 
drawing respectively on their work on second skin fonnations and containment. Anzieu 
also draws on Winnicott's concept of transitional phenomena and the maternal holding 
function. 
Anzieu (1989, p.21) identifies the body as "the great missing, unrecognised, 
unacknowledged element [of our time]". arguing that since the time of Freud the part of 
individual and collective selves that is most repressed has shifted from sexuality to the 
body. He understands this shift to underlie changes in the nature of human suffering. In 
keeping with psychoanalytic thinking, Anzieu (1991, p.61-2) understands that "the body 
is the bedrock of the mind": 
as Freud guessed and as we can now systematise it ... psychic functions, psychic organs, 
and psychic agencies spring from a concrete basis in organic functioning. 
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Anzieu builds on Freud's (1920/1995, p.637) brief statement that the bodily sensations 
from which the ego derives are "chiefly ... those springing from the surface of the body". 
Understanding that "[ e ]very psychical activity is anaclitically dependent upon a 
biological function" (Anzieu, 1989, pAO), Anzieu conceives of a Skin Ego arising from 
the physical functions of the skin, which he understands to be "of both an organic and an 
imaginary order" (ibid. p.3). The Skin Ego is thus, 
. .. an intennediate structure of the psychical apparatus: intennediate chronologically 
between the mother and the infant, and intennediate structurally between the mutual 
inclusion of psyches in the state of primitive fusion and the differentiation of psychical 
agencies (ibid.). 
Anzieu argues that Freud's formulation of incorporation and repletion (based on the 
bodily experiences of the mouth and abdominal cavity) during the oral phase of 
development, leaves out a key third function. This function stems from the formative 
experience of maternal holding and touching during feeding, washing, playing etc. This 
skin contact between mother and child Anzieu understands to underlie the principle of 
"internal differentiation and containment" (ibid., p.5) which he identifies as an addition to 
Freud's principles. Through this, the infant is able 
progressively to differentiate a surface which has both an inner and an outer face, in other 
words an interface, pennitting a distinction between inside and outside, and an 
encompassing volume in which he feels himself bathed, the surface and the volume 
affording him the experience of a container (Anzieu, 1989, p.37). 
While basing his thinking on Klein's understanding of the oral stage of development, 
Anzieu recognises two omissions in this. Firstly, in focusing on the role of phantasy in 
relation to the breast as first object, Klein neglects "the qualities belonging to bodily 
experience" (ibid.). Secondly, in emphasising the infant's early experience of the 
maternal body through part-objects, Klein disregards ''what joins these parts together in a 
unifying whole, namely the skin" (ibid.). This omission is curious, Anzieu points out, as 
Klein's theory, centered on the dual processes of introjection and projection which are 
modeled on the bodily processes of incorporation and excretion, "presupposes the setting 
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up of a boundary differentiating outside from inside" (ibid.). Anzieu fills these gaps by 
bringing the surface of the body to the forefront of his theory, understanding the psychic 
functions of Skin Ego as anaclitically derived from the physical functions of the skin. 
These include the skin as container of internal space, allowing the experience of psychic 
fullness; the skin as interface between inside and outside that protects the former from 
penetration by the latter; and the skin as inscriptive surface onto which the inside 
communicates with the outside through symptoms, and upon which the marks of the 
external are registered 12. 
The Skin Ego evolves through a combination of physical contact and emotional 
attachment between mother and infant, spanning the realm of fantasy and reality. Like 
other psychoanalytic theorists, Anzieu (1989, p.42) conceives of an early stage of 
"symbiotic union" between mother and child. He understands this state to be experienced 
through a "tactile ... image in which the two bodies of child and mother have a common 
surface". What he terms the 'phantasy of a common skin' between mother and child is 
pictured as an 'interface' between two 'envelopes': the 'external envelope' being the 
maternal environment, the 'inner envelope' the surface of the infant's body. If all goes 
well, the external envelope fits itself with flexibility to the inner envelope, allowing both 
contact and space between mother and infant. The phantasy of shared skin can then 
facilitate both communication between them (registering their sensations, feelings, and 
vital rhythms) and the gradual differentiation of their own skins, which is "represented by 
the tearing away of that common skin" (ibid.). If both connection and separation are 
successfully negotiated, the child is able to internalise both the external skin/mothering 
environment, which enables the establishment of an internal psychic reality, and the 
experience of a common skin, which comes to envelope the psychical contents. In this 
way. the child gains a Skin Ego of his own!3. 
12 Anzieu (1989) identifies nine functions in total. 
13 The central role of thought in this process, which Anzieu (1989, p.64) likens to an "inner skeleton", is 
beyond the scope of this discussion. 
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When there is a mis-fit between external and internal envelopes, the development of the 
Skin Ego is impaired. Should the external envelope be too closely adhered to the inner 
envelope, the child's ego development is "invaded" and "suffocated"(Anzieu, 1989, 
p.62). Should the external envelope be too loose, the child's developing ego is devoid of 
consistency, and so the child must create her external envelope. This Anzieu understands 
to takes the form of Bick's 'second muscular skin', which develops to "both compensate 
for, and mask, the deficient Skin Ego" (ibid., p.60). In this 'second skin formation', the 
external layer is "rigid, resistant and closing" while the inner layer is porous and pierced. 
Damage to the skin ego through either form of mis-fit between external and internal 
envelopes would result in a fragile Skin Ego oscillating between anxiety of being 
abandoned (if the object of attachment is no longer close), and persecution anxiety (if that 
object is too close). This pattern Anzieu associates with borderline pathology 
characterised by "uncertain ... frontiers between the psychical and bodily Egos". This, he 
understands, leads to a tendency to "remain glued to others" while at the same time 
"fear[ing] penetration" (ibid., p.24). 
2.10 Kristeva 
French psychoanalyst, linguist, philosopher, feminist and novelist Julia Kristeva has 
made a major contribution to contemporary thought across disciplines. While her work is 
rooted in a wide range of sources from philosophy to anthropology, Kristeva's 
psychoanalytic thinking draws on, and at the same time critiques and departs significantly 
from, Freud, Lacan and Klein. This discussion focuses on her conception of an archaic, 
pre-verbal and 'preobjectal' relationship to the maternal body as that which contains us 
and as that from which we must part in order to become, that is always in tension 
between mergence and differentiation; and the ways in which this is retained in our own 
bodies through what is un-metaboliseable. 
Kristeva understands the infant's psychic being to exist in relation to the maternal body 
as its container, before clear boundaries are established between them. This she terms the 
'chora', borrowing from the ancient Greek word meaning ''the original space or 
receptacle of the universe" (McAfee, 2004, p.19). The chora reflects the pre-verbal space 
of mother and infant which is inherently bodily and "inaccessible to the mind" (Smith, 
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1998, p.60). Kristeva understands that the chora enters and is retained in language 
through what she termed the 'semiotic' aspect of signification: the extra-verbal rhythms 
and intonations of language that make up its materiality, as distinct from the • symbolic' , 
which is the grammatical or structural aspect of language through which unambiguous 
meaning is communicated. Through what she calls the • semiotic chora', communication 
remains connected to the maternal body, and the drives which are rooted in this 
relationship continue to be discharged through the rhythms and tones of languagel4• 
Language acquisition itself Kristeva understood to be based on the dual processes of 
differentiation and incorporation first experienced in relation to the maternal body 
(Oliver, 2002). Thus the process of metabolisation (intake, assimilation, expulsion) is 
seen as an early bodily blueprint for signification. 
Undercutting and disrupting the chora, Kristeva conceives of the abject as that which is 
indigestible, uncontainable, which hovers between integration and separation. The abject 
is inherently difficult to define, it is contradictory and always shifting. I understand the 
abject as anacUsis: it is the inherently contradictory relationship to the maternal body as 
that from which we emerge, and from which we must part in order to become separate 
selves. At the same time, it is the 'anti-anaclisis', that which disrupts or reverts this 
process, the simultaneous horror of and yearning for the early state of mergence with the 
maternal body, the crisis of at once desiring and fearing distinction and autonomy. It is 
the "uncertain boundary" (Oliver, 2002, p.22S) between the infant and the maternal 
chora, the "fragile limit" (Kristeva, 1980/2004, p.243) between fusion and differentiation 
that is never absolute, and is always threatening to give way. The act of abjection is that 
of rejection, the fIrSt awkward attempts to break free of the maternal body to which we 
14 Kristeva revolutionised understanding of the relationship between language and the body: In contrast to 
traditional conceptions oflanguage as representation of bodily experience, she proposes that language is a 
manifestation, or direct expression, of bodily drives (Oliver, 2002). 
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are still attached, the ongoing expulsion of that which both is and is not ourselves: spit, 
pus, excrement. Abjection is that which is 
radically excluded but never banished altogether ... [for it] hovers at the periphery of 
one's existing, constantly challenging one's own tenuous borders of selthood (McAfee, 
2004, p.46). 
Rejecting traditional psychoanalytic understanding of the maternal body as the infant's 
first object, Kristeva identifies in abjection a far more complex relationship which is prior 
to the existence of a subject with objects, and yet which sets the possibility for this in 
motion. This is an archaic form of relationship which Kristeva (1980/2004, p.236) cans 
"preobjectal", and which she characterises as "[i]ntrinsically corporeal" (ibid., p.238): 
This is: 
Before the mother or the maternal body becomes an object for the infant, it is an abject. It 
is neither object nor nonobject, but something in between" (Oliver, 2002, p.226). 
Not at all an other with whom I identify and incorporate, but an Other who precedes and 
possesses me, and through such possession causes me to be (Kristeva, 1980/2004, p.237). 
Later in life, the abject remains and is remembered in our own bodies through that which 
crosses, and so makes permeable, its boundaries: food, which is incorporated into or 
rejected from the body; bodily waste, which is expelled from it; and dirt which threatens 
to contaminate it. Food loathing, for Kristeva, is "the most elementary and most archaic 
form of abjection" (Kristeva, 1980/2004, p.230). It involves repulsion towards, and 
expulsion of, matter that would become part of oneself, and which, in abjection, becomes 
oneself, so that "I spit myself out, I abject myself within the same motion through which 
'I' claim to establish myself' (ibid., p.23!, emphasis in original). The bodily matter that 
leaks, washes, bleeds or erupts out of the orifices and skin is simultaneously part of 
oneself and yet "permanently thrust aside in order to live" (ibid.). Kristeva (1980/2004, 
p.231) sees the abject in a "wound with blood and pus, or the sickly, acrid smell of sweat, 
of decay ... refuse and corpses". Filth, the underside of the "clean and proper (in the sense 
of incorporated and incorporable)" threatens the body because it resists assimilation, and 
so threatens to contaminate it with its own properties. Dirt defiles because is out of place, 
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has traversed a boundary (ibid.). Purification rituals are based on re-establishing this 
boundary and so "enact symbolic separation from the maternal body" (Smith, 1998, 
p.33). 
The abject, then, is most broadly manifest in aU that threatens the boundaries between 
inside and outside, self and other, individual and world: 
what disrupts identity, systems, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. 
The in-between, the ambiguous (Kristeva, 1980/2004, p.232). 
As such, abjection exists, "beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. 
It lies there, quite close, but cannot be assimilated" (Kristeva, 1980/2004, p.230). It is 
what we can never quite get rid of, and also never quite integrate: that which hovers 
between expulsion and incorporation, but is processed by neither, is unmetabolisable. At 
the same time, the abject is also that which keeps us alive, keeps us ourselves, keeps us 
growing. "It is an alchemy that transforms death drive into a start of life, of new 
significance (ibid., p.241). For Kristeva, the aim of therapeutic treatment "is to reconnect 
soma and psyche" (Oliver, 2002, p.xxiv). 
2.n Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a review of psychoanalytic literature on the role of the body in 
the reciprocal processes of containment and trauma, focussing on the anaclitic 
relationship between body and mind, mother and child, during early development. While 
the theorists discussed in this review share an understanding of an initial state of 
mergence in both these sets of relationships, they offer specific understandings of the 
subsequent processes of differentiation and integration, as wen as the consequences when 
these are not successfully negotiated. In a sense they can be seen as anacliticaUy related: 
each theory being rooted in, yet departing from, its predecessors. There are some threads 
across these relationships: Bick, Anzieu and Kristeva all depart from traditional Freudian 
and Kleinian thinking in their understanding of earlier, archaic experience. Bion and 
Segal emphasise distinction between body and mind as essential for development and 
how this goes wrong under trauma, the collapse back into indistinction. While Winnicott 
emphasises integration, Kristeva brings into focus what cannot be integrated. Winnicott, 
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Anzieu and Kristeva in different ways conceive of that which hovers between these 
processes: the transitional realm, the Skin Ego, the abject which suggests that the passage 
from mergence to differentiation to integration is never neat or absolute, but is always in 
tension. The psychoanalytic concepts reviewed in this chapter will be used as a lens 
through which to analyse the process of therapy in the case of a multiply traumatised 
young boy. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter provides a rationale for the use of the qualitative clinical case study in this 
research, which is theoretically and methodologically situated in psychoanalysis. It 
begins with an outline of the pwpose of this study, and then delineates the research 
design. After noting the context in which this study took place, details of the child 
participant and the nature of the therapeutic intervention are described. The method of 
data collection and analysis are then discussed. Finally, ethical considerations are 
addressed. 
3.1 Research aims 
This clinical case study aims to develop a clinical and theoretical understanding of the 
relationship between physical and psychic processes in a two-year psychoanalytically-
oriented therapy with a child trauma survivor. The anaclitic relationship between psyche 
and soma is a basic premise of psychoanalytic thought, and is richly although implicitly 
woven into psychoanalytic thinking. However, the historical review of psychoanalytic 
literature on the role of the body in the reciprocal conditions of containment and 
traumatisation revealed a dearth of writing explicitly addressing this topic in its own 
right, or drawing together the many references to it as a building-block in psychoanalytic 
thinking. In analysing the case material through the lens of this reviewed literature, I 
integrate these disparate theories on the role of physical and psychological processes in 
containment and traumatisation, drawing on points of resonance between them. More 
specifically, I explore the roles of, and interactions between, the therapist and child 
client's bodies (as well as the material things that come to represent these), in repeating 
and repairing processes of early maternal containment (or 'developmental trauma') and 
chronic exposure to deprivation, punishment and sexual abuse (,external trauma'). My 
aims are twofold: firstly, in reading the therapeutic process through this theoretical lens, I 
seek to gain a deeper understanding of this and other such clinical processes; secondly, I 
hope that this empirical material can be fed back to enrich theoretical conceptions of the 
relationship between body and mind in containment and traumatisation. 
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3.2 Research design 
This research constitutes a qualitative, clinical, psychoanalytic case study. Below, I 
briefly defme and outline qualitative research, case study design in general, clinical case 
studies in particular, and then the specifically psychoanalytic case study. After explaining 
why I have chosen this design for the current research, I examine the limitations of each 
of these forms of case study, as well as rationales for their use with reference to the 
current case. 
Qualitative research is acknowledged as difficult to define, as its meaning differs across 
contexts, while it crosses paradigms, disciplines and methodologies (Banister, Burman, 
Parker, Taylor & Tindall, 1994; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Silverman, 2000). Attempts at 
a broad defmition include several key elements. Qualitative research is interpretative, and 
focuses on human and social experience and processes, particularly meaning-making. 
These experiences and processes are investigated in their natural settings. In so doing, the 
role of the researcher in shaping the research is acknowledged, and research is ethically 
and politically positioned. The findings of qualitative research are understood not as 
singular, static truths, but as attempts to make sense of the subject matter in ways that 
hold multiple and often contradictory meanings (Banister et. aI, 1994; Denzin & Lincoln, 
1994). In conceptualising the qualitative researcher as bricoleur, Denzin & Lincoln (ibid., 
p.3) therefore speak of the "product of the bricoleur's labour" as, 
. .. a bricolage, a complex, dense, reflexive, collagelike creation that represents the 
researcher's images, understandings, and interpretations of the world or phenomenon 
under analysis. This bricolage will ... connect the parts to the whole, stressing the 
meaningful relationships that operate in the situations and social worlds studied. 
The case study in general is also recognised as difficult to defme, as the term is used 
widely and inconsistently, both within and beyond the research arena (Hammersley & 
Gomm, 2000; Stake, 1994; Yin, 2003). Broad definitions of the case study focus on the 
following features: This research design investigates relatively few (and often just a 
singular) case/s, but does so in an in-depth way. The casels occur naturally in social 
reality rather than being constructed by the researcher as in the laboratory (therapeutic 
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interventions are considered 'natural' in that they are not set up for the purposes of 
research). Case study data is usually analysed through qualitative means, although this is 
not always the case (Stake, 1994). These factors mean that, "the case study method 
allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life 
events" (Yin, 2003, p.2). The case study design is therefore considered most fitting for 
research questions which ask 'how ... ' or 'what ... ', and which focus on current, real-life 
phenomena which the researcher seeks to understand but not control (ibid). Within the 
social sciences, the case study design is currently acknowledged as an appropriate 
methodology for investigating complex social and psychological phenomena (Yin, 2003). 
Clinical case studies examine particular therapeutic processes, and can be defined 
"heterogeneously to denote several different things, including the focus on the individual, 
reliance on anecdotal information, and the absence of experimental controls" (Kazdin, 
1981, p.184-5). The clinical case study has been central in the development of 
psychoanalysis and of clinical psychology, in which individual cases, as well as series of 
cases, "have exerted remarkable influence on subsequent research and practice (Kazdin, 
1981, p.184). Despite this, clinical case studies have historically been marginalised and 
criticised within psychological research for their limited capacity to support scientific 
inferences (see below). In response to this, there have been recent calls to re-centralise 
and legitimate the clinical case study within this field, and so "for restoring the case study 
to its former prominence as a vehicle for systematically reporting and evaluating clinical 
observations, exploring theory, and documenting advances in professional effectiveness" 
(Fishman, 2005, p.2). The case study is argued to be particularly appropriate in this field 
as ''the basic unit of psychological practice is the case" (ibid., p.1). Clinical case studies 
therefore have the potential to bridge the widely recognised - and lamented - divide 
between psychological research and practice (Barlow, 1981; Hayes, 1981). It is argued 
that this form of research is compatible with clinical practice as "[b ]oth the science and 
the practice of psychotherapy involve at their core a hypothesis-testing procedure" 
(Kiesler, 1981, p.214), and it is this scientific aspect of clinical work that case study 
research utilises: 
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There can be no doubt that most of what the field has learned about psychotherapy since 
Breuer treated his famous patient Anna O. a century ago has come from astute and 
creative clinical observations. In other words, the human observer in this as in other areas 
of scientific work reigns supreme. As participants in and observers of immensely intricate 
human interactions, we have the opportunity - if we are sufficiently ingenious, 
perceptive, and sensitive - to make observations, discern connections, form hypotheses, 
and, within limits, test them... In an important sense, as advocates of the single case 
studies reconfirm, each therapeutic dyad constitutes an experiment, albeit an experiment 
with built-in limitations (Strupp, 1981, p.216). 
Since Freud, the psychoanalytic case study has been the principal method for presenting 
psychotherapeutic material, and psychoanalytic knowledge has evolved largely through 
the accumulation and cross-examination of single cases to form a meta-theory (Attwood 
& Stolorow, 1993). Although it is therefore the tradition upon which the field of 
psychoanalysis has been built, there is a surprising dearth of literature on the 
psychoanalytic case study as research methodology. Psychoanalytic case study research 
enables both depth and specificity through the recognition and exploration of meaning as 
layered and as shaped by unconscious processes (Gibson, 2002). The goal of what 
Attwood and Stolorow (1993, p.27) call the "intensive, in-depth case study", or 
"psychobiographical research" (ibid., p.31), is therefore ''the illumination of the inner 
pattern of a life, the distinctive structure of meanings that connects the different parts of 
an individual's world into an intelligible whole" (ibid., p.28). They identify three 
distinguishing features of this methodology: Firstly, it is "inherently personalistic and 
phenomenological" (ibid, p.27, emphasis in original), assuming that the topic under 
investigation can best be understood "in the context of the individual's personal world" 
(ibid., p.27-8). Secondly, this personal world is conceived as a "life-historical 
phenomenon" (ibid., p.28), the research therefore being temporally situated in relation to 
individual development (rather than a comparison across a population of different 
individuals). Thirdly, the case study method is "clinical and interpretive (rather than 
experimental or deductive)" (ibid., emphasis in original), understanding of individuals 
being arrived at through the analysis of existing clinical material rather than the testing of 
pre-specified hypotheses. This process gives rise to what Attwood & Stolorow (ibid., 
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p.28) identify as ''provisionally identified meanings", which are then contrasted, 
compared and linked together to make up the overall case analysis. 
The qualitative single-case study has been chosen as the most appropriate design for 
capturing the complex clinical processes under examination in this research, which is 
focussed on meaning-making rather than arriving at a singular truth. A single case has 
been used to enable sufficiently in-depth exploration of the therapeutic material. 
I now examine critiques and limitations of these various forms of case studies, as well as 
the ways in which proponents of this form of research answer to these, making reference 
to the current study. Broad critiques of the qualitative case study as a form of research 
design focus on its lack of objectivity and limited generalisability (Hammersley & 
Gomm, 2000; Hollway & Jefferson, 2000; Stake, 1994; Yin, 2003). A counter-argument 
in relation to the former is that qualitative case studies do not claim to be objective, but 
rather explore, and make explicit, the subjectivity of the researcher and the ways in which 
this shapes the research (ibid.). This means that, "Subjectivity is a resource, not a 
problem, for a theoretically and pragmatically sufficient explanation" (Banister et al., 
1994, p.13). Reflexivity is therefore fundamental to qualitative case study research, in 
which the role of the researchers' own assumptions and motivations is acknowledged, as 
is the more basic premise that the act of research win always change what is being 
studied (Denzin and Hcoln, 1994). In the current study, I draw on my counter-
transference experiences in making meaning of the therapeutic material. 
In response to the second critique mentioned above, it is argued on the one hand that the 
strength of case studies lies in their particularity rather than generalisability (Stake, 
1995), and on the other that case study findings are generalisable to theory rather than 
populations (Hammersley & Gomm, 2000; Silverman, 2000). Yin (2003, p.32-3) calls 
this 'analytic' (as opposed to statistical) generalisation, in which "a previously developed 
theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case 
study". Theory therefore plays a central role in most qualitative case study designs, 
providing a frame through which the data is selected, gathered and interpreted, as wen as 
being the (evolving) end-point into which the fmdings are fed. Particularly in single-case 
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studies, this end-point may include attempts to "confum, challenge, or extend" (Yin, 
2003, p.40) particular theories, which the single case critically tests. The present case 
study design is based on what HoUway & Jefferson (2000, p.107) call "theoretically 
driven research questions": it is in the light of the reviewed literature on the role of the 
body in psychoanalytic understandings of trauma and containment, that I explore the 
relationship between physical and psychic processes in the therapy process with a child 
trauma survivor. 
With regard to clinical case studies in particular, limitations centre on the ability to draw 
valid inferences about anything with a sample size of one on the one hand, and on the 
other to draw inferences about changes in personality and functioning, as inevitable 
confounding variables may mask what change is in fact due to the therapeutic 
intervention (Kazdin, 1981). With regard to the first, it is argued that accumulations of 
case studies over time can be compared and contrasted within and between groups of 
homogenous patients/participants, from which valid inferences can be drawn, and 
through which the "N = 1 study achieves a legitimate place in the confiImatory aspects of 
scientific activity" (Kiesler, 1981, p.213). More recently, Fishman (2005, p.1) argues for 
the systematic organisation of individual case studies into "journal-databases" through 
which they can be utilised in a coordinated way. While both these limitations are 
acknowledged with regards to this study, this research is concerned with psychological 
change in relation to the shifting role of the physical in relation to the psychic, rather than 
in measuring or making claims about the efficacy of the treatment as a whole. 
Turning to the limitations of the psychoanalytic case study, Attwood & Stolorow (1993, 
p.9) note that "It might appear that this kind of work creates a paradox, in that the 
proposed interpretations might depend, like the mythical snake that devours itself by 
swallowing its own tail, on concepts from the very theories being analysed". While the 
validity of particular insights can be established by assessing the coherence of these 
'provisionally identified meanings' with the analysis as a whole, validity of the complete 
analyses can therefore "only be tentatively established, as it relies upon interpretive 
criteria pertaining to coherence of argument, comprehensiveness of explanation, 
consistency with accepted psychological knowledge, and the aesthetic beauty of the 
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analysis in disclosing previously hidden patterns in the material being investigated" 
(ibid., p.29). Attwood & Stolorow (ibid., p.29) understand that it is this complexity that 
has led psychological research to tum to forms of analysis that yield "more certain 
results", but they believe this "abandonment" of psychoanalytic case analysis to be 
''based on a deploringly mistaken understanding of the purposes and rationale of the case-
study approach, the goal of which is not arrive at final truths and incontrovertible general 
principles, but rather at significant theoretical ideas and promising lines of research". 
They conclude that "This approach is primarily a strategy of discovery and not a strategy 
of proof' (ibid.). In this study I read the clinical material through the lens of the reviewed 
literature, and seek in so doing in some way both to further understanding of the 
therapeutic process and to contribute to theory-building in this field (rather than to use 
either data or theory to prove one another). It is hoped that this win enable a mutually 
enriching, rather than circular or 'self-devouring' , process. 
3.3 Context of study 
This study took place at the Child Guidance Clinic (CGC), a University Clinic where I 
did my first year of training in clinical psychology in 2006. It involves a single child 
participant, who was my 'long-term' therapy client during the two years of my clinical 
psychology training. The therapy itself spanned 19 months, from April 2006 until 
November 2007, and included 69 weekly therapy sessions, as wen as regular feedback 
and psycho-education sessions with Chad's aunt and primary caretaker, Natasha, and his 
teachers. During this period, I attended weekly clinical supervision sessions. Chad was 
seven years old, and repeating Grade 1, when we began therapy, and nine, and 
completing Grade 2, at termination. He is a coloured IS child, living with his paternal aunt 
Natasha, her husband and his adult daughter, in a lower-middle class suburb on the Cape 
Flats (further details regarding the case history will be discussed in Chapter 4). While 
IS This term reflects the racial categorisation of apartheid, and is used here because it still has descriptive 
meaning in South Africa, but its racist implications are rejected by the researcher. The particular meanings 
and implications of Chad's skin colour will be explored in Chapter 4. 
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Chad had spoken Afrikaans with his biological parents, he spoke only English with 
Natasha and her family, and attended an English-medium school. 
3.4 Intervention 
This was a psychoanalytically oriented therapy with an emphasis on free play16, but I 
drew on some narrative therapy techniques, particularly at the start of therapy when some 
structure was needed to contain Chad's anxiety. These included the making and 
decorating of a box in which to keep his drawings and other objects he made in therapy, 
and a book in which to draw and write. In this section I briefly outline the evolution and 
nature of child psychotherapy, with emphasis on a particular adaptation of this for work 
with traumatised children that was drawn on in this therapy. 
Freud ascribed central importance to early childhood in his understanding of adult 
suffering, and applied some of his techniques for adult psychoanalysis to children, 
ushering in a new era of taking children and their struggles seriously (Glenn, 1992). In so 
doing, however, he tended to treat children as 'little adults', and it was left to Anna Freud 
and Melanie Klein to systematically develop psychotherapeutic techniques appropriate 
for children (ibid.). These made central use of playas the natural fonn of expression of 
children. While their work differed in some respects, Anna Freud and Melanie Klein 
shared 
a strong belief in the importance of the child's imaginative life as developed in the matrix 
of family relationships and as expressed symbolically through play ..• Thus play, as the 
16 I follow Boston's (1977, p.23) distinguishing between psychoanalytic psychotherapy with children and 
what she notes is "popularly referred to as 'play therapy'" by the fact that for the fOlmer, play is understood 
to be "only one of many of the child's ways of conveying his feelings and thoughts to the therapist. It is the 
understanding of the communication rather than the opportunity for free play which is therapeutically 
important." 
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crucial idiom of childhood, remains the medium through which child analytic therapy is 
conducted (Likierman & Urban, 1999, p.29). 
Play is understood to exist in the intermediary realm between fantasy and enactment 
(Marans, 1993). Here, "wishes and their consequences, conflicts and their solutions, can 
be manipulated or tried in multiple forms and configurations ... [which] allows the child 
to titrate fantasy and real life" (ibid., p. 183). Closely associated with play, the capacity 
for symbolisation is considered crucial in child psychotherapy, and "is linked, 
psychoanalytically, to the perception of separateness from the mother and the need to 
bridge that gap" (Home, 1999, p.34). For Melanie Klein (1979, pp.137-8), symbolisation 
was both the medium and objective of the technique of play therapy she developed, in 
which she "made full use of the archaic language of symbolisation, which I recognised to 
be an essential part of the child's mode of expression ... the capacity to use symbols 
enable [ling] the child to transfer not only interests but also fantasies, anxieties and guilt 
to objects other than people". As Home (1999, p.35) articulates, 
This ability to symbolise what has been feared and to place it outside, for perusal and 
hence to acquire control, is important for later adolescent and adult capacities to think, to 
gain mastery and not be overwhelmed, and helps in the process of not having to act out 
what might otherwise feel uncontainable (Home, 1999, p.35). 
The central aim of psychoanalytic work with children is to address and unblock areas of 
development that have become stuck, and so to enable normal developmental processes 
to resume (Lanyado & Home, 1999). As growth towards independence always involves 
loss of a prior state of dependence, which is then regressed to under stress (Home, 1999), 
child psychotherapy involves a central interplay between progressive and regressive 
tendencies (Anderson, 2002). The role of the child psychotherapist is therefore to "reach 
and effect change in the child's inner world" (Boston, 1977, p.22), while holding and 
sometimes working with their external world in so far as this impinges upon their internal 
world. This role echoes that of parenting, and it is often a form of re-parenting that 
children need in therapy. It is therefore this "constantly evolving relationship between the 
therapist and the patient [that] lies at the heart of aU psychoanalytic work and is the main 
vehicle for psychic change" (Lanyado & Home, 1999, p.56). Through this transference 
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relationship, the child is able to "re-experience, in relation to the therapist, anxieties and 
conflicts that originated in the crucial early interactions (or perhaps lack of them) 
between the parent and himself' (Boston, 1977, p.2S, emphasis in original). Thus, 
although the problems children present usually relate to their current external worlds, and 
are rooted in their early parental relationships, therapeutic change is understood to occur 
through "the 'here and now' of the meeting of two people, the therapist and the child" 
(Lanyado & Home, 1999, p.56). 
Interpretation also plays an important, and related, role in child psychotherapy, entailing 
the "putting into simple words, appropriate to the patient, the therapist's understanding of 
what is taking place in the developing relationship between the two of them" (Boston, 
1977, p.24). Through such interpretation, it is hoped that the child will gain insight into 
the feelings and actions arising in the therapeutic relationship. ' his insight, which needs 
to be emotionally located and not just intellectual, should enable the child to gradually 
come to contain his or her own anxieties and so intemalise the role of the therapist (ibid). 
Alongside this introjection of the containing function of the therapist, projection is 
recognised as central to psychoanalytic child therapy, as it is through this process that the 
internal world of children is revealed and engaged with in symbolic play and in the 
transference relationship (ibid.). The physical setting is of central importance in 
psychotherapeutic work with children, regularity in time and space providing consistency 
and containment. 'This physical space reflects the space in the therapist's mind which is 
uninterruptedly available for the child for the duration of the session (Lanyado & Home, 
1999; Sternberg, 2006). Play material is designed to be used as an aid to symbolic 
expression (ibid.). 
Assessment for child psychotherapy involves gauging the child's ego resources and thus 
their capacity to confront their struggles and bear distress, as wen as to form and sustain a 
therapeutic alliance (Anderson, 2002). Both the internal and external worlds of the child 
are therefore examined in an attempt to ascertain the child's "capacity to cope with 
mental pain" (ibid., p.19). While initially psychoanalytic psychotherapy was only 
undertaken with neurotic children, more recently this approach has been applied and 
adapted for psychotic, traumatised and deprived children (Home & Lanyado, 1999). In 
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her work with chronically abused children, Anne Alvarez (1992) problematises the notion 
of psychological trauma, as it "assumes some degree of previous trauma-free 
development, and, in the case of abused children, some notion of non-abuse, of self-
respect and self-valuation" (p.IS3). Instead, Alvarez understands that, 
something may need to grow for the first time. This is a slow delicate process and may be 
more akin to the way mothers, by attunement and shared mental states, provide alpha 
function for their babies, than to older psychoanalytic models of recovering lost splits and 
lost projections" (ibid., p.91, emphasis added). 
This is associated with the concept of the therapist as a new developmental object (and 
not just a transference object) central to the work of the British Independent School 
(Sternberg, 2006). According to this thinking, change is understood to occur through the 
new relational experience in therapy (rather than only through insight or understanding). 
Thus, ''psychoanalysis depends on the repetition of some aspects of the mother-infant 
relationship, such as attunement, holding in mind and containment" (Sternberg, 2006). 
Anne Hurry's work in particular explores the role of the therapist as new developmental 
object, which involves re-parenting so as to enable the child client to go through 
developmental processes that did not happen at the appropriate age. It is the role of 
maternal container that the therapist often assumes, through which: 
The patient learns to experience acute emotions in the presence of another, the therapist, 
whose capacity to bear them and think about them gradually enables the patient to 
introject the possibility of doing the same... The therapist who is able to bear staying 
with the unbearable feelings creates both a space within which it becomes safe to think 
and a model of that capacity which can be developed over time (ibid., p,46) 
This role is, 
not about making up deficits in a gratifying way but about providing a relational 
framework so that these representations and processes can unfold in a relational context. 
It could be thought of as the relationship within which experiences of mentalisability can 
arise (ibid.). 
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3.5 Data collection 
The data used in this case study were generated as an inherent part of the therapeutic 
process, constituting the various means by which this process was documented for 
clinical, supervisory and record-keeping purposes. This documentation took the form of 
clinical case notes, supervision notes, video footage, transcripts, and drawings. Firstly, 
detailed clinical case notes were written from memory after each weekly therapy session. 
These document and explore both the content and process material arising in each 
session, including counter-transference responses. Secondly, notes were taken during 
weekly supervision meetings, in which each therapy session was reviewed (often while 
replaying video footage). These included technical and theoretical input into the 
therapeutic process, as wen as exploration of 'micro-moments' ithin a particular 
session, and counter-transference experiences. Thirdly, each session was recorded with 
video footage. Fourthly, this footage was used to transcribe various key sessions for 
academic and supervisory purposes. Finally, the drawings made by the child client over 
the course of therapy were kept in his file along with any comments he made about these. 
Thus multiple sources of evidence are drawn on in keeping with recommendations for 
qualitative case studies (Yin, 2003). 
3.6 Data analysis 
The data in this qualitative case study are interpreted through the psychoanalytic 
framework, which emphasises the exploration of layered, subjectively constructed and 
unconsciously influenced meaning, as opposed to the rmding of objective 'facts' (Gibson, 
2002). This form of data analysis makes use of the concept of interpretation comparable 
to, yet distinct from, that used in the clinical setting, and is centred in theory on the one 
hand and reflexivity on the other (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). This interaction between 
theory and reflexivity in the analysis of data is expressed in Attwood & Stolorow's 
(1993, p.9) understanding that psychoanalytic research "always entails a complex back-
and-forth movement between theoretical constructions and the phenomena being 
studied", and so involves, 
a series of inferences into a person's psychological life, ideally alternating and interacting 
with the investigator'S acts of reflection upon the inevitable involvement of his own 
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personal reality in the ongoing investigation. By lifting the particularising impact of his 
personal subjectivity into reflexive awareness, the investigator seeks to deepen and 
broaden the interpretations that are brought to bear on the case material (ibid, p.28-9). 
Attwood & Stolorow (1993) identify two phases in the psychoanalytic data analysis. 
Firstly, the individual's internal psychic world must be formulated according to "the 
unique dimensions of which his experiences are organised, the central concerns and 
dilemmas that are for him subjectively salient, and the recurrent thematic configurations 
of self and other (and associated affects) that pervade his world" (ibid., p.31). This is 
based on the psychoanalytic assumption that "subjective experience, viewed across a 
variety of situations and over a sufficient span of time, is always thematically organised 
around some more or less coherent set of nuclear concerns and, furthermore, that these 
concerns arise out of critical formative events in the person's life" (ibid., p.32). The 
second phase of analysis involves the "clarification of the developmental origins and of 
the functional significance of the particular organising configurations in the person's 
subjective world" (ibid.). This entails historically locating the central themes and 
concerns that have been identified in the first phase, in relation to individual 
development. This reconstruction of "the genesis of his psychological world" (ibid.) 
occurs with reference to factual information about the individual's life history and 
circumstances. The two phases of analysis are clearly inter-related as 
understanding of the person's present experiential states will to some extent guide ... 
inquiry into developmental history, and it will influence the determination of which 
formative events we should regard as critically important. Conversely, information about 
critical developmental situations may alter and transform the provisional characterisation 
of a subjective world. Every case thus involves a dialectical process in which the 
descriptive and genetic phases reciprocally interpenetrate and illuminate one another 
(ibid.). 
The credibility of psychoanalysis as an analytic tool in the research setting has been 
problematised (Honway & Jefferson, 2000). Critiques rest on the subjective nature of 
psychoanalytic interpretations, which are shaped by personal and social characteristics of 
the researcher. However, proponents of this form of analysis emphasise the importance of 
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acknowledging the limitations of objectivity and utilising, rather than trying to exclude, 
subjectivity (ibid.). Counter-transference and intersubjectivity thus become tools in a 
psychoanalytic analysis, which enables a "tolerance for paradox and uncertainty" 
(Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, p.7S) so important in this form of inquiry. Psychoanalytic 
interpretation therefore requires exploration of unconscious motivations in both 
researcher and participant/s, as wen as the dynamics between them. In this way, 
psychoanalytic data analysis can be seen, like therapeutic interpretation, as more of an 
'art' than a 'science' (ibid.). 
In this study, I interpret the clinical material in relation to my formulation of Chad's 
psychic functioning which has been shaped through the reviewed literature, as well as 
through my counter-transference experiences. The clinical case notes, along with 
supervision notes, transcripts and drawings, were analysed thematically, and organised 
into four predominant, although inter-related, themes. Clinical vignettes illustrating these 
themes are included in the fmdings and discussion section of this thesis (Chapter 4). This 
process of reviewing, sifting through, analysing, synthesising and writing up the therapy 
material has felt analogous to the central theme of psychic digestion. Thus this academic 
process has held echoes of the therapeutic one in which I took into myself, felt, thought 
about, made meaning of, and eventually returned, feelings that were given to me in their 
raw, undigested, often chaotic and overwhelming form. In so doing, I have found the 
theory to be containing. 
3.7 Ethical considerations 
As with all clients of the cae, Chad's aunt as primary caretaker was informed at the fIrst 
intake that this is a teaching institution and that all clinical material may be used for 
training or research purposes. At this time, N atasha signed a written consent form giving 
pennission for this eventuality. When it was decided (a year into the therapy process) to 
write up this case for the current study, this was discussed extensively with Natasha. The 
nature and purpose of the study were explained to her in general terms, and she was given 
time to think through any concerns she might have. After reflection, her written consent 
was given (see Appendix for copy of consent form). It was explained to her that should 
she wish to withdraw this at any point, this would be respected and the study would be 
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discontinued. She was also assured that all personal information would be changed so as 
to protect the identity of her nephew and herself. Thus voluntary participation, 
confidentiality and informed written consent were secured from the primary caretaker in 
keeping with American Psychological Association guidelines on research with children 
(http://www.apa.orgldivisionldiv7). 
While these guidelines indicate that child participants of psychological research should 
be informed of the research and give verbal assent, this was complexified in the current 
study by the fact that the child participant was in an ongoing therapeutic process with the 
researcher as therapist. After careful thought and discussion with clinical and research 
supervisors, the decision was made not to inform the child client about this study. This 
decision was based on concern regarding the therapeutic implications that this 
information might hold for this particular child at that juncture in the therapeutic process, 
as well the understanding that given his cognitive developmental stage, the child client 
would not really be able to understand the concept of a research study such as this. This 
decision was made in keeping with the recommendation that such decisions regarding 
informed consent in research drawing on clinical material, particularly in cases of child 
clients, are made on an individual basis, and with flexibility, wisdom and discretion in 
order to balance the therapeutic needs of the patient with the profession's need for 
research on the clinical process (Lanyado & Home, 1999). 
The concept of 'informed consent' has in itself been problematised, particularly in the 
context of psychoanalytic research, where, it is argued, this "cannot be reduced to a 
conscious, cognitive process" (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, p.88). Moreover, it is 
acknowledged that, "There are occasions when consent is not the primary ethical 
principle, but is contradicted by another" (ibid. p.94). In such cases, it is arguably 
sufficient to get consent from some but not all parties involved (ibid.). In the current 
study, consent from the child client was understood to have posed a potential risk to the 
therapy process, and so to contradict the ethical principle of avoidance of distress. In 
keeping with Hollway and Jefferson's (2000) guidelines, and given that all other ethical 
principles were met, it was therefore deemed sufficient to get informed consent from his 
primary caretaker. 
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The need to obtain informed consent from Chad's biological parents was considered, and 
discussed with clinical and research supervisors. Consensus was that under the 
circumstances of both parent's psychological instability and impaired functioning 
(associated with their continued substance abuse and the fact that at the time Chad's 
father was in and out of psychiatric institutions), they would not have been in a position 
to give meaningful informed consent. Their incapacitated state also meant that Chad's 
parents were not at all involved in his care, and had not been for the two years of Chad's 
therapy. The decision was therefore reached that, although not ideal, it was adequate 
under these circumstances to have obtained consent from Natasha in her role as Chad's 
primary caretaker and effective, although not legal, guardian. In addition, before giving 
her consent, Natasha consulted with other members of the family directly involved in 
Chad's caretaking. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This qualitative research entails a clinical, and specifically psychoanalytic, case study 
that seeks to enrich both clinical and theoretical understandings of the relationship 
between physical and psychic processes in relation to conditions of containment and 
traumatisation during a therapeutic process with a child trauma survivor. This is 
embarked on in the light of identified gaps in psychoanalytic literature on this topic, and 
of the relevance of this question for therapy with multiply traumatised children in South 
Africa. This chapter has articulated these aims, outlined the research design, detailed the 
context of this study and the nature of the therapeutic intervention, described data 
collection and analysis, and noted ethical considerations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter is an analysis of the therapeutic material through the lens of the literature 
reviewed in chapter two. I begin by outlining the case history, and then discuss the 
therapeutic material through four inter-related themes: firstly, Chad's relationship to me 
and my body as maternal object, through themes of breaking and sticking; secondly, the 
taking in of external goodness through bodily incorporation of food and symbolic 
introjection of care and understanding; thirdly, Chad's sense of himself and his body in 
relation to the revealing and concealing of internal badness; and fmally, the getting rid of 
badness through physical expulsion and psychic projection, with a move towards 
communication rather than evacuation of Chad's internal world. The shifting relationship 
between body and mind, self and mlother, will be central threads through this discussion. 
These will be explored in relation to Chad's 'developmental' trauma of inadequate early 
maternal containment, layered with 'external' traumas of deprivation, punishment and 
abuse, which are understood to have ruptured whatever degree of internal containment he 
may have internalised. Throughout this discussion, I draw on psychoanalytic concepts 
reviewed in the literature to make meaning of the case material. In order to retain 
something of the immediacy and aliveness of the therapeutic process in this discussion, 
and to avoid repetition, the theoretical lens will be applied in an implicit and integrated 
manner, with references to concepts from specific theorists being bracketed but their 
theories not explicitly reiterated. Explicit linkage between the findings emerging from 
this analYSis and the reviewed literature will be the focus of the concluding chapter. 
4.1 Case history 
Chad is very small for his age (which may reflect a stunting of growth due to early 
malnourishment). He has a Malaysian-looking complexion, with dark skin, dark eyes and 
dark hair which is neatly cropped (the significance of his skin colour will be explored 
below). Chad's general appearance and posture differed markedly on different days, 
seeming to shift according to changing internal states: sometimes he arrived full of 
energy and excitement, his body upright and clothes neat, moving with a vividness and 
agility, his speech rapid and engaged; at other times his whole being seemed to 'flop', his 
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body sagging in a strangely awkward way, as though he was experiencing internal pain, 
and he seemed terrible fragile. his clothes worn sloppily, his speech slow and almost 
slurred; at other times, as will be explored below, he acted as a punitive, very angry and 
controlling, even malicious adult; at yet others as a weeping, forlorn, distraught, or 
accusatory child. The feeling of vulnerability that Chad projected seemed to elicit 
nurturing and protective responses in all who set eyes on him at the Child Guidance 
Clinic - so many people who saw him walking to or from the therapy room told me they 
just wanted to hug him! My counter-transference responses to Chad win be explored in 
relation to the case material below, but in general they ranged from a similar sense of 
intense maternal protectiveness and warm affection, to a sense of intimidation and real 
terror, to feelings of helpless, of being overwhelmed, in despair and shock and sorrow. 
For a long time I seemed to fluctuate between feeling saturated or too fun, at times even 
physically nauseous, with an I felt I was carrying, and a sense of emptiness, of blankness, 
of being unable to think, and a profound not knowing. 
Chad was referred to the CGC in February 2005, by his paternal aunt and primary 
caretaker, Natasha, but on the recommendation of his class teacher. The reason for 
referral was concern by his aunt and class teacher about his inability to cope 
academically, behaviourally, socially and emotionally. They attributed these problems in 
particular to his history of sexual abuse (see below). In 2005, Chad was assessed at the 
COC, and psychometric testing was undertaken. The results of the cognitive assessment 
indicated that Chad was functioning in the range of Mild Mental Retardation. However, it 
was acknowledged that the emotional impact of his traumatic history (see below) was 
probably affecting his performance. The emotional assessment pointed to Chad's 
insecurity and experience of himself as 'bad' or 'damaged', It was recommended that he 
repeat Grade 1 and be referred for long-term play therapy at the CGC the following year. 
This history was obtained from the file records of the clinician who had seen Chad during 
2005, which he obtained from interviewing Natasha and Chad's class teacher, To this 
was added information that arose during my own contact with Natasha and the teacher 
over the course of 2006 and 2007. Our knowledge of Chad's early development is 
therefore limited through lack of contact with his biological parents, who in most 
likelihood would not have been able to provide a coherent history. 
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Chad has a history of extreme deprivation, neglect and abuse. His parent's relationship, 
which had centred on substance and alcohol abuse, ended soon after his birth. Chad and 
his three older siblings (a girl and two boys), about whom Natasha did not know anything 
further, remained with his mother. They lived in impoverished, overcrowded and chaotic 
conditions, where Chad witnessed drug-taking, sex and violence. He was physically and 
emotionally neglected, often going hungry and unwashed, and unattended to when 
distressed. Chad was at the same time emotionally and physically abused: in particular, 
he was subjected to malicious forms of punishment such as being made to stand in a 
comer for long periods of time, often for no particular reason or for the 'entertainment' of 
the adults. When he was five, Chad was sexually abused by his maternal uncle, who was 
living in the same house. Chad told his father, who visited periodically, that this man had 
been "rubbing himself' against him. His father reported this to his sister Natasha, whom 
Chad visited over weekends. She arranged a medical examination for Chad, which 
showed evidence of attempted penetration. A case was lodged but no action was taken. 
After this, Chad reportedly pleaded with Natasha not to return him to his mother's house. 
A family decision was taken that Chad live with Natasha and her family, and that she 
undertake all the duties of primary caretaker. He continues to live with Natasha, her 
husband and his daughter, where he is loved, very well cared for, and comfortably 
provided for. Chad's parents continue to abuse substances and according to Natasha to be 
severely debilitated by this. His father was in and out of Valkenberg Psychiatric Hospital 
during the course of our therapy. Over these two years, Natasha attempted to establish a 
regular visiting arrangement for Chad with both his parents, but this was frequently 
disrupted when either were in too unstable a state to see Chad, and he therefore went for 
long periods without seeing his biological parents. Natasha reported that he would 
sometimes ask to see his father, but never even mentioned his mother, and seemed 
reluctant to see her. 
Natasha reports that for a long time Chad was terrified of being abandoned by her and 
returned to his mother, and was very compliant and withdrawn, apparently trying to get 
everything 'right' to avoid punishment and abandonment. Chad began Grade 1 in 2005, 
and here too was initially very 'good' as well as extremely anxious about possible 
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punishment. He gradually developed a very close and trusting relationship with his class 
teacher, who was exceptionally caring and committed to Chad. Because he reportedly 
remained very anxious around other adults at school, this teacher decided to remain with 
him when he had to repeat Grade 1 (see below), rather than proceeding with the class to 
Grade 2 as would ordinarily be the case, so providing him with continuity and safety. 
Chad's initially compliant and 'good' behaviour gradually changed, apparently as he felt 
safe enough at home and at school, as well as at the COC, to express what he called his 
"bad behaviour". This extreme acting out was considered the most serious of his various 
presenting symptoms, which will now be discussed. 
4.1.1 Presenting problem 
When I frrst saw Chad in April 2006, he presented with the following (inter-related) 
symptom clusters: Firstly, Chad's behaviour was the most urgent source of concern. At 
school, he was victimising smaller children, teasing and bullying them, as well as 
initiating frequent fights in which he would kick, box and bite them. He was at the same 
time extremely disruptive and disobedient in class, swearing, screaming and laughing 
inappropriately. Although the school was aware of, and understanding about, the 
implications of Chad's traumatic history, his behaviour became so unmanageable that 
they threatened to expel him. At home, Chad was defiant and unmanageable, throwing 
frequent tantrums when he didn't get his way. Despite her genuine love for him and 
concern about his wellbeing, Natasha felt unable to cope and threatened to return Chad to 
his mother. Both at school and at home, Chad showed extreme anticipatory anxiety in 
relation to punishment, which led to inconsistent discipline. In both settings, the adults 
around him reported feeling overwhelmed and desperate. As will be discussed, psycho-
education and supportive work with N atasha and Chad's teacher was undertaken, and 
eventually seemed to help alleviate this crisis. 
Secondly, Chad displayed a marked deficit in social skills. He was unable to share with 
other children, and would become easily jealous and vindictive. Together with a very low 
frustration tolerance, this left him socially isolated. Thirdly, Chad was emotionally 
volatile, with periods of intense anger and hostility interspersed with times of withdrawal 
and weepiness, during which he would become overly compliant, apparently seeking to 
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be 'good' at get things right all the time. At the same time, Chad was extremely anxious 
about being abandoned by his aunt, teacher or therapist, and terrified of punishment by 
them. Chad also had an intense fear of the dark, and was preoccupied with the colour 
black, which he associated with his own skin. His teacher further reported that he would 
become distressed when the topic of sex was mentioned at school. Chad had a stutter, 
which his aunt, teacher and therapist all noted occurred when he became upset or 
anxious. Finally, while academically Chad was managing his second year in Grade 1 
better than the first, he still struggled significantly with concentration and memory, which 
impacted on his performance. His teacher also reported that Chad would become very 
distressed during tests, and that he was hypersensitive to failure. 
By the end of therapy, all of Chad's presenting symptoms had stabilised, and he was 
thriving in many areas. During the second year of therapy, Chad's behavioural problems 
settled completely. His teacher and aunt reported no problems in either setting - there 
was no longer any need for disciplining beyond a first warning! However, for a few 
weeks after termination was raised in therapy, Chad began acting out again (while he had 
only received two 'demerits' over the entire year, he accumulated 15 in the following two 
weeks). This was understood to be a response to the anxieties raised by termination. 
Socially, Chad had established a number of close friendships both in and out of school, 
was reported to interact well in group settings, and, according to his teacher, showed 
remarkable "compassion" towards other children. Emotionally, Chad's tantrums and 
specific fears disappeared completely. He displayed no anticipatory anxiety towards 
punishment, and diminished anxiety about separation and abandonment (although 
Natasha reported that he became more "clingy" towards the end of the therapy process). 
While Chad was no longer compliant and withdrawn, he did become weepy during 
particular stages of the therapy, most notably at termination. Chad's stutter cleared almost 
completely. Academically, Chad was assessed by his teacher to be an "above average 
student", producing "really high quality work" across all subjects, and leaving her with 
''no concerns" regarding his cognitive capacity. He also evidently enjoyed (mostly!) his 
school work, and was reported by his aunt and teacher to be self-motivated and confident. 
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4.1.2 Diagnosis 
Chad was initially diagnosed with Oppositional defiant disorder and Posttraumatic stress 
disorder (Chronic) on Axis I of the DSM-N, as wen as the Neglect of Child, Sexual 
Abuse of Child, Physical Abuse of Child and Parent Child Relational Problem. 
Symptoms of the fIrst condition included Chad's pattern of defIant behaviour, such as 
frequently losing his temper, arguing with adults, actively defying rules and deliberately 
annoying others, while at the same time being easily annoyed by others, angry and 
resentful. Chad displayed aU the symptom clusters of Chronic PTSD. Firstly, he appeared 
to be reexperiencing his traumatic past through reenactment (in his behaviour towards 
other children as wen as his play), recollections (through his drawings and play), distress 
at exposure to cues (such as during sex education) and apparent dissociative flashbacks. 
Secondly, Chad showed a pattern of avoidance of thoughts, feelings, and conversations 
associated with the traumas he had experience. Finally, hyperarousal was evidenced 
through Chad's irritability and angry outbursts, concentration difficulties and exaggerated 
startle response. Differential diagnoses on Axis I included Dysthymic Disorder 
(symptoms of which included irritable/depressed mood, fatigue, low self-esteem and poor 
concentration), and Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID). The fIrst was not diagnosed as 
the duration specifIcation could not be established. Although Chad did display evidence 
of distinct personality fragments (such as a fIerce, self-protective child and a punitive, 
angry adult), these were not sufficiently pervasive or stable to warrant diagnosis of DID. 
Chad's stutter was not diagnosed as it was not found to be severe or pervasive enough to 
impair his functioning. On Axis II, Chad was initially diagnosed with Mild Mental 
Retardation. No diagnosis was made on Axis III. On Axis N, the following was 
diagnosed: Problems with primary support group, Problems related to the social 
environment, Educational problems and Economic Problems. Chad was given a Global 
Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 55, indicating moderate symptoms and 
moderate difficulty in functioning. 
At the time of crisis in his home and school environments, Chad was given a/Children's 
Global Assessment Scale (C-GAS) score of 40, indicating major impairment in 
65 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
functioning in several areas and inability to function in one of these areas (at home, at 
school, with peers). 
On termination of therapy in 2007, Chad's only remaining diagnosis was of Parent Child 
Relational Problem. An the symptoms of his previously diagnosed Axis I disorders had 
stabilised, and his diagnosis of Mild Mental Retardation was ruled out when Chad's 
scholastic performance as wen as adaptive functioning improved markedly - the results 
of his initial assessment were understood to be reflective of his traumatic history and 
post-traumatic state. On Axis HI, Problems with the primary support group remained his 
only diagnosis. Chad's C-GAS was 80, indicating good functioning in all areas (family, 
school, peers), with transient difficulties that occasionally become more debilitating but 
then stabilise. 
4.1.3 Intervention 
Regular feedback sessions were held with Natasha, on a roughly monthly basis (although 
less frequently and more flexibly during the second half of the first year, when Chad 
became extremely anxious about confidentiality being breeched between his therapist and 
aunt during these meetings). These included general feedback to Natasha regarding 
Chad's progress in therapy (which was formulated together with Chad during our prior 
therapy session). feedback from Natasha about how Chad was doing at home and school, 
as well as support and parenting psycho-education for Natasha. (She was referred to the 
Parent's Centre for parenting skills and supportive therapy, but was unable to take this 
up). Roughly quarterly feedback meetings or telephone conversations were held with 
Chad's teacher, in order to find out how he was doing at school, as well as to provide her 
with support and psycho-education. A crisis meeting was also held with the school 
principal when Chad was threatened with expulsion. These were all attempts to provide 
containment for those functioning as Chad's 'containers'. 
The decision to take Chad into long-term individual psychoanalytically-oriented therapy 
was made largely on the basis of his remarkable capacity for symbolic expression 
witnessed during his psychometric assessment in 2005. The clinician and his supervisor 
felt that Chad was not only able to, but communicated a strong need to, express himself 
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symbolically. He was also found to be able to create and sustain a therapeutic alliance. 
Furthennore, despite the fact that his biological parents were in unstable conditions, Chad 
was placed in a very caring and stable home environment, with the additional care and 
support of his teacher and school. It was therefore considered that both the internal and 
external worlds of this child would be able to provide the ego- and environmental-support 
necessary for him to deal with the raised levels of distress likely to occur during therapy 
(Anderson, 2002). This decision was made despite, but with some cognisance of, various 
contra-indications to this choice of intervention, particularly his cognitive functioning 
within the range of Mild Mental Retardation. However, the validity of this diagnosis was 
in question given his trauma history. 
The broad aim of this therapy process was to unblock the places where Chad's 
development was understood to have become 'stuck', and so to enable his normal 
developmental processes to resume. It was hoped that this could arise from a reparative 
experience of emotional containment that it was understood Chad had lacked early in his 
life ('developmental' trauma), and that whatever degree of internal containment he had 
managed to internalise was eroded through the 'external' traumas of deprivation, neglect 
and abuse. In this way, I sought as therapist to act as a new developmental object, in 
particular to allow, receive, feel, think about and survive the intense feelings he 
communicated to me. The hope was that Chad could internalise this into his own 
containing function that would enable him to think about, and so manage, his own 
feelings, enabling a shift from direct discharge through enactment and bodily expulsion, 
to mentalisation and emotional expression. 
4.2 Case material 
I tum now to the analysis of the case material through the lens of the literature reviewed, 
looking at four inter-related themes: 
4.2.1 Theme 1: Relationship to maternal object 
In this section I explore Chad's expressions of having lacked, and of now needing, the 
inter-related maternal functions of containment (Bion, 1967), holding (Winnicott in Davis 
& Wallbridge, 1981) and 'primary skin' functioning (Bick, 196711988) (these terms are 
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used interchangeably at times during this discussion to indicate general impaired early 
maternal care, while at others their different implications are explored). These are 
examined in relation to Chad's expression of a sense of brokenness within him, and a fear 
of losing the newly found maternal object - both of which manifest in the theme of fixing 
and sticking together. His negation between connection and separation with me as 
maternal object, and his gradual expression of a capacity to internalise the maternal 
functions, are then explored in relation to play sequences with the telephone and the toy 
snake. 
To begin with, I examine Chad's preoccupation with brokenness during therapy. From 
the very first session he sought out "broken things", such as toys or bits of clay or paper, 
which he would then "stick together" with glue or plastercine. He communicated over 
and over again his need for me to fix what he felt to be a brokenness inside him. Chad's 
body had a strange and remarkable 'floppiness' to it at times, suggesting a struggle to 
'hold himself up', or to hold himself in. As shall be explored, this seemed to 
communicate both a need to cohere what felt broken within him, and at the same time a 
desire to merge with, or become stuck to, me as maternal object. 
During my first meeting with Chad and Natasha (1)17, while playing alone when I was 
talking to Natasha, Chad stuck two wooden blocks together with pink plastercine. He 
repeated this image of two things being held together by a warm, fleshy, common sticky 
stuff during a number of early sessions. For example, in our first therapy session (2), the 
following play sequence took place: 
Giving me one of the toy telephones and holding the other to his ear, Chad said he was 
phoning to ask if I was going out or if I would "be there" 18. I said I would be here, and 
17 In order to locate therapy material in relation to the process as a whole and other examples, I indicate in 
brackets the session number out of the total of 69 sessions over the course of 2006 and 2007. 
18 Session material is italicised and quotation marks reflect actual quotes as recalled and recorded in session 
notes. 
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asked why. He said he had "some stuff" of his that he needed to "bring" to me. I said 
that would be fine and asked what it was. He said it was a towel of his that was "broken" 
and that he wanted me to "fIX ". I asked how that had happened, and he said "it was a 
little thing that was trying to be big, but it couldn't be, so it stretched and got broken n. I 
asked if he would like to help me fix it and he said he couldn't. I said that was okay. He 
brought me his blue tracksuit top that he had taken off and said this is the towel. He then 
asked me to pretend to take out a circular hole in a toy and to stitch it into the towel. He 
went and got a pink crayon and said that was my needle. I sat at the table and stitched up 
the hole in the towel, and stitched in the hole from the toy, while he played in the corner 
and waited for me. After a while he came to see if it was fixed, and said it was. After that 
he began looking at the toys and said he was looking for something broken. He fetched 
the scissors and cut a small square out of a piece of paper, and stuck press-stick onto 
each corner and made out of this a roof for a wooden car. 
I understood that at this fIrst therapeutic contact Chad was telling me what he needed of 
me: to be there, present with him, not going away, and through this containment (Bion, 
1962), to repair what felt broken in him. This question of whether I would be there 
became later in therapy a question of whether I could bear, withstand, tolerate, survive aU 
the brokenness and 'badness' he brought. The thing that Chad here feels to have broken 
for him is his towel and then his warm top, which are both comforting external skins, 
associated with early maternal care, with being cleaned and dried and warmed. But 
instead of being allowed to be a little boy, looked after, Chad had to stretch into a 
defensive 'second skin' (Bick, 196711988) of 'bigness', which he feels to have broken 
him. He seems to be communicating that this defence is not working, in his 'bigness' he 
has not been able to really grow, and he is hoping that through therapy, in providing him 
with a maternal mantle, another chance at the 'primary skin' (Bick, 1967/1988) 
experience, he can be 'mended', and return to his intenupted development. He is asking 
if I can bear to be there with his littleness. This littleness returns him to an early state in 
which he needs to be passively held, needs me to do the fIxing for him, and so to stitch 
up, link and cohere, the broken bits inside him. Chad then continues this act of sticking 
together broken things himself. 
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A second manifestation of this theme of sticking was Chad's apparent attempts to stick to 
me, symbolically and literally. This theme emerged particularly around the time of 
termination, perhaps reflecting his anxieties about losing the good maternal object he had 
experienced during therapy, and so wanting to stick us together to avoid the pain of 
parting. In a session (66) during the period prior to termination, when we were talking a 
lot about having to say goodbye, 
Chad arrived with two pieces of paper from the waiting room which he had folded 
intricately, saying he needed some glue and scissors. He began trying to slot and stick the 
two paper objects together. I said "there are two things which you're trying to keep 
together" He said "yes!" enthusiastically, and then became very frustrated when they 
failed to stick. I said 'you don't want them to come apart". I reminded him that last week 
he had said that he wished he and his best friend could be stuck together forever like 
blood brothers. He agreed with this, saying he remembered. I went on to say that maybe 
he'd also like for us to carry on seeing each other each week and not to have to say 
goodbye so soon. He said tentatively, 'Yeees". Later in the session, Chad made a ball 
from the rolled-up paper, adding lots and lots of glue to it. He then instructed how we 
must throw it to and fro between us in a rhythmic movement. He kept on adding more 
glue, and I said "my hands are getting very sticky!" He laughed delightedly and said 
"mine are also!" 
Here the theme of two things that Chad was earnestly trying to keep together repeated 
itself throughout the session. I understand his apparent attempt to stick our actual skins 
together, through the glue that passed between us, as a concrete manifestation of an 
adhesive attachment pattern (Bick, 1967/1988) here activated by the pending termination, 
in which Chad tried to prevent the loss of the good maternal object by sticking himself to 
me. A second example of this theme in the period prior to termination was during a 
session (31) in which: 
Chad asked me to leave some of the juice he had given me (see Theme 2), which he 
poured in the water jug and to which he then added some glue, stirring this mixture and 
then attempting to drink from it through the straw. 
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This sequence similarly seems to reflect Chad's attempts to hold us together, here 
combining something of mine with his own, sticking and stirring this, and attempting to 
physically ingest this (the theme of bodily incorporation and psychic introjection is the 
focus of the following section). 
The recurrent motif of sticking is closely related to that of a 'phantasy of common skin' 
(Anzieu, 1989) with the maternal object, which I understand Chad to have sought with 
Natasha as another sort of new maternal object. At the start of therapy, Chad was 
reported by N atasha to be extremely preoccupied with the difference between his and her 
skin colours, his being darker than hers and her family's (Chad never made direct 
reference to the difference between our skin colours). This difference was a source of 
massive distress for him, perhaps because it gave physical, visible 'evidence' to the fact 
that Natasha was not Chad's mother, at a time when Chad needed to be 're-mothered'. 
This would have disallowed the recreation of a phantasy of common skin (Anzieu, 1989) 
between them and so forced Chad into a state of differentiation between himself and his 
new mother figure prematurely, before he had re-experienced the early state of mergence 
with a mother of which he was initially deprived. 
I now explore various manifestations in therapy of Chad's sense of having been deprived 
of early maternal care, and his attempts to experience this newly through me as maternal 
object. This was expressed on the few occasions that Chad played with the baby doll and 
pram. During a session (27) in which he repeatedly asked me to ''watch him" while he 
performed all sorts of ''tricks'', seeming to crave an admiring maternal gaze (whereas 
usually he scolded me for looking at him - to be discussed in Theme 3 below): 
Chad went up to the baby doll's pram for the first time and started pushing it around, 
saying "how do they do it?" I asked who they are, and he said he didn't know. I said, 
"the mommies?" He then spoke of his own mother, for the first and only time during 
therapy, tentatively telling me her name and surname. Immediately after this he took a 
toy and tried to break it, saying that he wanted to break it. I said that the toys are not for 
breaking, but maybe he is wanting to break things to tell me he wants things to be fued. 
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At the end of this session, Chad did not want to leave the room, whereas usually he tried 
to leave before the time. 
Chad seemed to be expressing his unfamiliarity with what a mother would do with a little 
baby in a pram, which he linked immediately with his own mother. His desire to break 
something in response can be understood simultaneously as an expression of anger at this 
absence, a demonstration of the internal consequences of this for him, and a call for a 
reparative experience here (which is what I picked up on in my comment). Through this 
expression of his internal sense of brokenness, Chad showed his vulnerability and 
'littleness' (which is usually masked by a 'second skin' (Bick, 1967/1988) of bullying 
control, also to be discussed in Theme 3), and so his need for the therapeutic space, 
expressed in his reluctance to leave it. 
On one of the other rare occasions when Chad played with the doll's pram (48), in a 
somewhat similar play sequence during the following year: 
Chad walked over to the pram, said he wanted to play with it and then attempted to climb 
into the pram. I said he wanted to "be in the pram like the baby is ". He said, "Ja, 'cause 
it's nice in there ". I asked what it feels like to be in there, and he said, HI don't know, it's 
just nice n. He then took the baby doll out the pram and started hitting it violently, saying 
"it's so hard". I said he seems very cross with the baby, maybe 'cause he couldn 'tfit in 
the pram? He then worked himself into a frenzy in which he took off the baby's clothes, 
threw these on the floor, and then kissed the baby's bottom aggressively and hysterically. 
I said, 'you're kissing the baby's bum ", and he laughed more and more hysterically, 
turning the doll around and kissing it's genitals, but now saying "I'm kissing the baby's 
privates ". After this he calmed down and started an elaborate play sequence with the toy 
animals. At one point he took the cow and said "we could burst her and all the milk 
would come out ". 
Once again Chad seemed to be expressing his desire for the unknown niceness of the 
little baby inside it's pram. When he did not fit, his 'bigness' belying the littleness he 
feels inside him, he became furious with the baby, it's "hardness" perhaps reflecting both 
the pain of this experience for Chad, and his sense that the baby was impenetrable, 
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wouldn't let him in to it's experience. This attempt to 'be' the baby, to get 'inside' it's 
skin, then collapses into sexualisation, Chad adopting the role of perpetrator in what 
appears to be a re-enactment of his sexual abuse. It seems that my making meaning of his 
actions by putting them into words, which he then does himself, contains (Bion, 1962) 
him so that he can return to his initial feeling of deep craving for maternal provision, now 
richly symbolised through the cow's milk (this will be returned to in the following 
theme). 
The only other occasion on which Chad played with the doll's pram was earlier in the 
second year (35), during a session in which he became- as was very often the case - very 
upset when I did not have anything for him to eat (this is to be the focus of the following 
theme): 
He started crying and shouting that he "hates coming to this room" because it makes all 
his "problems come ". When I say gently that I hear it feels very hard to be in this room, 
he says that I am nice to him when he cries, but only when he cries, and he has to cry for 
me to be nice to him. I say I will try to be here for him no matter how he is. In a fragile-
feeling state he then looks into the baby doll's cot and says he wants to sleep, and taking 
the pillow from the cot begins an elaborate activity of creating a bed with all the red 
chairs, in which he instructs me how to help him. He is particularly careful to stop up the 
openings between the chairs, and saying he needs something to "cover" him, uses the 
table cloth to act as blanket. When it is ready, he lies down and snuggles up inside his 
bed. I sit on the floor and watch over him. He pretends to fall out the bed and I say I 
wonder if he is checking if I will catch him if he falls out. He settles, checking every now 
and again to see if I am looking at him, and eventually actually falls asleep. I feel a 
strong sense of maternal warmth and protectiveness towards him, and a calmness as I sit 
and watch over him. When the session time comes to an end I go up to him and say it is 
time to wake up. He turns over and says he was "lekker sleeping now". 
Here Chad does perhaps manage to 'get back inside' the baby's experience, recreating 
it's cot to fit his own body, and so feeling it's "lekker" sleep of safety. This seems to 
occur after he has expressed in words his anger at the absence of maternal provision, here 
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experienced in relation to lack of physical nourishment (the role of which win be 
explored in relation to matemallove below). His 'hatred' of the therapy room is perhaps 
a combination of the provision of an experience of emotional containment making his 
deprivation feel more acute, and the feeling that this provision will never be enough, 
cannot replace the early absence, leaving him with an insatiable craving (Bion, 1967). 
This provision also does not feel secure, feels conditional on his behaviour, in this case 
his distress. It is when he is able to trust that I as maternal object win 'be there' whatever 
state he is in, that he is able to enter perhaps the most vulnerable condition: that of actual 
sleep, like an infant. In so doing, he ensures that he is physically enclosed or 'held', the 
elaborate bed and covers seeming to stand in for maternal arms (Winnicott, in Davis & 
Wallbridge, 1981), and he needs to be sure that I am right there. Chad's falling asleep 
could also be understood as a defensive means of withdrawing from his painful feelings 
of vulnerability, but I have interpreted it in this way largely because of my counter-
transference experience of calm protectiveness, rather than emptiness or agitation. 
However, once he had experienced this initially absent, currently called-for maternal 
presence during therapy, Chad repeatedly expressed anxiety that I as maternal object 
would not continue to 'be there' for him, that my presence was conditional on his 
behaviour, or that his badness would drive me away. One such expression of his anxiety 
about the loss of the good object was in relation to the soft ball he played with almost 
every session. This seemed to represent the therapy space for Chad, and can be 
understood as a symbol of the breast that was alternatively good and bad (Klein in Segal, 
1981). On a number of occasions, when dissatisfied with the therapy space, Chad became 
angry with the ball, kicking it very hard and calling it "pap" and "small", telling me that 
he had seen "bigger" and ''better'' ones. Here the breast seemed to be bad and 
withholding, empty of goodness. At other times, Chad communicated in various ways, 
and once (36) said directly, that "the ball is very important to me", suggesting that the 
ball now represented the good breast. Chad's anxieties about losing this good breast were 
expressed in relation to the ball going out the window, and occurred particularly after 
breaks in the continuity of our sessions, suggesting that the containing structure of the 
therapy room might be pierced and so the goodness disappear out of it (Bion, 1962). 
During the first session of2007 (33), after a long holiday break: 
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Chad became distraught while playing soccer, saying I didn't remember all the things 
he'd taught me about the game. He then cried out that I was going to "kick the ball out 
the window" and that we "wouldn't get it back". I said I know it's been a long time since 
we saw each other but I want him to know I haven't forgotten the things he told me and I 
thought about him a lot during the holidays. He became increasingly distraught, weeping 
and screaming and saying over and over that Natasha would hear him and then he would 
not get his treat, and at the same time demanding that Natasha come into the room 
(which he had never done before). I became increasingly overwhelmed myself, and after 
trying various ways of calming Chad, left the room briefly to get him some tissues (again 
something I had never done before). Outside, I saw my supervisor and asked his advice. 
He said that I should end the session early, which we did. 
The rupture in the continuity of our sessions, during which Chad seems to have feared 
that I have not held him in mind, but rather forgotten him, is experienced as a rupture to 
the physical structure of the therapy room, out of which all the goodness threatens to be 
lost (Bion, 1962). This piercing of the containing function of my mind, concretised 
through the break in therapy and the openings of the room, left Chad in a terribly 
uncontained state. In trying to reassure him that I had held him in mind, trying to bind up 
the rupture of the break, I did not hear and receive and digest the feeling of rupture that 
Chad was trying to communicate to me, but rather, out of my own anxiety, tried to 'fix' 
them. This clearly heightened his distress, and seemed to confIrm his fear that I could not 
bear to hold his feelings in my mind. This he again experienced as a rupture to the 
container of the therapy space, through which he worried that Natasha would witness his 
weeping and then that further goodness would be withheld. And through my own distress 
at being unable to contain him, I did in fact further break the continuity of this space, 
leaving the room and seeking containment myself. The early ending of the session (the 
only occasion in which this happened over the course of therapy), while considered 
necessary under the circumstances, might have felt like a further confirmation for Chad 
that his overwhelming feelings could not be contained, and that the good object would 
disappear (Bion, 1967). 
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Chad continued to test my capacity to 'be there', particularly when he brought what was 
felt to be 'bad' material into therapy. This testing sometimes occurred through a return to 
the use of the telephone to communicate during symbolic play, as well as the use of the 
toy snake, both of which win now be explored. For example, in a session during the 
second half of the first year (20), during a period of lots of acting-out and testing 
behaviour: 
While playing with the ball, Chad suddenly asked me if I "talk a different language ". I 
asked him what he meant, and he made a whole lot of funny sounds and spoke about 
different ways of talking and different languages. Then he said he was "just giving me an 
example, so that we can ... " He trailed off, and I asked: so that we can understand each 
other and speak the same language? He said yes, and then went straight to get the two 
toy telephones, and sat across from me at the table, putting one in front of each of us. He 
instructed how we must dial each other, and then he turned away from me and said in a 
faint 'telephone' voice, "hello, how are you?" I said I'm fine. He asked what I was 
"doing ", and I said I was talking to him. He asked "what else" I was doing, whether I 
was "busy ". I said "I'm not busy, I am here, talking with you ". He said "good" and put 
down the phone. After this Chad looked through some magazines and paused at all the 
revealing pictures, naming and pointing to the places where the "bottoms ", "breasts ", 
"penises" and " vaginas" would be. I sat with him and evenly repeated the words after 
him. He then got up and climbed onto the shelves, saying he "almost fell". Then he 
climbed onto the chair, and rocked it so that he did almost fall. Then he said that I "must 
catch" him if he falls, and that I "must care for" him, that that is why he is here, and that 
I must "look out for" him as well. I repeated that he is here for me to catch him if he 
falls, to care for him and to look out for him. He said yes, and I asked how it is for him 
when that happens. In response, he told me a story about when Natasha had "hurt her 
arm" and there were "broken bones and blood", but the doctors "made it better and 
fued it up ". I asked if that is what he feels happens to him here. He lay down on the floor 
and in a dreamy voice said "one must say thank you to that person ". I asked what he 
meant, and he said "that person has saved your life, and you want to say thank you ". I 
felt very moved. 
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Here Chad is again using the telephone, with it's associations of a physical, almost 
umbilical, link to facilitate our communication, to ask again whether I am still 'there', 
still present to him, not busy. He then goes on to test whether I will still be there even if 
he shows me 'bad' material, but which he is beginning to speak of and name rather than 
enact. When I am still there, he expresses again his need for me to catch and care and 
look out for him, all the functions of early maternal care. As in the first example, psychic 
repair is pictured concretely, here in terms of bodily healing. And as in that first example, 
I again feel that Chad is saying that it is through my (continued) presence, through being 
present to him, able to bear what he brings, and digest this, through this reverie, that the 
repairing takes place (Bion, 1967). It is through this that Chad feels his brokenness to be 
bound, and in this sense his emotional life to be saved. While his emotional needs are still 
expressed through the physical, the body is now a metaphor for the mind, not collapsed 
into it. 
In the interplay between Chad's attempts to stick himself to me to keep me near, and his 
growing trust that I would continue to 'be there' (however he might be), the soft toy 
snake seemed to be a transitional object (Winnicott in Davis & Wallbridge, 1981) 
through which he negotiated our separation and connection. This was intimately tied to 
the theme of maternal holding, and the gradual capacity to hold, and so feel cohered 
within, himself (ibid.). During the second half of the fIrst year Chad started to wrap the 
large soft toy snake around himself at times when he seemed to need comforting, in what 
felt like a form of self-soothing. Early in the second year (37) he developed a game in 
which he would lie on the floor holding one end of the snake, and I would stand up, 
holding the other end and swinging him around with it. Curling up into a ball, in a foetal 
position, he said over and over while 1 spun him around, "hold me, hold me!" This game 
was repeated frequently, especially after breaks in therapy, and always with a feeling of 
warmth and closeness between us, expressed by Chad through a number of references to 
positive, providing maternal fIgures, for instance (40) speaking of "mother Christmas" 
during the game, and in another instance (37) saying "I want to be a baby!" The snake 
seemed to create an umbilical link between our bodies, through which Chad was able to 
feel held as a baby might, (as wen as nourished and provided for, as shall be seen in the 
following theme), which he used particularly to reconnect with me when this has been 
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disrupted by a therapy break. When the toy snake itself began to break, we made our own 
one out of a strong rope and brightly coloured material which Chad enthusiastically 
stitched and wound together (44). This snake was used for the same game, and seemed to 
become a transitional object used to negotiation separation and connection between us 
(Winnicott in Davis & Wallbridge, 1981). 
Towards termination, Chad used this snake to express both his anger at being 
'abandoned' by me, and a sense of being ready now to hold himself. For example (65): 
Chad took the snake we made and started hitting it violently against his own reflection in 
the mi"or, and then wildly into the room. I said that's the snake that was for holding and 
now it's being used for hitting. He replied, with feeling, 'yes it is!" 
It seems that the snake as that which had linked us was now being used to attack that link, 
perhaps expressed in Chad's attempt to destroy his physical reflection as a manifestation 
of the containing function of the room, the place where his image was held. This seems 
then to have been transferred into an attempt to hit out at and so destroy the actual space 
of the room. In an example of Chad's apparent expression of having internalised the 
maternal holding function (62): 
After planning how we would spend our last session together, Chad tied the snake around 
his middle, and with pride said that it was his "trophy", and went on to show me how he 
could count up until very big numbers. 
Here he seemed to be expressing the part of himself that did feel ready to leave, that felt 
big enough to be holding himself with the snake now wrapped around him rather than 
being passively held by me from the other end of it. (This could also be understood as a 
defensive communication that he no longer needs me, to avoid being hurt by my leaving 
him, but the atmosphere of genuine celebration and pride, rather than pain and 
punitiveness, led me to the current reading). This motif of being able to hold himself 
recurred in a session (59) where the two umbilical symbols, telephone and snake, seemed 
to converge: 
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I had been talking about bad things that adults do to children that make them feel very 
angry and bad. Chad appeared to listen attentively and (unusually) to be carefully 
thinking! Then he wandered over to the toy telephone. Holding onto the dial, he twisted 
this around and then let the whole phone uncoil in a circular motion as he released it, 
absorbed in it's motion. He asked me excitedly if I knew what he was "holding onto ". I 
said I didn't, how was he doing it? He was delighted, and again asked if I knew how he 
did it, and I said with bafJlement I didn't, but did he want to tell me? After a while he 
showed me how he was "holding onto the piece inside", 
Here Chad repeated the circular spinning movement of the snake, in which I had held 
him, but was now doing so himself, by holding onto something internal. This may be 
understood as a way of symbolising that he is turned inward, communicating internally, 
with space to think and process (Bick, 1967/1988; Bion, 1962), 
In conclusion, this theme has explored Chad's expression of having initially lacked, and 
of now needing, several specific functions of mothering. His sense of having been 
deprived of proper maternal care was understood as a reflection of his mother's likely 
actual physical and emotional unavailability, the profound sense of abandonment that 
probably stemmed from her failure to protect him from, as wen as her direct perpetration 
of, his abusive treatment, and the likely experience of his trauma as a failure of whatever 
good maternal object he might have managed to intemalise (Garland, 1999). Chad's 
sense of maternal deprivation was expressed in therapy mainly through the motif of the 
baby doll, whose experience he sought. The needs he variously expressed were for me as 
maternal object to 'fix' him, to 'be there', and to 'hold' him. The first was explored 
through Bick's (1967/1988) concept of the primary skin function by which fragmented 
parts of the personality, in a state of unintegration, are externally cohered. This was 
associated with a desire to return to a state of mergence with the maternal body, seen in 
relation to the phantasy of a common skin (Anzieu, 1989) that Chad perhaps sought to 
recreate with Natasha, and what was felt to be evidence of an adhesive attachment in 
therapy. The second of Chad's communicated needs was understood through Bion's 
(1962) concept of maternal containment, and particularly a state of reverie in which I 
would be receptive to, and survive, the things he was communicating to me that felt very 
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· vulnerable or bad. Thirdly, Chad's expressed need was understood in relation to 
Winnicott's (Davis & Wallbridge, 1981) concept of maternal holding, through which the 
child comes to be internally cohered. The recurrent theme of sticking was seen to reflect 
both his need for internal cohesion and his attempts to stick himself to the good maternal 
object that, newly found, he desperately feared losing (and had not yet securely 
internalised). Some suggestions of this gradual capacity to take in the maternal qualities 
Chad sought was seen in the motif of the telephone and the toy snake, through which he 
expressed a sense of being internally cohered and able to hold himself at times. 
4.2.2 Theme 2: Intake of goodness (incorporation and introjection) 
Throughout the therapy, but in a changing way, Chad demanded food and drink in the 
sessions, and became furious or distraught when this was denied. In this section, I explore 
his changing relationship to material provision, and its relationship to psychic 
introjection. 
During the early phase of therapy, Chad asked occasionally if there was cooldrink or tea, 
or food, in the room, but accepted with little complaint when there was not. He did 
occasionally drink from the jug of water in the room. For example, in the middle of a 
session (10): 
Chad said "there is no food here, is there? ", and when I confirmed this he said with 
resignation, "I knew there wasn't ". A little later in the session, while cleaning up the 
painting material, he asked what it said on the jars in which the paints are kept. These 
are called First Food, which I read out to him, explaining that it is a "container for 
baby'sfood". He looked at the jars with wonder, saying he could see the baby on the lid, 
and that he knows what babies eat. I asked what this was, and he said Itl can't describe 
but it is very nice ". I asked if he has ever had any and he said no. 
Although apparently resigned to its absence from the therapy room, Chad seems here to 
be expressing a tentative craving for the 'first food', that mixture of love and milk, the 
goodness of which Chad has knowledge but not experience. At that stage when psychic 
and physical are still entwined, the fIrst food is both the milk - physical nourishment -
and the matemallove, care, and understanding (Bion, 1962; Freud, 1905; Klein in Segal, 
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1973). Here Chad seems to be expressing that he lacked both, so lacked the "goodness" 
which he knew to be contained in it, lacked a good maternal object (ibid.). 
After this, Chad became gradually more demanding of food and drink, and started to 
experience my lack of provision of this as sadistic withholding. It seems that the 
emotional provision in the therapy process had at once brought his emotional and 
physical deprivation into poignant focus, and awakened his 'appetite' for the flrst food 
denied to him the flrst time around (Bion, 1967). As physical and psychic remained 
undifferentiated for Chad (initial inadequate maternal containment layered with 
subsequent trauma, leading to beta-screen functioning), he sought this in the form of 
bodily nourishment from material food (ibid.). During the middle of the fIrSt year, Chad 
repeatedly complained of being hungry during the sessions, and at one point (25) said 
that talking makes him hungry inside. Emotional provision seems to have re-awakened in 
Chad an early craving that it could not (retrospectively) fulfil - but Chad was initially 
unable to mourn the historical loss, trying instead to flll what he experienced as physical 
emptiness and hunger with actual food, which therefore acted as a form of symbolic 
equation (Segal, 1954/1988). 
In the following session (26): 
Chad said again that he was hungry, and then asked if there was food here, or tea. I said 
there was not, but he could have water if he was thirsty. He started to moan and then to 
shout, telling me I was starving him and that I was jealous of him and that I was a thief 
that wanted to take all the good things that he liked away from him. He said he never 
wants to come to see a person like me, and that I am horrid and I always boss him 
around because I can't understand what it is like to be him, and I never listen to him, I 
always forget. He said I must apologise to him for all this. I replied that I am sorry that 
he is feeling like this. He repeated that he wants tea and that I am making him cry. By 
then he was crying so hard that he was drooling and shaking. Later, in the waiting room 
he told Natasha that "Aunty Anya made me cry because she wouldn't let me drink tea ". 
In responding to Chad's demands for material sustenance with an offer of a material 
alternative, I missed his call for emotional containment and so did not translate this 
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craving (beta-elements) into meaningful form (alpha-elements) (Bion, 1962). This 
seemed to have left him both with the initial craving unsatiated, and with the additional 
sense of being mis-understood, unheard and forgotten: not held in mind. This is 
experienced by Chad as sadistic withholding out of envy and greed, stealing what is his 
right (Klein, 1957/1975). 
After this, Chad started bringing his own juice to the sessions, sometimes sharing this 
with me and at other times not, but continued to ask for food and drink and to be 
distressed by its absence. He resisted my attempts to reflect on this or to link it to his 
internal world. The food here felt like a symbolic equation, his need being to replace and 
so deny what he had missed early in his development, which left him feeling so empty 
and hungry (Segal, 1954/1988). At the same time, potential symbols of the good object 
were also reduced to the physical. For example, in a session (30) in which we each made 
a clay bird to look after for each other over the pending long holiday break, Chad 
smashed one of the birds and dissolved some of this clay in the water and then tried to 
drink it up! This seemed to be an attempt to deny the reactivation of loss threatened by 
the holiday by physically incorporating and taking with him the symbolic object that I 
was to take symbolic care of. At this point, this psychic process did not seem to hold 
Chad, so he had to reduce the space of the symbol by collapsing this into the tbing-in-
itself. Unable to trust that I would bear him in mind, he had to take away the therapy 
space in his own body. 
Yet a shift occurred during the following session (31), which was the fmal one for 2006, 
in which Chad began to play symbolically with the juice, using it to celebrate his growth 
over the course of the year: 
Chad arrived in a lively mood, with two juices which he poured for us after playing some 
sports. Laughing, he called the juice wine. I said are we drinking wine like grown ups? 
Delightedly, he said yes, and clinked our glasses together, saying "cheers" and looking 
very pleased with himself. 
Here the juice seems to have become a symbol proper, the wine used playfully to signify 
his grown-upness, while knowing that it was really juice (Segal, 195411988). 
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During the second year, Chad was increasingly able to symbolise his desire for 
nourishment, which began to feel increasingly satisfied through alpha functioning (Bion, 
1962), and the motif of emptiness gradually shifted to that of fullness, and bodily 
incorporation shifted to psychic intemalisation of good (Freud, in Laplanche & Pontalis, 
1973). Early in the year (38), Chad muttered as he arrived, "there is tea up there" in the 
therapy room, and later that session he drew an oven "where you put a kettle on", making 
me guess what it was and being delighted when I did so. Here the tea that he knows is in 
the room takes a psychic form, symbolised in his drawing which re-presents rather than 
denies the lost original object (Segal, 1954/1988). My ability to 'read' and understand his 
representation was itself a form of nourishment. Later in the year (64), he drew a fridge, 
and when I ask what is inside it, he said "drawings." So the symbolisation of physical 
nourishment now became psychically nourishing, and Chad pictured this relationship by 
replacing food with drawings, suggesting that psychic introjection may have replaced the 
need for concrete bodily incorporation (Klein in Segal, 1973). This was associated with a 
period in which Chad began to tolerate thinking and reflecting, rather than avoiding this 
through activity or shutting it down actively (Bion, 1962). For example, in a session 
where Chad tolerated more talk than usual (59): 
He seemed to be listening attentively, and continued kicking the ball but in a calmer way, 
playing with it gently and distractedly. He seemed to be thinking, or reflectinglprocessing 
in some way: his energy was not with the activity, but turned inwards. I couldfeel a kind 
of charge and presence between us in the room, and I experienced a sense of relief in 
myself. 
In symbolising nourishment, Chad returned to the image of the snake (explored in 
relation to the soft toy under Theme 1) a number of times, two examples of which will be 
examined. Earlier in the first year (13): 
Chad made what he called a "fat queen" out of clay. He said at first that she was 
"good", and then that she was "bad". I said it must be a bit scary if people suddenly 
change from good to bad. He then made a snake and said "the snake makes her bad", 
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and that people can make other people turnfrom good to bad by making them "eat stuff" 
that "changes your brain ". 
Towards the end of the second year (61), Chad again made a snake out of play dough, 
initially pretending to eat the play dough: 
... saying it is "lekker", "good" and "healthy". When I commented that the stuffhe used 
to feel was dirty and had to wash off his body [see Theme 3 J he now felt to be good and 
was pretending to take into his body, he listened thoughtfully, and then made a snake out 
of clay that bites me, "'cause you're nice". When I said, "so you're taking the goodness 
into you", he said 'yes I can feel it in my stomach!" 
In this second sequence, the play dough had become a symbol proper, representing rather 
than replacing the goodness which Chad no longer needed to actually eat, but through the 
symbolic play, came to introject. Bodily incorporation is then the model for psychic 
introjection, which occurs through this symbolic 'eating' of me as good object. 
In both of the above sequences, the snakes seem related to the toy snake in the game 
described under Theme 1, which I understood as a physical umbilical link enabling an 
experience of being held - the snake a form of transitional object, here a symbol of 
connection and of healing (Winnicott, 1981). The umbilical cord is that through which 
very early nourishment is conveyed from mother to baby's body at a time when the two 
are still physically merged. So the snake seemed to represent Chad's hope that through 
therapy he can change from bad to good, but in an internal way, not just covering good 
over bad (as will be explored in Theme 3), but becoming good inside himself, through re-
experiencing, eating in and digesting the good. In the second sequence, the snake is the 
medium of introjection, the umbilical cord through which maternal goodness is taken into 
his body. In the first sequence, the reverse took place: rather than conveying goodness 
from mother to child, the snake fed back badness to the queen as mother-figure, and 
changed her from good to bad. This seems to reflect Chad's sense of internal badness and 
fear of contaminating me with this (to be explored in the following theme), as well as the 
belief that through physical incorporation psychic change can take place, here from good 
to bad, but perhaps an expression of hope of the possibility of change from bad to good, 
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expressed in its inverse. At the same time, the queen's fatness suggests that she was 'full' 
(see below) with sustenance that she was absorbing and stealing from her child's body, 
rather than feeding him with it, and this theft turned her from good to bad (Klein, 
195711975). This seems related to the example discussed above where Chad accuses me 
of stealing the goodness out of him out of jealousy. 
Chad then began talking of food that had satisfied and fulfilled him, the talking itself 
generating these feelings - a link which he tolerated and accepted when I made it in 
therapy (Bion, 1962)(65): 
Chad lay down and told me in great detail, with energy and animation, of a 'lekker, 
lekker' meal he had, and repeats instructions so I can make it too, saying I must taste this 
meal. I engaged in this in a lively way, repeating and exclaiming with him how lekker it 
sounds. I said that he was wanting to share the goodness with me, and that thinking and 
talking about how lekker it is just about as lekker as eating it! He squirmed on the floor 
in delight, agreeing, then said that he was 'Ius' for it now, and I'm also Ius for it, and he 
wishes he was eating a lekker meal right now. I said that in a funny kind of way we're 
eating it by talking about it! He said yes, he ate "soooo much, two whole burgers ", and 
that he had to hold his stomach in he was so full (gesturing to show me how very full!). 
Over the next few sessions Chad told many stories about being full, for example (67) 
speaking of a McDonald's meal he had with his best friend where, "I was so full so full, 
toofulll" 
During the following session (68), he asked me with a sense of urgency if I had tried the 
meal, and was very angry and upset when I said I had not yet, but that I hear its really 
important to him. The following session (69), which was our fmal one, for the first time 
involved actual food: when I asked Chad how he would like to mark the end of our time 
together, he said he wanted to have a party with food, and told me exactly what he 
wanted. We spent a lot of time planning and talking about this in the sessions leading up 
to it: 
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Chad was very excited about the food, delighted, repeating that its just what he wanted, 
and its "so nice" he "won't ever be full ", and also that he's "going to eat until I'm full ", 
repeating the word ''foil'' with a lot of energy. He stuffed chips into his mouth, moaning 
with joy, saying he's "such a lucky child". Then he asked if I had eaten "the meal", 
which I had the night before, and I said (truthfully!) that I had really erifoyed it and I had 
thought of him all the time. He was delighted, and asked me in detail about each step of 
the preparation and eating. In the last moments of the therapy, he asked if I was going to 
take home the left-overs. I asked ifhe would like to: he rep/iedwithjoy "yes!" 
In the end there was a return to the concrete in Chad' s need to leave something of himself 
in my body, to digest this physically for him, and his need to take something concrete 
with him (Bion, 1962). 
In conclusion, this theme has explored Chad's shifting modes of taking in goodness, from 
bodily incorporation to psychic introjection (Bion, 1962; Freud, 1905; Klein in Segal, 
1973). I have understood his intense craving for physical nourishment both in relation to 
Chad's experience of actual deprivation, and as an expression of, and need to fill his 
sense of lacking good enough mothering at a time when food and love were merged 
(ibid.). This absence of adequate early containment meant that Chad was left with a 
seemingly insatiable craving for the good breast, that he still experienced in concrete 
form, as physical and psychic had not been adequately differentiated (and whatever 
differentiation had been achieved likely reversed to some extent on subsequent 
traumatisation) (Klein i  Segal, 1973, Bion, 1962). It is interesting to reflect that the 
sustenance that Chad caned for most frequently was tea - a warm, sweet, comforting 
liquid, perhaps the closest he could get to asking for breast milk. As has been seen, 
during most of the therapy process, Chad needed this actual nourishment, which felt 
indistinguishable from the absent good object, in a form of symbolic equation used to 
deny this loss (Segal, 1954/1988). However, he gradually came to symbolise nourishment 
in various ways, and to feel satisfied by images and words, rather than things in 
themselves (Bion, 1962). This shift to symbolisation proper was associated with a 
depressive position capacity to mourn the absence of the good breast (Klein in Segal, 
1973). This enabled a shift from incorporation to introjection, and with this a marked 
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change from expressions of emptiness to fullness: the initially insatiable hunger and 
narratives of lack, emptiness and craving shifting to those of fullness, bounty and 
satisfaction. 
4.2.3 Theme 3: Sense of self 
The third theme to be explored is that of Chad's sense of himself, which is a layered one, 
expressed in the opposition between his inside and his outside. Inside, the sense of 
brokenness explored in Theme 1 will here be examined in relation to a sense of profound 
vulnerability, which is equated with inherent badness. I flrst examine the ways in which 
Chad felt this internal badness to be revealed through his physical skin, and through 
'mess' on this skin and in the therapy room. I then tum to his consequent attempts to 
conceal this badness through a defensive identiflcation with goodness and strength, and 
through controlling and bullying behaviour in therapy and outside it, which I understand 
as manifestations of a second skin formation. The tension and interplay between these 
various meanings of the skin win be discussed in relation to Bick's (1967/1988) 
understanding of the second skin formation resulting from impaired primary skin 
function, Anzieu's (1989) theory of the Skin Ego, and Kristeva's (1980/2004) concept of 
abjection. 
Chad seems to have experienced the underlying sense of damage within himself, 
explored in relation to brokenness in Theme 1, as an inherent badness, this badness being 
associated with weakness and smallness. Beyond the motif of brokenness examined in 
that theme, Chad rarely expressed directly this internal sense of vulnerability or badness -
mostly it manifested through its inverse in his defensive identiflcation with goodness, 
bigness, strength and dominance. But there were a few occasions when he did 
communicate this inherent sense of badness in itself, for example, early in the therapy 
process (4): 
Chad made a drawing of a man who he said was "angry", and "powered", adding 
spontaneously and very adamantly that this man was "good". Next to the man he drew a 
small boy, clearly himself (he was standing on the staircase we climb to the therapy 
room, each of the 18 steps he counts each week reflected in the drawing). This "little 
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boy" standing on the staircase next to the angry and powered man, Chad identified as 
"bad". 
In Chad's symbolic play, almost every game involved a battle between "goodies", who 
were "big" and "strong", and always won, and "baddies", who were "small" and "weak" 
and "losers". While Chad's defensive identification with the goodness=bigness=strength 
will be explored below, in another rare communication of his underlying sense of 
badness=smallness=weakness (24): 
Chad become intensely absorbed in the manner in which his fist appeared to change size 
when it was submerged in, and then emerged from, a jug of water. He exclaimed over 
and over, with incredulity but also a sense of cunning, how "big" and then how "small" 
he was. Then he turned and said he had a "secret ", that he would tell me only if I 
promised not to tell anyone (threatening to hurt me if I did): his hand "can be big in the 
water, but it is really small, but the water makes it look big ". 
Through this "trick", Chad may have been communicating that his defensive mask of 
bigness, goodness, strength, was in fact an illusion, that beneath this musculature he was 
really very small and vulnerable. In an inversion of his protective disguise of this 
underlying state, the deception was sunken beneath the surface while the reality revealed 
above it. But this truth remains a fiercely controlled secret, and he needed to bully and 
threaten me in order to guard it - a manifestation of the second skin formation (Bick, 
196711988) to be explored below. 
It is this tension between his underlying sense of smallness, weakness and vulnerability, 
and his defensive second skin of strength, bigness, and control that seems to have been 
felt by Chad to have caused the brokenness, the sense of deep damage within him. 
Returning to the moving play sequence from our first therapy session (2) discussed 
above, Chad communicated, over the toy telephones, that he had a towel of his own, 
which had broken, and which I must fix. When I asked what happened to it, he said "it 
was a little thing that was trying to be big, but it couldn't be, so it stretched and got 
broken". The defensive need to split good from bad, to be big when he feels small, seems 
to split Chad within himself, leaving him in a state of fragmentation or unintegration. 
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Chad may have been communicating his need for fIxing, binding or integration through 
the image of a second skin, not of rigid strength and control, but of softness, warmth, and 
flexibility: a towel in which to be wrapped, comforted, held. A towel is an external skin, 
but a soft, absorbent, malleable one. He may also be communicating that this defensive 
musculature is not working, it has made him prematurely 'big' but has stunted true 
growth - so he needs the holding environment or external skin of therapy to provide the 
necessary supporting structure in which he can begin to heal and grow. 
Turning now to the role of Chad's physical skin, I have mentioned his preoccupation with 
its colour (explored above in relation to its difference from Natasha's), but here I look at 
the implications of this mis-fIt between external and internal 'envelopes' (Anzieu, 1989), 
which seems to have been experienced by Chad as caused by his own badness, which his 
skin colour was felt to reflect. This meant that instead of being able to introject the 
containing functions of the maternal envelope to his own skin, it seems that this skin was 
felt to betray his dark internal state through its uncohered and porous state (Anzieu, 
1989). Chad was preoccupied not only with the difference between his and Natasha's 
skin, but the darkness of his own. He expressed a belief that people with dark skin are 
hated by others, his internal sense of badness seeming to articulate with cultural 
associations of blackness with badness through the historical and enduring implications 
of skin colour in this country. Early in therapy, Chad was reported by Natasha and his 
teacher to avoid black people, while in therapy he identifIed them as being "poor", but 
deserving "pity" and urged that ''we must not hate them". This seemed to be exacerbated 
by the fact that Chad was teasingly caned "black cat peanut butter" by the children at 
school. 
It seems that Chad's physical skin reflected the state of his impaired 'skin ego' (Anzieu, 
1989), which failed to protect his inside from the outside world, but instead, in it's 
porousness, its lack of cohesion, revealed what he felt to be his bad, dark interior. And 
the outside world seems to have reinforced this equation of blackness with badness, and 
the inscription of the skin in particular as signifIer of this (further exploration of this 
social and contextual 'loop' in the interplay between body and mind, inside and outside, 
although highly relevant, is beyond the scope of this discussion). It is perhaps 
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understandable that Chad would wish to avoid black people for fear of what they mirror 
to him. Yet his expectation is that he will be hated for the badness made manifest through 
his dark skin, and through his urging that black people should be pitied and not hated, 
Chad seems to be asking this same treatment for himself. 
This association of himself with blackness, and blackness with badness, seems to have 
been profoundly if inadvertently reinforced by responses to Chad's use of the colour 
black in drawing and painting, which at the start of therapy was reported by Natasha and 
his teacher to be excessive. Both were greatly concerned and distressed by Chad's 
reportedly constant use of black to colour in and to scribble over his drawings, and so 
forbade him to use this colour. Chad continued to use black despite this prohibition, and 
was repeatedly punished for doing so, getting demerits at school and being scolding at 
home. This struggle was consuming so much energy that it was identified as a primary 
reason for referral to the CGC, and it seemed that all their concern about Chad, as well as 
their horror at, and fear of, what had happened to him, were concentrated in this issue. 
This use of black coincided with Chad's "bad behaviour" discussed above, and can be 
understood as an equivalent expression of the darkness, disturbance and real badness that 
he felt to be inside him, which he seemed to be attempting to symbolise and express in 
his drawings. But as the internal meaning of his dark skin seems to have been reinforced 
by external associations of blackness with badness, so too the banning of his use of black 
reinforced his sense that this thing with which he identified, that was him, his own inside 
and his skin, was in fact bad, deserving of punishment. Instead of feeling that this 
expression of his distress could be received and contained by the adults around him, Chad 
was given the message that the pain and darkness he contained was unbearable to them 
(Bion, 1962). 
I understand that in the post-traumatic and vicariously traumatised state that Chad and 
those around him were in, this symbol of his traumatic experiences was felt to be 
traumatic in itself (Garland, 1999), and therefore evoked a level of horror and concern 
proportionate to a major trauma. This seemed to entail a collapsing of what was perhaps a 
'symbol proper' for Chad, into a 'symbolic equation' (Segal, 1954/1988) in which his 
drawings were felt to be indistinguishable from his actual experiences. This may have 
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made the adults around him feel that in preventing him from using black, they could 
retrospectively protect him from the terrible things that had happened to him. However, 
these responses seem inadvertently to have reinforced Chad's sense of internal badness, 
his attempts to express what he felt to be inside him being met with the message that this 
was itself bad, so much so that it had to be banned and punished. This was made 
painfully clear when I met with him and Natasha to contract for two years of therapy: on 
hearing that this was going to be the case, Chad turned to Natasha and said very urgently, 
"but she doesn't know the secret". When we asked what secret this was, he said "that I'm 
not supposed to use black". So it seems that for Chad too his use of black had become 
indistinguishable from the badness he felt to be inside him, both perhaps being equated 
with the badness he had experienced. This cumulative badness felt bad enough that it 
should prevent him from coming to therapy. And when I then told him that in this room 
he would be allowed to use whatever colour he wanted to, and that this was his space to 
do and play and draw and be as he liked, as he was, as he felt, he was completely 
incredulous. A lot of psycho-education work was done with Natasha and his teacher 
around understanding the meaning of Chad's use of blackness as an expression of his 
trauma and a sign that he was feeling safe en ugh to begin to process this. 
In therapy, Chad was at fIrst very tentative with his use of black, slowly testing whether 
this would indeed be allowed. Early on he made a portrait of himself fIlled with a light 
shading of black, but apart from this did not use black until one session (8) during a time 
when he became fascinated with the paints themselves rather than their application, and 
was particularly engrossed with squeezing out huge amounts of paint, exclaiming with 
wonder again and again at ''how much" he was using. This seemed a reflection of his 
material deprivation and the fact that he had not had a lot of anything that was delightful 
to him. In this session: 
Chad decided to paint the back cover of his book, pointing out a few times that this is 
what it was. He mixed many colours together, and then commented tentatively that "they 
are becoming like black". Seeing that this was allowed, he later asked (for the first time) 
for the black paint. With a sense of urgency and excitement, he then started filling the jar 
of red paint with this blackness. I felt very uncomfortable with this, and for the first time 
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really understood the distress Natasha and Chad's teacher experienced watching this 
child 'consume' colour with blackness. Out of this distress, I suggested that we divide the 
red into two jars, and that he could do whatever he wanted with the one half, but that we 
'save' the other half. Chad proceeded to fill both jars of red paint with black, turning it 
all black. I sat watching, feeling really wrenched. 
Here Chad seemed to be testing my tolerance of the black that was previously banned for 
him (the back of his book was perhaps associated with licence to express what would not 
normally be seen). In thus testing the truth of my statement that he could bring and be 
whatever he wanted in this room, Chad seemed at the same time to be testing whether I 
would allow and be able to bear the badness that had become associated with blackness. 
And my immediate response was to feel something of the unbearableness of this, and to 
react out of this in a way that repeated in part the prohibition of the other adults. Chad 
discounted this, and only then was I able to be with the feeling that this blackness evoked 
in me, and so to allow and begin to bear this (Bion, 1962). 
A related consequence of what can be understood as a porous or uncohered skin ego, 
manifesting in Chad's sense of a physical skin that exposed rather than protected his 
vulnerable inside, was his concern about contamination. This experience of a skin 
functioning in reverse, opening out the inside rather than holding out the outside, a skin 
which is therefore too permeable, may be associated with Chad's immense anxiety about 
contamination. This included what I understood to be a fear that he would contaminate 
others by his badness, which win be explored in the following section, and that he would 
be contaminated by the outside world. The latter manifested in Chad's anxieties about 
what he caned "mess" or "dirt". It seemed that in external filth, Chad had found a further 
external representation (in addition to badness and brokenness) of what he felt himself to 
be internally made up of. The three are understood to be linked, dirt being that which is 
out of place and so threatening of order and boundaries, and in this sense abject 
(Kristeva, 1989). (The relationship of this to faeces and farting will be discussed in the 
following section). 
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Turning to the manifestations of this during therapy, Chad would became extraordinarily 
distraught when his hands became "messy" or "dirty" with paint or with clay, and he 
would need to rush to the bathroom in a state of urgency, to wash these off (this meant 
that during the early stages of therapy he would often decide excitedly to play with the 
clay, but as soon as he had taken some in his hands he would look at them in horror, and 
immediately need to clean them). Before I understood the seriousness of this need for 
Chad, I tried to restrict his 'breaking' of the session with trips to the toilet for cleaning 
(feeling that this was avoidant). On one such occasion (19): 
We had just been down to the toilet to clean his hands after he broke a drinking glass 
with the soccer ball, when Chad took out the clay and then immediately wanted to go 
wash his hands. I said he could do so with the water in the room, and that we only go out 
of this room when he needs the toilet or when there is an "emergency" like with the 
broken glass (which had gotten into his hand). He looked at me with an expression of 
panic and said "the mess is very serious", then started shouting and crying that he needs 
to go right now because he "can't have messy hands ". I said I know that the mess "feels 
like an emergency" for him, and that he can clean his hands with the water from the jug. 
He does this, but again becomes distressed at the "dirty" water, which he wants to go 
clean, repeating with rising panic "it can't be messy". I said maybe we can make a deal, 
that he can choose one time to go out the room each session, but only once and for very 
short (he had previously tried to stay out of the room on the way to andfrom the toilet). 
This stuff on Chad's hands seems to have been felt to be not a symbol proper but a 
symbolic equation (Segal, 1954/1988), an actual manifestation of the messy yucky, gooey 
stuff inside him, which his skin could not contain, and which was therefore leaking out 
onto this skin. This felt like a profound anxiety, a real emergency for him, that his skin 
would not hold and conceal but become his insides, that all differentiation between inside 
and outside would collapse, and that this internal badness would be exposed to the world. 
On a few occasions, he said with panic that Natasha and her husband "must not see me 
like this", and when I tried to explore this he would make reference to punishment. So it 
seems that, like the blackness of his skin, the "mess" on his hands threatened to reveal the 
badness inside him, which those around him could not bear, but would instead punish. 
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Inversely, this seems to have translated into anxiety that the muck of the external world 
would penetrate into his porous skin, filling him with filth. 
Once his actual hands were clean, Chad would often develop elaborate cleaning activities 
to remove the traces of clay or paint or even spilt water in the therapy room. These did 
not have the same feeling of panic to them, but rather of playful relief. He would always 
include me in these activities, giving me precise instructions what to do, but the 
atmosphere between us was amiable and often lively, rather than controlling or punitive. 
This extended at times to the cleaning of existing aspects of the room, which seemed to 
be in response not to the presence of material 'yuckiness', but to emotional stuff that felt 
bad and had to be cleaned away, both because of the discomfort within him, and the need 
to hide evidence of this internal badness to others. For example, during one session (26): 
He told me he had turned 8 on Friday, and I asked what it felt like to be 8. He started 
speaking about how he could "hit the bigger boys now" because he was big. When I tried 
to ask him about this he interrupted and said "we must go clean the windows". He gave 
me strict instructions as to how we should do so, with bits of paper dipped into the jug of 
water and then proceeding to clean each part of the windows. When I wondered why we 
were cleaning the windows now, Chad said so that the room will be "nice and clean and 
special "for other people, and then commented that Natasha was waitingfor him 
downstairs. I said that a little while ago we had spoken about messy feelings and how 
cleaning can also make you feel like you are cleaning up the messy things inside. He said 
yes, that is right, "because you can control if you feel things, like anger, you can decide 
to not be angry". 
Here it seems that not only did Chad try to 'clean away' his admission of what he knew 
was "bad behaviour" (his desire to fight the children), but to cover over this exposure of 
'badness' with a fa9ade of 'goodness', making the room nice for others (his association 
being the nearness of Natash a). Yet he permitted and then contributed to my linking of 
activity to feelings, articulating his desire to control and so wipe away his anger. 
Similarly, in the session (24) to which I had referred in the above sequence, this linking 
of Chad's need to clean up mess with his attempts not to feel "yucky feelings", seemed in 
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itself to enable him to expose, now through talking about rather than acting out, both 
some of this 'bad' behaviour, and the difficult feeling that lay behind it: 
After splashing painty water out the jug, Chad said he wanted to clean up the mess, and 
then that, "that is why I made the mess, to clean it up". I said maybe if we clean up the 
mess around us it makes us feel like we're clean inside, and I wonder if we can also have 
messy feelings that we want to clean up or make go away? He went on to talk about 
''fighting with the children" when he is "very angry ", and about being punished for this. 
Gradually, over the course of therapy, Chad became able to tolerate clay and paint on his 
hands, the first time being in the pivotal session (61) discussed in Theme 2 above, when 
he said that the clay was "lekker", "good" and "healthy", and he did not need to clean it 
off his hands! When I then commented that the stuff he used to feel was dirty and had to 
wash off his body he now felt to be good and was pretending to take into his body, Chad 
made a snake out of play dough and used this to • eat' me into him because I was "nice", 
later saying that he felt fuU of goodness. It seems that this change from symbolic equation 
(in which the clay was equated with his insides) to symbolisation proper (in which the 
material of the external world, now felt to be external to him, could be used to represent 
these insides) was associated with his introjection of the good maternal object, which 
could itself by symbolised in this sequence (Segal, 1954/1988). This suggests that his 
shift from feeling that the clay was an actual manifestation of his all-bad insides, to a 
sense that it was external to him and could thus be used with some distance to symbolise, 
without collapsing into, his internal world, coincided with Chad's experience of some 
goodness within him. 
In-between the experience of the materials of the therapy room as either bad or good, 
either entirely of him or entirely external to him, there were times when Chad seemed to 
be in a state of simultaneous wonder and horror at this 'mess', a kind of incredulous 
delight tinged with repulsion, and a sense of disbelief at the licence to 'indulge' in it. I 
understand the mess at these times to be abject in Kristeva's (1980/2004) sense: both of 
him and not of him, and his hovering between disgust and a desire to be rid of it, and a 
particular kind of longing to incorporate and 'merge' with it. Here the abject mess 
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seemed not only associated with his own interior, but with his ambivalence towards the 
maternal body (Kristeva, 1980/2004). For example, in an early session explored above 
(8), during which Chad used black to paint the back cover of his book, 
Chad commented with a mixture of concern and tentative glee that his "dirty" hands had 
marked his book, when I said that he could actually use his fingers to paint with if he 
wanted to, he did so with abandon and revelry, smearing all the paint, all the colours 
onto the back cover of his book and exclaiming with delight at the huge mess he was 
making! A moment later he looked at what he had made with a kind of disgust, and said 
he must go wash his hands. 
Later, on a number of occasions Chad looked with dismay at what he called the "mess" 
on the back of his book, asking "who did this, who made this mess?" It seems that this 
specific abject space of horrified delight in the stuff that for this time hovers between 
being and symbolising what is inside him, feels foreign to Chad when he is outside of it 
(Kristeva, 1980/2004). 
In the light of the erosion of distinction between physical and psychic that is understood 
to have occurred through the trauma Chad experienced, as wen as the lack of early 
maternal containment that should have enabled their differentiation, Chad's actual skin 
seems to have became particularly invested as a manifestation of his sense of self. In an 
inversion of the process of anaclisis by which the psychic structures are derived from the 
physical (Freud, 1923), here it seems that Chad's physical skin was a concretised form of 
his psychic self (Anzieu, 1989). In Bick's (196711988) terms, it is understood that the 
absence of an adequate primary skin function disallowed Chad's internalisation of this 
experience of being externally cohered to his own skin, leaving him instead in a state of 
unintegration, which manifested in his experience of his physical skin as uncohered and 
unable to hold him in. Using Anzieu's (1989) language, in the absence of the experience 
of a containing external envelop meeting his own skin to create a phantasy of common 
skin, which could then be internalised to form his own Skin Ego, Chad's Skin Ego seems 
to be porous and leaky, and his physical skin, as a reflection of this, to be permeable both 
to his inside and to the external world. Bick and Anzieu's theorising converges in their 
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understanding that it is under such circumstances that the defensive second skin is formed 
as a rigid, muscular mask to this fragile, pierced inside. It is to the various manifestations 
of this second skin formation to which I now tum. 
As mentioned, almost all of Chad's symbolic play involved a battle between "goodies", 
who were "big" and "strong", and always won, and "baddies", who were "small" and 
"weak" and "losers". While Chad would always identify himself with the goodies, there 
was a confusing tendency for the goodies and the baddies to inexplicably reverse roles. 
This seemed to reflect a tension between Chad's defensive identification with the good 
and his internal sense of badness. Despite this interchangeability between good and bad, 
these opposing positions initially remained rigidly split, suggestive of paranoid-schizoid 
functioning; however, towards the end of the therapy process, there was some indication 
of their integration with Chad's move towards depressive position functioning (Klein in 
Segal, 1973). This need to mask an underlying sense of weakness, badness and 
vulnerability with an external display of power and strength manifested markedly through 
the activity of sport - which occupied a great deal of therapeutic time! Throughout these 
games Chad would make sure he won, changing the rules when I threatened to score or to 
win, and mocking me for losing, designating a "loser's chair" on which I must sit. Later 
in the therapy, he began gradually to tolerate losing in sport, and to play fairly. 
This dynamic was played out further in Chad's extreme attempts to control my every 
action, my talking, and even my thinking. This was initially expressed through a play 
character called "the boss", whose voice and demeanour Chad came to adopt as his own. 
Through this, Chad aggressively and threateningly ordered what I must do, how to be, 
and shut down my questioning and my thinking (to be examined further in the following 
section). This rigid control seemed to serve the purpose of restricting my access to his 
'bad' inside, which questions and talk and interpretation threatened to expose, but 
ironically the very form of this control came to reveal this: Chad experienced his own 
bullying as "bad behaviour", and was very anxious that I would tell Natasha that he had 
been ''naughty'', and that he would then be punished. Unable to bear or own this 
"badness", Chad then projected 'the boss' onto me, experiencing and accusing me of 
sadistically controlling him. This was particularly the case when I resisted his attempts at 
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complete control of me - he then become distraught, a 'victim', and I the perpetrator. For 
example (23), 
Chad assigned us each an animal, and showed me exactly how I must manipulate mine in 
a play fight between them. As was usually the case, I inevitably got this wrong, and Chad 
became increasingly angry and upset, shouting that I "don't know how to do it ". I began 
to say that I realise it feels like I never get things right for him, but I wonder if he knows 
what it feels like to be shouted at? He became furious, cutting into my talk and saying 
with a threatening, almost sinister-feeling voice "remember what I said? Remember the 
rules? NO TALKING!" I said I hear the talking is feeling too much for him. He then went 
into an almost incoherent frenzy of screaming that I must not speak, that I must 
remember the rules, that I just make up the rules. At one point he pushed the table over 
towards me and says he would "hit" me if I don't listen to him. He then threw all the toys 
onto the floor. He closed the curtains, and told me not to look at him, and then to close 
my eyes. I did so for a moment, and felt terrified, hearing him banging things around in 
the room. I decided to open my eyes and said I won't close my eyes and I won't stop 
thinking but I will try hear what he needs me to. He shouted and shouted again about the 
rules, and who made them. I said it's very scary not to know who made the rules and why 
they made them. He then seemed to kind of collapse into himself and began to weep 
wrenchingly. He said in a timid, broken child's voice, "don't be scared of me n. I felt 
terrified and overwhelmed. He sat weeping and whimpering. I went up to him and tried to 
settle him, offering him a tissue and suggesting he sit on the small chair for a little bit. He 
did so, still crying, and gradually became calmer. 
At such times, I felt caught in an intractable situation. Either I allowed Chad to 'bully' 
me, and felt shut down and persecuted, or, I attempted to interpret what he was doing to 
curb this enactment. But such interpretation gave back to him his disowned and split off 
experience of victimhood, which swung our positions so that I became perpetrator, 
violating him now with words. These interchangeable but always opposing positions felt 
a form of traumatic re-enactment, a dialectic of dominance and submission which left me 
feeling vicariously traumatised (Herman, 1997). Through his bullying and through 
projective identification, I was experiencing something of the complete helplessness, 
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persecution and terror to which he must have been subjected (Bion, 1967). Yet in 
becoming overwhelmed by these feelings I was no longer able to contain them for him, 
and so repeated his experience of impaired maternal containment. Chad's splitting of 
good and bad therefore occurred both intrapsychically and interpersonally, both of which 
manifested in his intolerance of any attempt to bring together the experiences of 
victimhood and perpetration (Klein in Segal, 1973). In adopting the role of powerful 
perpetrator, Chad distanced himself from the vulnerable and bad-feeling parts of himself. 
In casting me as victim, he expressed at the same time his anger and contempt for, as wen 
as fear and shame of, these projected parts of himself. Attempts to bring these together 
reversed these roles. 
This bullying behaviour extended beyond the therapy room, Chad's aggression towards 
smaller children being his most serious presenting symptom. He similarly seemed to be 
projecting his own experience of being a victim onto others, and assuming the role of 
aggressor. This made up one aspect of Chad's more general behavioral acting out, which 
he caned his "bad behaviour". This behaviour emerged at school, at home and in therapy 
only when he felt safe enough to express this internal sense of badness - initially he was 
very compliant and 'good' in an these contexts. Yet his fear that revealing and 
communicating his internal state of 'badness' and disturbance would be intolerable for 
those around him, and lead to punishment or abandonment, was almost confumed in 
reality: his discipline problems reached such an extreme that the school threatened to 
expel him and Natasha threatened to return Chad to his mother's house. A lot of psycho-
education and supportive work was done with Natasha and the school, through which we 
came to see Chad's behaviour as a healthy sign that he was beginning to process the 
trauma that he had until now not been safe enough to metabolise, and for which these 
three environments were providing the necessary external containment. 
In conclusion, this theme has examined the implications of Chad's experience of 
impaired primary skin function and resulting state of unintegration (explored in Theme 1) 
for his layered self-experience (Bick, 1967/1988). This was understood in terms of a 
tension between an inherent sense of badness (associated with vulnerability and the motif 
of brokenness explored in relation to unintegration in Theme 1), and his defensive 
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attempts to mask this through a second skin of goodness and dominance (ibid.). Yet 
Chad's physical skin was found to function in opposition to this psychic second skin, 
exposing rather than masking his internal world, and in this way manifesting his ill-
formed, porous Skin Ego (Anzieu). It is this state of fragility and lack of cohesion that 
was understood to further fuel his defensive need to mask and control access to his 
insides. The changing meaning of 'mess' was explored in relation to this fear that his 
unintact skin would not hold out his insides, or the world (Kristeva, 1980/2004). While it 
has not been explicitly explored in this discussion, this motif of rupture is understood not 
only in terms of the impaired psychic cohesion stemming from this 'developmental' 
trauma, but in relation too to the actual breaking and crossing of his body's boundary 
through the physical and sexual abuse to which Chad was subjected, and the psychic 
rupture to the internal protective shield that these 'external' traumas would constitute 
(Freud, 1920). 
4.2.4 Theme 4: Evacuation of badness (expulsion and projection) 
Having examined Chad's underlying sense of badness and his (more and less 
'successful') attempts to mask this through a second skin formation, I tum now to a 
discussion of the ways in which he attempted to rid himself of this internal badness. This 
occurred through the related processes of bodily evacuation and psychic projection. 
Turning firstly to the role of actual defecation within the therapy process, Chad would 
frequently break the sessions - initially almost every session - with an urgent need for the 
toilet, usually to defecate (the times when he would urinate seemed to be a more 
deliberate and conscious avoidance of material as opposed to urgent unconscious 
evacuation). This occurred in moments when his anxiety was highest, when I was in 
some way challenging him to reflect internally, to acknowledge his inside and use his 
alpha function, and so attempt myself to gain some access into his internal world (Bion, 
1962). Questions or talk or interpretations that challenged him to look inside, to be inside, 
to use and experience an internal reflective space, were profoundly threatening for Chad. 
This could be as simple as a question, any question, a linking of behaviour to feeling, a 
reflection or 'mild' interpretation, linking perhaps a story he has told me to a general 
theme, or talk itself, which required Chad to process, to psychically digest what he or I 
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was saying (ibid.). In response, Chad would urgently rush to the toilet with a very upset 
stomach, and often bad diarrhoea (which I could hear and smell from the door where he 
asked me to wait for him, often for up to ten to fifteen minutes). As he rushed down to 
the toilet, Chad's whole body seemed to flop or dissolve, becoming jelly-like and 
wobbly. Such diarrhoea was not reported to be a problem for Chad at home or at school. 
The absence of an internalised good maternal object or internal containment, seemed to 
mean that Chad couldn't hold anything inside him, everything just poured out of him -
diarrhoea reflecting an inability to hold the nourishing part of food in, absorb it, but 
rather fragmenting this and expelling it as indistinguishable from waste (Bion, 1962). It 
seems that to hold something in mind was too threatening for Chad, forcing him to know 
what was too painful, so this link was attacked and splintered, and the thought or feeling 
concretised and then 'liquidised' into the mushy yucky insides that filled and rushed out 
of him. This process can be understood as a form of anti-anaclisis, a reversal of the 
mind's differentiation from the body, in which they collapsed back into indistinction, and 
alpha elements, instead of being linked to create meaning, became fragmented and turned 
back into disparate beta-elements (Bion, 1962). This may have meant that Chad's body 
came to mirror the 'collapsed' state of his mind, or rather his collapsed-together body-
mind could not hold itself up, could not hold anything in, neither thought or faeces, which 
collapsed into one another and poured out together. In this way, physical in-digestion 
perhaps defended against, replaced, and got rid of, psychic metabolisation. 
This was associated with the loss of the good object along with the riddance of bad. In a 
session at the start of the second year (36), after allowing me to score in sport for the first 
time and then telling me that the ban mustn't go out the window because "it is very 
important to me": 
He talked in great detail about "water poeps" that he had made recently after eating too 
much sweet melon, which he loves. He says that these "poeps just kept coming out", and 
remained in the toilet even when he flushed it. He says he was "very worried that the 
toilet wouldn't come clean ". When I said it seemed like he was worried there was bad 
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stuff inside him that would come out and not be cleaned away, he said yes he was worried 
about "the mess" but that it was "healthy" that it came out. 
The sweet good food that he loved came straight out of him, could not be integrated, held 
there, so was expelled and turned bad. But it could not be gotten rid of, and instead stayed 
there for him to see. This kind of getting out is felt to be healthy. Chad was now bringing 
what he saw and didn't flush away, what he held onto, and bringing it to me in words 
(Bion, 1962). This seemed to be a test of whether I could tolerate, could connect with, the 
yucky stuff that was inside him, that makes him up. And if he 'gets it out' in this way, 
seeing it, in therapy, will this be healthy? Later in the session he spoke about being very 
''worried'' about starting Grade 2 the next day, calling this a "secret" as he was supposed 
to be looking forward to it. He was now able to share verbally this 'bad thing' inside him, 
which he experienced as a feeling (ibid.). 
While this physical evacuation is understood as a means of emptying out his inside for 
fear of exposure of bad, the physical evidence of this, particularly in the form of smell, 
was deeply threatening for Chad. He therefore used the air freshener toilet spray to try 
and disguise this smell, at times spraying this allover his body, and becoming very 
distressed when I tried to set a limit on this, for example (43) crying out "but its stinky". 
He also initiated an elaborate ritual of cleaning his hands after defecating, in which he 
called me into the bathroom and asked my to squeeze soap onto them and help him dry 
them with the towel. While Chad needed privacy while he was in the toilet cubicle so as 
to hide the evidence of his bad stinky insides coming out (on a few occasions I was 
concerned about him and poked my head around the bathroom door to ask if he was ok, 
and he shouted that I must stay out), he needed me to witness his cleansing. Chad's 
digestive disturbances and his shame in relation to them are also understood in relation to 
his history of anal sexual abuse, and in his drawings and games 'bottoms' were often 
identified as being naughty and embarrassing. 
Because of this collapse of distinction between physical and psychical, talk, questions 
and reflections not only threatened to expose Chad's bad insides, but may also have been 
experienced by him as concrete intrusions (Bion, 1962; Segal, 1954/1988). 
102 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Interpretations in particular seemed to be experienced as violations through which I was 
gaining access to, or read, his mind. Thus words were felt to penetrate and wound him in 
a form of repetition of his physical and sexual abuse. As a means of defending himself 
against this wlnerability and violation, Chad projected these feelings, associated with the 
role of victim, onto me, adopting that of aggressor himself. He frequently threatened me 
physically when I asked him a question. For instance (11): 
Chad threatened to hit me in the stomach with the ball if I ask any more questions, saying 
'you mustn't ask someone a lot of questions. They don't like it because they feel bad ". I 
asked if they feel "they are bad" if you ask them questions. He said no, they feel angry. 
In this way, Chad seemed to have turned his sense of badness into anger and rather than 
have his internal world exposed through questions, Chad both shut down the questioning 
and disavowed this internal world. Around the same time (10), when I made reference to 
this internal world by linking behaviour to a feeling, he said "there is nothing inside". I 
had been asking Chad questions which, when he resisted them, I explained I was asking 
in order ''to try and understand what's going on inside you", giving him the example that 
sometimes when he kicked the ball very hard or pulled a particular face I realised that he 
must be feeling angry. This may have been deeply threatening, both because it challenged 
him to experience and know this inside which was felt to be bad, and because this would 
be seen and known by me. The denouncing of his psychic insides enabled their collapse 
into physical insides which could be expelled through defecation. 
This disavowal of his internal world seems to have left Chad stripped of curiosity, of the 
capacity to think and learn, in a state of - K., where an linking, thinking, talking is 
threatening (Bion, 1967). It left him not only with "nothing inside", but with an 'empty 
head'. Around the same time (9), Chad told me that the children at school tease him by 
calling him 'dikkop', which is associated with being 'thick' or 'stupid'. In response, he 
told me that he "forgets what they say". So the pain of an empty head reflected was dealt 
with by further emptying it. When I wondered how it must have felt to be teased like that, 
Chad says, "there is no feelings 'cause sticks and stones can break your bones but words 
can never harm you ". Yet he goes on to say that he hit a "small boy" at school that day. 
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For Chad, words are things, and can do harm, can threaten to break him, so he responds 
by breaking them up and by breaking up those who threaten him or those onto whom he 
can project his vulnerability. Thus words are dealt with physically, splintered and 
expelled through the body, shutting down and beating up, and by filling the space of 
thought with action. As has been discussed, words hurt Chad in therapy too, 
interpretations feeling like concrete invasions. Chad's constant need for activity (mainly 
in the form of sport), seemed to be a means of avoiding and shutting down this pain of 
mental activity, and with this any curiosity and understanding, as wen as a form of direct 
discharge of the split-up beta elements that were the product of this process of reversal of 
alpha functioning (Bion, 1962). 
A further form of attacking and splintering words, which brought together various of 
these mechanisms, was what we came to call "fart language". This occurred over a 
number of sessions at the beginning of the second year of therapy, when Chad would 
respond to me or shut me down by making fafting sounds with his mouth, often loudly 
and repeatedly, right into my face. This occurred at times when he was threatened by 
having to hold onto a position of vulnerability, for instance (41): 
He told me how he had laughed at a "little boy" who he saw in his underwear, and I 
wondered out loud how that little boy felt. Chad responded by saying very anxiously, 
"not sad", and then making his farting noises. When I wondered again what he was 
trying to tell me through these noises, and suggested I would understand better in words, 
he became very angry and punitive, and then rushed off to the toilet where he used a 
great deal of spray. 
So it seems that when he was challenged to be in touch with his own smalllweaklbad-
feeling state, Chad attacked the words that threatened to link him to this, reducing 
language to flatus (Bion, 1962), emptying it of meaning and expelling it not through his 
anus but through his mouth. This created another form of anti-digestion in which the 
mouth was turned into a kind of anus, scrambling and excreting rather than forming and 
containing words. This gave rise to a form of 'verbal diarrhoea' in which language 
became discarded waste which blocked, rather than enabled, communication. 
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But farts held other, shifting, functions over the course of therapy_ During the early 
stages, Chad would occasionally ask me whether my nose was blocked, and as it so 
happened it always was! When I asked why, he would always answer something like 
"good, then you won't smell if I made a stinky fart" (11). This seemed an expression of 
his anxiety that I would flnd out about and come to experience his stinky, bad inside, and 
not be able to bear it - might perhaps be disgusted by it. When I asked what it means if 
someone is stinky, he said (12) ''they can't help it". It also seems that he was afraid of 
contaminating my body with his (Kristeva, 1980/2004). A number of times, Chad 
expressed his sense that my body was 'pure' and 'healthy', while his was stinky and 
contaminated. For example (53), when I followed him in taking off his shoes and 
emptying the "dirt" from them into the bin (in an attempt to show that I, too, had dirty 
shoes, and that it was okay to contain and express this), he said that my feet are "clean" 
and his "dirty". In another example (16) he said that he must drink water ''to be healthy" 
but I don't have to "'cause you're healthy". This anxiety about contaminating other's 
purity was also expressed in Chad's fascination with the idea of contagion. For example, 
around this time (15): 
Chad spoke with great energy of a little girl who had chicken pox at school, and the ways 
in which one could and could not ca ch this disease, but particularly how one could 
"pass on the germs" without knowing it. He said that "if you have had the sickness it's as 
if you're invisible ". 
Chad may have been afraid not only of the effects of the visible evidence of his 'stinky' 
insides in the form of faeces (and his skin which is felt to reveal these), but with unseen 
signs of these, such as farts. These might infect others unknowingly, and so overwhelm 
their bodies as his mother might have been felt to be overwhelmed by projected beta 
elements (Bion, 1962). 
Yet speaking about it seemed to shift something for Chad. During this discussion about 
illness (15): 
Chad made aloud fart, and when he asked as usual if my nose was blocked I told him for 
the first time (as this was honestly the case), rather tentatively, that today I could smell a 
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bit, adding that maybe he's worried that if I find out he's stinky I won't want to be near 
him. He said no, he wanted me to smell his stinky fart, "'cause then you'll know how it 
feels!" I said that if I can smell his stinky fart then I will understand what it's like to be 
him. He said yes. Later that session, he went on to speak more about the content of his 
past, and for the first time in ages he did not go to the toilet. 
In the period following this session, Chad repeatedly asked me if I could smell his "stinky 
farts", and continued to be delighted every time, repeatedly saying that it is ''the first 
time" I have smelled him and that now I "know how it feels" (17). It seemed that for the 
'first time' Chad was allowing himself to be known, not through the defensive second 
skin of compliant goodness or controlling badness (Bick, 196711988), but as he felt 
himself to be. This knowledge was on the one hand very concrete: in physically taking 
into my body his actual stink, I would experience what it is like to have a stinky inside. 
At the same time, Chad was possibly asking me not only to ingest his stinkiness, but to 
digest these expelled beta-elements such that they could be transformed into alpha 
elements (Bion, 1962). This would enable me to make meaning of his experience of 
internal stinkiness and come to know not just his body but his self. No longer afraid of 
contaminating my body with his stink, he now trusted that this was bearable for me, that I 
could in fact contain this for him. In this way Chad was allowing me to resume the 
function of reverie, which for him was modelled on the physical intake and processing 
(ibid.). This was associated with licence to bring bad/rude/forbidden stuff, for example in 
one session (21) singing a "rude" song, repeatedly saying "ass hole", and then telling me 
about a music video in which people are dancing about, and "you can see their bums, 
shaking about". He began to tolerate questions, talking and thinking a little more, and 
began to talk himself about some of the content of his traumatic past. 
Over the course of therapy, this theme of faeces and farting gradually changed from 
concrete to symbolised form, starting to appear in play and drawings and in Chad's 
growing capacity to talk about his 'yucky' feelings. Associated with this was a gradual 
ability to hold within him, rather than splitting apart, states of goodness and badness 
(Klein in Segal, 1973). For example, in a play sequence with the toy animals (51): 
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Chad explained that the two lions were brothers, and he kept saying that one was good 
and the other bad, and then these reversed and got increasingly interchangeable. Then he 
continued playing with only one of the lions. A monkey came to «help" this lion, offering 
him a chocolate, which Chad said was his "favourite food". After making the lion 'eat' 
the chocolate, Chad said quite lightly that it was "actually popo ". Then more animals 
arrived and they got into a fight and when this lion's "stomach got kicked in" Chad 
exclaimed that "all the blood and popo comes out!" I said that both the good stuff and 
the bad stuff are together in one animal. 
It seems that the two lion brothers, initially split between good and bad, were integrated 
into one, which then contained both good and bad. The 'favourite food', given out of 
helpfulness, seems to have been 'digested' by the lion, turning it to faeces. This 'popo' 
was not immediately evacuated, but was held inside the lion's body along with it's blood, 
the stuff of life. While the exposure of this inside still felt violently painful, it was 
perhaps tolerable because what was revealed was not only badness. Around this time, 
Chad started going to the toilet less frequently, and when he did, would use the toilet 
spray to a lesser extent, suggesting a lowering of the need to disguise evidence of his 
stinky insides. He also began to tolerate making mistakes and losing games, and showed 
a decreased need to control me. A more reciprocal relationship became possible. He was 
able to express difficult feelings more directly, in words rather than bodily. For example, 
in the first of these sessions in which he did not go to the toilet (58): 
Chad says in anger, "I'm not your baby and I'm not your slave! I'm here 'cause I have a 
problem, and it hasn't gone away - I get angry!" 
His problem had not disappeared by being flushed out of his body and flushed down the 
toilet, but was now being owned and faced and expressed with words and real feeling. 
directly to me. 
Turning now from the motif of bodily evacuation to that of psychic projection in this 
theme of the riddance of badness, I return to the dialectic, explored in part above, through 
which Chad shut down talking, questioning and thinking by 'bullying' me, adopting the 
role of aggressor and projecting that of victim onto me. This occurred in many sessions, 
107 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
particularly during the second half of the first year, in which he would kick things and 
throw toys around, would threaten to hurt me, and would above all shout and scream at 
me, telling me stop to talking, stop looking at him, to close my eyes and block my ears, 
and at times to actually "stop having thoughts in your head". I would feel terrified, 
terribly shut down, and would struggle desperately to resist this, to maintain the function 
of reverie (Bion, 1962). Often I felt unable to do so, felt overwhelmed and quite unable to 
think. Through his bullying and through projective identification, Chad seemed to be 
communicating and evoking in me an experience of extreme helplessness which must 
have been his, particularly I felt in relation to the sadistic forms of punishment to which 
he was subjected, as well as earlier experiences of nameless dread when his 
overwhelming fears were not contained by his mother. My overwhelmed response to this 
seems to have constituted a repetition of this failure of containment, and perhaps 
confirmed for Chad a deep fear that his feelings were too much for the adults around him, 
and couldn't be digested and made manageable by them, but were rather returned further 
stripped of meaning (Bion, 1962). This was expressed by Chad when he cried out once in 
the middle of such an attack that I "can't handle" him (21). Around the same time (23), in 
an example mentioned above, again in the midst of a barrage of shouting and screaming 
at me, Chad cried out poignantly, "don't be scared of me". 
Here Chad seemed to be caning for me not to be subjected to this state of thought-less 
terror, to resist his shutting down of my containing capacities (Bion, 1962). However, 
when I was more able to hold onto these, to receive his violent communication but to 
keep thinking and find some space inside me within which to hold this, this too became 
terrifying for him, as it held the risk of being known that he had originally attacked. This 
left us in a vicious cycle whereby the alpha functioning that he needed to curb his 
enactment further fuelled it: he began by attacking the links that might lead to 
understanding, but the devastation that this fragmentation left us with, the splintered beta-
elements, required alpha functioning to be cohered and contained (ibid.). One of the 
ways in which I would resist being completely shut down by Chad in these interactions 
was to speak to the experience of the victim (for example, saying that it is very scary to 
be shouted at like that, or it makes me feel sore inside when I can never get things right), 
and so resist being completely overwhelmed by it. But this challenged Chad to hear and 
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hold onto the experience of victim while enacting that of aggressor, which he had 
defensively split from each other (Klein in Segal, 1973). He would then break down, and 
weep distraughtly, collapsed back into the role of victim, my words wounding him. He 
would cry out that I was doing something very terrible to him, was making him cry, and I 
would again feel like an abuser. There seemed no easy way out of this dialectic, only the 
challenge to continue feeling and surviving what he needed me to bear for him, as wen as 
to keep thinking and making meaning of this - despite the fact that the two processes felt 
directly contradictory so much of the time. 
In conclusion, this theme has explored Chad's attempts to get rid of badness through the 
related processes of bodily evacuation and psychic projection (Freud in Laplanche & 
Pontalis, 1973; Klein in Segal, 1973). These have been found to entail a reversal from 
alpha to beta functioning in which psychic products are subjected to physical discarding 
through defecation and fafting, alongside the psychological projection of the undesirable 
roles of victim and 'baddie' (Bion, 1962). I have identified the shifting meaning of these 
forms of elimination through the course of therapy: in relation to Chad's anxiety about 
exposure of his bad inside, which is therefore 'emptied out'; as a form of direct discharge 
of splintered beta-elements; as a means of avoiding alpha functioning in the form of 
talking and thinking by actually breaking the session and by reducing language to flatus; 
as well as a gradual desire to be known and understood, and a communication of what is 
inside through bodily waste. As a result of this in-digestion, in which an goodness and 
meaning was attacked, stripped away and evacuated along with the badness felt to be 
inside him, rather than 'absorbed' or integrated, Chad seemed to have been left emptied 
out, denuded not only of the badness he sought to expel but of good internal objects. (It is 
this emptiness that Chad attempted to fill by the physical nourishment referred to in 
Theme 2). Words and questions were explored as having exposed his bad insides, leading 
to concrete evacuation, and as concrete intrusions leading to psychic projection. Farts 
were understood as a means of emptying meaning, as threatening exposure of and 
contamination from the bad inside, and eventually as a communication of his internal 
badness. 
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4.3 Conclusion 
This analysis of the case material has identified four inter-related themes which have 
been examined through the lens of the reviewed psychoanalytic literature on the role of 
the body in conditions of containment and traumatisation. The first two themes examined 
the absence of the good object: fIrstly in relation to Chad's expression of having initially 
lacked, and now needing, maternal care which once newly experienced, he fears losing, 
before intemalising a maternal object for himself (Anzieu, 1989; Bick, 1967/1988; Bion, 
1962; Winnicott in Davis & Wallbridge, 1981); secondly in relation to Chad's seemingly 
insatiable desire for material nourishment during therapy, and the interplay between 
bodily incorporation and psychic introjection (Bion, 1962; Freud in Laplanche & 
Pontalis, 1973; Klein in Segal, 1973). Tracked across both these themes was Chad's 
gradual shift from attempts to replace his losses through symbolic equation, and so deny 
the absence of the lost good object (associated with paranoid-schizoid functioning), to his 
symbolisation of this absence (associated with the depressive position capacity for 
integration) (Segal, 1954/1988). The second two themes related to the presence of the bad 
object: the third theme in terms of Chad's experience of his physical skin as revealing the 
badness he felt to be inside him, and his attempts to mask this through a defensive 
'second skin' (Anzieu, 1989; Bick, 1967/1988; Kristeva, 1980/2004); the fourth theme 
relating to Chad's concrete expulsion and psychic projection of this bad inside, through 
faeces and farting on the one hand and re-enactment and projective identifIcation on the 
other (Bion, 1962; Freud in Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973; Klein in Segal, 1973). Traced 
across these latter two themes was Chad's gradual shift from evacuation to 
communication, from terror of and attacks on knowing, to a tentative desire to be known. 
In the following chapter, I draw together these four themes to summarise the fmdings of 
this analysis in the light of the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, as well as evaluating that 
literature in relation to these fmdings. I then discuss limitations to this study, and, fInally, 
provide recommendations for future research and practice. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this study, I have drawn together previously disparate threads of psychoanalytic 
thinking on the role of the body in trauma and containment to make sense of the whole of 
what often felt like a disjointed and bewildering therapeutic process with a multiply 
traumatised child. In this way, the theoretical lens has performed a containing and 
integrative function. While this process was very useful for me as a trainee therapist, and 
I feel in some way retrospectively meaningful for Chad, the more broadly useful finding 
of this study is considered to be the robustness of the theoretical lens in accounting for a 
wide range of what previously felt like confusing and dispersed case material. In this 
sense, the case analysis has served to illustrate and to demonstrate the utility and 
explanatory power of this theoretical framework, rather than to add something new to 
this. The usefulness of this literary lens was found to lie in its bringing together of a 
number of disparate, although conceptually related, theories spanning the last hundred 
years and more of psychoanalytic thinking. While Bion's model formed the core of the 
analysis, the integration of the work of other theorists to create a broader framework was 
found to enable a more nuanced and cohered reading of the case material as a whole, 
indicating the robustness of this lens in making meaning of therapeutic work with a 
multiply traumatised child. In this chapter, I summarise these fmdings by reviewing the 
relationships between, and roles of, the different theories in analysing aspects of the case 
material. I then identify the limitationS of this study. Finally, recommendations are made 
for future research and clinical practice. 
5.1 Summary of findings 
Bion's thinking formed the basis of this analysis, into which the work of the other 
theorists was integrated. His conception of containment and the consequences when this 
goes wrong ('developmental' trauma) or is later eroded (,external' trauma), in terms of 
the interplay between physical and mental alimentation, brings together the components 
of the central question of the role of the body in the reciprocal conditions of containment 
and traumatisation. Central to the analysis then was Bion's (1962) model of mentalis at ion 
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as an adaptation and abstraction of metabolisation, which therefore provides both the 
actual developmental bodily basis, and a metaphor with rich explanatory power, for 
psychic processing. In this process, raw sensory and somatic experiences, or beta-
elements, are 'digested' through the alpha function to create alpha elements that are of 
meaningful mental form, and which can be linked together to enable thinking and 
dreaming, creating a protective alpha screen. Bion understood that before the infant has 
his own alpha function, he digests his experiences through his mother's mental 
alimentary system. This is the process of maternal containment, through which the 
mother receives, bears, emotionally thinks about, and so makes meaning of, her infant's 
intense and overwhelming feelings and fears. These she returns to him modified through 
this process, in a mental form. The infant can then re-introject both his initial fears made 
more manageable, and the containing function itself, which forms the basis fore the 
development of his own alpha function, or internal containment. 
I now examine the specific aspects of this theory that were found to be useful in 
interpreting case material from each of the four themes of the analysis. Into this will be 
woven the work of the other theorists, and their links as wen as additions to Bion's 
thinking will be summarised. I will begin by discussing Theme 1 (Chad's relationship to 
the maternal object) and Theme 3 (Chad's sense of selt), which together focussed on the 
relationship between mother and child, explored through the central motif of skin. I then 
discuss Theme 2 (intake of goodness) and Theme 4 (riddance of badness), which together 
focussed on the relationship between body and mind, explored through the central motif 
of digestion. In the first pair of themes, the work of Bick, Anzieu and Winnicott was 
added to that of Bion. In the second pair, the work of Freud and Klein provided a 
background to Bion's concepts. Across all four, Segal and Kristeva's thinking was 
included in specific places. 
The first and third themes were analysed through Bion's (1962) concept of containment, 
and specifically the state of maternal reverie. In the first theme, aspects of Chad's 
behaviour and play were interpreted as expressions of the initial absence of, and now 
need for, maternal containment. His various play sequences with the baby doll were 
understood as communication of the pain of having lacked maternal love and 
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understanding, and his tentative curiosity about, and desire to experience, this. His 
repeated requests for me to 'be there' and in so doing, repair what felt to be broken within 
him, were understood as calls for maternal reverie, to receive and bear and survive, as 
well as make meaning of, his painful, bad-feeling experiences and anxieties. The 
devastating consequences when he felt I was not there, particularly after breaks in therapy 
when he feared I had not held him in mind (expressed in relation to the physical 
containment of the therapy room) were understood to perpetuate this failure as I tried to 
reassure and 'take away', rather than receive, bear and so contain them. This was felt to 
confirm his early experience that his feelings were unbearable to others, and so 
unknowable in himself. This seemed to have left him in a state of 'nameless dread', out 
of which he expressed his anxiety that I could not handle him and was afraid of him. 
Within this first theme, various theories were used in conjunction with Bion's concept of 
maternal containment to enable a broader reading of the various implications of impaired 
maternal skin functions as expressed by Chad through the motif of brokenness and fIxing. 
The brokenness was understood as a reflection of a porous and unintact Skin Ego 
(Anzieu, 1989), and what Bick (1967/1988) understood as a state of unintegration 
resulting from the failure of the primary skin function, through which an infant would 
initially feel passively held together. His sticking activities were read in relation to 
Chad's consequent attempts to cohere himself internally, as well as to fIx himself to me 
in what Bick called an adhesive attachment, fearing further loss of this newly found 
maternal object before he had securely internalised his own. This was simultaneous 
interpreted as an attempt to recreate what Anzieu (1989) identifIes as a phantasy of 
common skin which Chad had apparently sought with Natasha too. Winnicott's concept 
of maternal holding and the interplay between separation and connection across the 
potential space were used to understand Chad's play sequences with the 'umbilical' toy 
snake as transitional object. 
The third theme explored the consequences of these impaired maternal functions for 
Chad's sense of himself. Here Bion's understanding that disruptions to the container-
contained leave the child with a sense of damage within themselves was understood as 
the basis for Chad's profound sense of inherent badness. The defensive structure he 
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developed to disguise this was understood through Bick's (1967/1988) concept of a 
defensive second skin, here manifesting in Chad's identification with goodness and 
strength, and controlling and bullying behaviour. This musculature was understood to 
mask the state of fragility and lack of cohesion identified in the first theme as a state of 
unintegration (Bick, 1967/1988) and of a porous, uncohered Skin Ego (Anzieu, 1989). 
Chad's profound anxieties about his physical skin and associated use of the colour black 
were made sense of through the understanding that his bodily skin reflected the fragility 
of his Skin Ego, exposing rather than protecting his bad and broken-feeling insides -
which he attempted to hide through his defensive second skin. Segal's distinction 
between symbolic equation and symbolisation proper and Kristeva's concept of 
abjection, were drawn on in interpreting Chad's changing relationship to the materials in 
the therapy room. These were initially experienced as a failure of his skin to hold in his 
gooey yucky insides, with which the materials were equated, but gradually came to be 
used to represent this internal world. 
I now turn to the role of theory in interpreting case material in the second and fourth 
themes of the analysis, which focussed on the relationship between body and mind, 
explored through the central motif of digestion: Theme 2 in relation to food and the 
intake of goodness, and Theme 3 in relation to faeces and the riddance of badness. In 
these two themes, Bion's theories were used against the backdrop of Freud and Klein's, 
and so their role in reading the case material will therefore be summarised first, as wen as 
mentioning those of Segal and Kristeva. The analysis of the relationship between 
processes of bodily incorporationlexpulsion and psychic intemalisationlprojection was 
based on Freud's theory of the anaclitic relationship between psyche and soma, the body 
providing the basis for the development of the ego, and the differentiation between them 
being a developmental achievement which collapses under trauma. Thus Chad's seeking 
of emotional nourishment through material means was understood as a reflection of his 
fixation in and regression to the oral stage of libidinal development, in which Freud 
understood milk and love to be initially entwined. His gradual capacity for psychic 
introjection could then develop out of this initial need for bodily incorporation. Similarly, 
Chad's attempts to rid himself of unbearable feelings by concrete evacuation was 
understood in relation to Freud's concept of the anal stage of libidinal development, in 
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which he sought to reject through bodily means what he could not recognise in himself. 
This was associated with controlling behaviour and the psychic projection of unwanted 
parts of himself. This reverting of the mind back to its bodily basis was understood as the 
reversal of the anaclitic relationship between them. Layered upon this was Klein's model 
of the role of the maternal body in these processes, from which goodness is eaten, and 
into which badness is expelled. In addition, Segal's distinction between symbolic 
equation and symbolisation proper was used to interpret the shifting meaning of food, 
which Chad initially required concretely to replace and so deny the absent good object, 
but which he gradually came to use symbolically to represent his psychic intemalisation 
of this. Kristeva's concept of abjection was drawn on in understanding Chad's fears of 
contamination and contaminating. 
Like Freud and Klein, Bion understood that body and mind, milk and love, are initially 
indistinguishable, and are introjected as such, concretely, in the form of the good breast. 
Bion understood the differentiation between physical and psychic to occur when, under 
conditions of manageable frustration, the absence of the good breast is made bearable by 
the evolution of a thought to flll the gap of the absent thing. In this way, the thought of 
the good breast is able to satisfy the infant in the absence of the physical satisfaction 
provided by the real milk. Without this capacity, the absent good breast is experienced as 
the presence of a bad breast, which must be concretely evacuated through defecation. 
And when frustration is not manageable by thought, either because of the disruption of 
this function in the infant or the fact that the frustration is too great to be tolerated in this 
way, the psyche would become fined with concrete bad objects (absent good objects), or 
beta-elements, instead of thoughts. These are fit only for evacuation, through direct 
discharge, acting out or excessive projective identification that erodes rather than enables 
communication. These beta-elements accumulate to form a rigid yet chaotic beta-screen 
in which thinking is attacked as it threatens to link together understanding which, in the 
absence of an apparatus for psychic digestion, is too painful to bear, and so is split up and 
broken to pieces. 
The case material in Themes 2 and 4 was interpreted through Bion's understanding that 
under such circumstances, the psychical will collapse back into the physical, such that 
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emotional sustenance will be sought through bodily or material gratification, and 
emotional pain will be evacuated through bodily or direct discharge. Thus Chad's initial 
insatiable craving for food and drink were understood as expressions of the absence of an 
internalised maternal object, and therefore of a desperate need to fill himself with 
concrete goodness from the outside world. This was understood to articulate with the 
actual material deprivation he had suffered. Chad's defecation was understood as a means 
of ridding himself of unwanted thoughts that he had reduced to faeces, his diarrhoea 
reflecting this failure to assimilate goodness, the denuding of meaning. This left Chad in 
a situation where the love and understanding he so badly needed could not be provided 
through the food and drink (beta elements) by which he sought them, while the emotional 
provision of the therapy, particularly my moves towards understanding him (alpha 
functions), were deeply threatening and so were reduced to faeces (beta elements) and 
expelled as such. Yet gradually Chad did start to tolerate and seek out knowing, 
communicating his previously disavowed internal world, initially in the bodily form of 
farting, and then more psychically directly through verbal expression of his feelings. This 
was associated with a shift from a narrative of emptiness and craving to that of fullness 
and satisfaction that was understood to reflect Chad's gradual psychic introjection of the 
good containing object. 
In conclusion, the fmdings of this study illustrate the potential usefulness and robustness 
of this integrated theoretical frame in making meaning of a large amount of complex and 
potentially confusing therapeutic material in a case of child maltreatment. Drawing 
together and applying these various psychoanalytic understandings of the role of the body 
in the reciprocal conditions of containment and traumatisation has helped me to 
understand and explain, and so to digest and contain, therapeutic processes and dynamics 
that at the time often felt incomprehensible and overwhelming. I therefore feel that this 
body of literature might similarly be useful for others working with multiply traumatised 
children, both those working within a psychoanalytic frame, and outside of this. I return 
to this in my recommendations, but firstly discuss limitations of this study. 
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5.1 Limitations of the study 
I now discuss a number of limitations to this study, which pertain to its generalisability, 
validity and objectivity, the use of a particular theoretical frame and the associated 
selection of specific data to analyse, the socio-political context of this study, and finally 
the fonn of this written dissertation in relation to the subject matter. 
While the findings of this case study are generalisable to theory (Yin, 2003) as noted in 
Chapter 3, the N = 1 design limits generalisability to other such cases. This means that 
inferences drawn about psychotherapeutic work with child trauma survivors cannot stand 
alone, but win only be meaningful in conjunction with other such case studies (Fishman, 
2005). The dearth of these further limits the utility of this research in this regard. 
The validity of this psychoanalytic case study is limited in its reliance on relatively 
subjective, although theoretically and clinically infonned, judgement of "coherence of 
argument, comprehensiveness of explanation, consistency with accepted psychological 
knowledge, and the aesthetic beauty of the analysis in disclosing previously hidden 
patterns in the material being investigated" (Attwood & Stolorow, 1993 p.29). While my 
subjective experience in my joint roles as therapist and researcher has been utilised as a 
source of infonnation in this study, this limits the objectivity of the findings. Moreover, 
in drawing on my counter-transference experiences in analysing the case material, 
distinction between what aris s as a response to the client's internal world, and what 
reflects my own, is inevitably blurred. 
The adoption of this particular theoretical frame of psychoanalytic understandings of the 
role of the body in processes of containment and traumatisation, necessarily omits other 
readings of the case material, which may complement or contradict the current one. 
Similarly, the synthesis of disparate theories reviewed into a Unified lens through which 
the data have been analysed does not account for discrepancies or contradictions between 
these. And correspondingly, selection of data for analysis has been made on the basis of 
what resonates with this unified theoretical frame, which means leaving out a great deal 
of additional case material that may have produced alternative meanings, or introduced 
dissonances into the findings. This emphasis on integration in the literature review and 
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analysis is perhaps appropriate in relation to the central theme of containment, but 
excludes the disruption to this cohesion that might be associated with the workings of 
trauma. 
This study is also limited by its focus on interpersonal and intrapsychic traumas and 
processes without situating these in the wider socio-economic and political context. This 
meant that the impact of the environment of poverty and marginalisation into which Chad 
was born was not accounted for in understanding the • developmental' or 'external' 
traumas to which he was subjected. Omitted therefore was a discussion of the interactions 
between the personal psychological, and cultural and contextual, meanings of many of 
the concepts discussed, such as Chad's skin colour, his relationship to food and to 
defecation. and his need to control and bully. 
Finally, I am left with some sense of contradiction in writing with words about inherently 
non-verbal, pre-verbal. even anti-verbal processes of messy materiality and bodily 
experience. While the process of making meaning from the raw data has felt analogous to 
the process of containment by which sensory and somatic beta-elements are transfonned 
into mental alpha-elements, the fmal fonn of this dissertation clearly privileges the latter. 
The very act of writing necessarily coheres and makes sense of disparate, nonsensical, 
crude or concrete things that would themselves undercut language and meaning, but 
cannot be captured by it. States of not knowing cannot be written about without making 
them known. This is of course not a solvable dilemma. but one that feels important to 
acknowledge and 'be with'. 
5.3 Recommendations 
The fmdings of this study, while limited in their representivity, indicate some tentative 
recommendations for theory and practice. 
With regard to theory, while this study provided a review of the many disparate 
references to the role of the body in containment and traumatisation in psychoanalytic 
thinking, these were integrated only implicitly through their application as a unified 
frame through which the case material was analysed. In the light of the usefulness of this 
theoretical lens in making meaning of this therapeutic process, it is felt that further work 
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is called for in drawing this 'body' of literature (so to speak!) together more explicitly, 
and in so doing clarifying its utility as an integrated model, as well as identifying points 
of divergence within it. Similarly, while this study made implicit links between the 
reviewed literature on early development and the therapeutic process, it is felt that a 
review and formulation of the implications of psychoanalytic understandings of the 
relationship between body and mind for psychoanalytic therapy with child trauma 
survivors would be very useful. Relatedly, while this study acknowledged the layered 
implications of what was denoted 'developmental' and 'external' trauma, the analysis 
privileged the former in focusing on the role of maternal containment in the therapy 
process. A more detailed exploration of the interplay between the bodily meanings and 
metaphors explored in relation to containment, and the actual bodily violations or 
omissions, with their psychological sequelae, involved in the different forms of child 
maltreatment, could build on the ideas explored in this study. This would involve a more 
in-depth linking of the 'external' traumas of abuse and neglect to the concrete and 
material, as wen as metaphoric and psychic, meanings of bodily intake and expulsion, of 
digestion, and of the skin as a piercable boundary of the body and self, which were here 
explored primarily in relation to the 'developmental' trauma of inadequate containment. 
To this could be usefully added an exploration of the interactions between these 
intrapsychic and interpersonal processes with the social processes of marginalisation and 
the marking of bodies, and the weighty meanings of skins in this country. 
Recommendations for clinical practice are made in the light of the recognition, as 
outlined in the Introduction to this dissertation, that child maltreatment constitutes a crisis 
in South Africa. For most of the multiply traumatised children who present to mental 
health services in this country, long-term psychoanalytic therapy is not a possibility (both 
because of lack of resources and because this may not be the most suitable treatment 
option). However, it is felt that the theoretical frame that really helped me to make 
meaning of what at the time often felt like incomprehensible and overwhelming 
therapeutic material, could be usefully applied in other forms of child interventions. In 
particular, I feel that the motifs of skin and of digestion could provide a useful metaphor 
to assist care workers and counselors in making sense of the presentations and behavior 
of traumatised children they work with, as well as the feelings and responses this elicits 
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within them. This would involve an accessible explanation of psychoanalytic 
understandings of the actual bodily processes, as well as the symbolic and psychological 
meanings, of skin and of digestion in this work. The potential value and explanatory 
power of such a model is felt to lie in its capacity to capture complex psychological 
processes in a concrete way, which would therefore make psychoanalytic theory 
accessible to a wider range of mental health workers across different settings. The 
language of taking food into, and expelling faeces out of, the body, and the role of the 
skin as boundary, could then help make sense both of actual material phenomena in 
therapy, and be used as metaphors for the powerful psychic processes and dynamics 
likely to be experienced in working with multiply traumatised children. And this 
understanding might, as it did for me, help careworkers and counselors digest and 
integrate, and so contain, what may often feel like fragmented and bewildering 
therapeutic material. However, these recommendations remain tentative, as additional 
case studies of therapeutic work with children who have been multiply maltreated are 
needed to further explore the ideas presented here. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study has found the integrated body of psychoanalytic literature on the 
relationship between psyche and soma under conditions of containment and 
traumatisation to be a useful and robust frame through which to make meaning of what 
had been a confusing and disjointed corpus of case material from a long-term therapy 
process with a multiply maltreated child. While bearing in mind the various identified 
limitations to this study, these findings tentatively indicate further areas of theoretical 
exploration and practical application. 
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APPENDIX: CONSENT FORM 
Department of Psychology 
University of Cape Town 
MA (Clinical Psychology) Research Project 
CONSENT FORM 
I, _____ -', understand that Anya Subotzky intends to write her master's research 
project on her therapy process with my nephew _____ _ 
I have been informed that the aim of this study is to examine the use of such a therapy 
process with children who have a history of traumatic experiences in South Africa. 
I am aware that ______ identity will be protected, and that all identifying details 
will be changed in the research report. 
I also understand that this project will not entail any other procedure apart from the 
existing therapy process, which began in April 2006 and is due to continue until 
December 2007. 
In my capacity as primary caretaker for my nephew, , I give consent for 
this study to take place. I am aware that I may withdraw this consent at any stage should 
this become necessary. 
Signed: 
Date: 
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